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Abstract 
 
Creative Destruction: Memory, Public Finance, and the State in New York City 
 
by 
 
Keerthi Choudary Potluri 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric  
 
Designated Emphasis in Women, Gender & Sexuality 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Samera Esmeir and Professor Michael Watts, Co-chairs 
 
 
This dissertation demonstrates how the neoliberal state marshals public finance and public 
memory to incorporate itself into the contemporary urban landscape.  It investigates sites in the 
built environment where the state deploys public funds to subsidize private construction projects 
that are fiscally unsound, using the institutional form of the public authority to covertly mediate 
between itself and the private sector. Combining discursive analysis of news media, funding 
allocation records, and the sites themselves, it looks at the World Trade Center reconstruction, a 
bus depot in Harlem, and Freshkills Park in Staten Island, a former landfill, and examines the 
effects of these projects both on urban space and public memory itself.  The dissertation argues 
that the state uses public funds to inaugurate sites of memory in the city’s cultural and political 
landscape in order to assert its ethical and political legitimacy in a moment when that legitimacy 
is bound up in its relationship to private capital. This is an unexpected manifestation of what 
Marx and Schumpeter describe as “creative destruction” – the destruction of capital necessary to 
the continuation of capitalism – but what the dissertation shows is that this process not only 
sustains capitalist economy, but also removes democratic participation from planning the built 
environment while regenerating the state’s failing legitimacy in times of fiscal crisis.  The 
dissertation employs historical and archival research on public authorities, including the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and qualitative research, such as personal interviews 
with project planners, neighborhood residents, tourists, state officials, and activists.  By showing 
that state projects of memorialization are central to mediating between private interests and the 
capitalist state, it contributes to scholarship in state theory, urban planning, and material culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Urbanism … might be defined as the instrumental theory and practice of constructing the city as 
memorial of itself.1    
 
 
Since the New Deal, we have come to think of public building projects as embodiments 
of civic spirit and a benevolent state.  Today it could be said that the reverse is true, as the 
visibility of similar public projects in the U.S. has diminished. With the growth of public-private 
partnerships, the boundary between the two blurs. Given these changes, to what extent do the 
way new things are built with public funds constitute a reflection of general interest and public 
good, as argued about the New Deal era?  Does this reflection persist amid the conflicts over 
space and place that characterize the contemporary global city?  What work does the neoliberal 
state accomplish when it finances such projects?  If the general interest is no longer central to 
financing public projects, what work does the state accomplish when financing them? And might 
this fiscal activity be constitutive of the state itself? 
In the midst of an economic recession and active warfare, domestic construction projects 
in the United States continue to slowly advance, such as levee-repair in New Orleans, work on 
the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, and the building of a bicycle boulevard in Austin, TX.2  
Recent U.S. history includes such controversial projects as the Alaskan “bridge to nowhere” 
made famous on the 2008 presidential campaign trail, which proposed building a $233 million 
bridge to serve between a town of 8,900 and an island of 50 people and 1 airport. Notably, some 
of these projects are built on sites of ruins and historical injuries.  Yet, the state justification for 
such public constructions cites an ethical commitment to the public good.   
The U.S. is in an infrastructural crisis from which New York City, the setting of this 
dissertation, is not exempted, with serious threats posed by such things as the aging water 
drainage pipes in the subway system.  Though it is the largest city in the world’s largest national 
economy, it also has the highest income gap of any other U.S. city and contains the poorest 
county in the country, the Bronx.3  Building in New York City – one of the most densely-
populated and unequal cities in the U.S. – has the potential to serve either the highest capital 
interests or public interest, often within the same block.  Therefore, the funding decisions the 
state makes also indicate its ideological priorities. 
This dissertation investigates the nexus between the state, finance capital, public memory, 
and the urban built environment of New York City.  It probes how the state rhetorically 
harnesses immaterial categories like ethics and memory to renew itself politically and 
economically, particularly in times of fiscal crisis.  Each chapter identifies sites where the state’s 
legitimacy is called into question and points to the ways “creative destruction” operates as a 
state-preserving strategy.  Creative destruction is typically understood to be the process by which 
                                                
1 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 179. 
2 The Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) were New Deal-era 
agencies established to stimulate the American economy in the midst of the Great Depression, existing until 1939 
and 1943, respectively.  The legacy of the New Deal and these agencies can be noted throughout New York City, 
but I will be focusing on present-day projects that resemble those taken on by the PWA and WPA. 
3 1% of the city’s population earned 45% of its income in 2007, versus 23.5% nationwide.  About 1 million 
households in the city earn $10,000 per year.  Statistics from “City’s extreme rich-poor divide” by Bill Sanderson 
and Amber Sutherland, New York Post, Jan 19, 2011. 
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destruction is instrumental to the regeneration of the economy.  The dissertation reveals this 
process to be regenerative of the state.   
Ira Katznelson has most recently argued that the contradictions of contemporary 
liberalism are rooted in the compromises struck during the New Deal.4  The championing of a 
public good is central to state legitimacy yet the pursuit of it runs counter to neoliberal political 
economy today.  Bringing the public authorities borne of the New Deal into the neoliberal 
present is the goal of this dissertation.  I focus on New York City because it offers several sites 
that bring together such institutions, finance capital, and urban palimpsests of memory, 
particularly as they call up notions of a commons.  It is also the site of exceptional projects, like 
the National September 11 Memorial Museum, the most expensive museum in human history, 
constructed amid urban austerity measures, as well as everyday battles for public memory, as at a 
city bus depot in Harlem. 
 The project demonstrates how the neoliberal state marshals public finance and public 
memory to incorporate itself into the contemporary urban landscape.  In particular, I investigate 
sites in the built environment where the state deploys public funds to subsidize private 
construction projects that are fiscally unsound, using the institutional form of the public authority 
to covertly mediate between itself and the private sector. Combining discursive analysis of news 
media, funding allocation records, and the sites themselves, I look at the World Trade Center 
reconstruction, the National September 11 Memorial and Museum, a bus depot in Harlem, and 
Freshkills Park in Staten Island, a former landfill, and examine the effects of these projects both 
on urban space and public memory itself.  The dissertation argues that the state uses public funds 
to inaugurate sites of memory in the city’s cultural and political landscape and in the process 
asserts its ethical and political legitimacy, in a moment when state power maintains an intimate 
relationship to private capital. This is an unexpected manifestation of what Marx and Schumpeter 
describe as creative destruction – the destruction of capital necessary to the continuation of the 
economics of capitalism.  What I show is that this process not only sustains capitalist economy, 
but also removes democratic participation from planning the built environment while 
regenerating the state’s failing legitimacy in times of fiscal crisis.   
 New York City politics are multi-layered, with many actors of different political 
affiliations, such as local political figures who do not hold office, city councilmen, MTA 
officials, state-wide representatives, and even politicians based in Washington.  This project does 
not focus on the specificities of the matrix of actors that inhabit the U.S. state, but instead 
differentiates between the state as an entity and the exercise of state power by political actors.  
Many of the people in conversation around the case studies of this dissertation, both officers of 
the state and concerned citizens, discuss the state as an institution whose purpose is to serve the 
public good.  However, how this good should be implemented is contested and the state thus 
emerges as a problem.  This project therefore asks, as it grapples with the rhetorical elements of 
such struggle: how does the way the U.S. state parcels out money and builds things influence the 
production of history – specifically, the way people understand the state over time?  In this way, 
I put state theory in conversation with the specific projects in New York City to suggest a more 
productive relationship between state-funded projects and the oft-present conflicts of interest that 
overlap them.  As we continue to see, every year, all over the country, territorial inclusion in the 
nation-state does not guarantee inclusion in the ideological commitments of the state, as much as 
American political leadership would have citizens believe the contrary.  The manifestations of 
                                                
4 Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, 1st ed. (Liveright, 2013). 
 v 
ideological exclusion in the built environment are one concrete way to explore this tension 
between inclusion and exclusion in the nation-state.  Beyond the motivations of individual 
political actors, I am interested in the logic of the contemporary capitalist state that is reflected as 
a whole.  Why is the turning of money into non-productive fixed capital – on top of ruins – 
desirable for the state’s maintenance of state power and the work it is attempting?  And how is 
such work consistent with the idea of a capitalist state apparatus?   
The universalizing and socializing effects of the capitalist state mean that as global 
capitalism evolves, it is ever more important to study how it sustains itself amid crisis and 
contradiction. Figuring how local government money is connected to federal decisions and actors 
in Washington is a way of making an immediate problem speak to a broader, more diffuse 
problem of the relationship between fiscal responsibility and responsibility to the public good, 
understood broadly.  The study of the relationship between local and federal monies contributes 
to philosophical and theoretical explorations of capital in circulation, of money being made into 
capital, and the double movement of the U.S. state’s vying for power by not only shifting its 
capital from high concentrations to lower, in a classic Marxist sense, but also doing work on 
landscapes and memory themselves. 
In the background of this project loom the capital changes and redevelopment of New 
York City, as sketched by historical and current examples, as well as a Marxist reading of urban 
theory in which a city is endlessly rebuilt to serve class mobility.  Its middle-ground, and 
empirical bulk, addresses the various public agencies involved in the WTC, Fresh Kills, and 
Harlem sites’ development, the reworking of their landscapes through construction and 
technology, and the specificities of the sites themselves as available through archives, physical 
visits, and interviews.  In the foreground, connecting the various chapters, are the questions of 
memory, remains, and the state as they emerge from the historical and empirical material.   
I employ historical and archival research on public authorities, including the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and qualitative research, such as personal interviews 
with project planners, neighborhood residents, tourists, state officials, and activists.  I also 
incorporate my own observations of the sites in question, offering discursive readings of their 
material and symbolic dimensions.  This blend of site-specific research provides a layered 
account of politics and political institutions as they work today, as well as of the state and civic 
rhetoric that defines them, while grounding analysis in the contemporary, place-based materiality 
of these sites in the city of New York.  By showing that state projects of memorialization are 
central to mediating between private interests and the capitalist state, it contributes to scholarship 
in state theory, urban planning, and American studies. 
Five chapters compose this dissertation. Each of these chapters discusses a particular 
public building project and facet of state activity: the public versus private, memory, and the 
moral and ethical.  “Destruction/Construction,” the first chapter, tells a story of New York City’s 
creative destruction.  It synthesizes the city’s modern building history, materialist state theory, 
and financial crisis in the neoliberal era, indicating different ways the state acts in the name of 
general interest.  The chapter points to the moral elements the state mobilizes in times of 
capitalist crisis and the implications of this mobilization for a theory of the capitalist state.   
“Unmeasured Authority” investigates the reconstruction of the World Trade Center, in 
the aftermaths of 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis. Under examination are public authorities and 
their national legacy, with a particular focus on the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
the owner of the WTC site.  The chapter demonstrates how the public authority exercises state 
power while enjoying a unique financial freedom, rendering this institutional form a particularly 
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opaque form of state governance.  This ambiguity, I argue, affords the state autonomy to bypass 
the usual juridical checks on its power.  
The third chapter, “Wounded Landscapes,” discusses ethical commitment in the capitalist 
state’s public portrayals.  Through an examination of the 9/11 Memorial and Museum, I theorize 
the state’s official parceling of memory throughout the cultural landscape of the city as 
paralleling the chaotic, disjointed national experience of dealing with 9/11.  I suggest that the 
state uses non-profitable memory practices to enhance its legitimacy in reaction to its own 
permeability.  The chapter argues that the publicly-financed building at the WTC site is an 
ethico-political strategy used by the state to simultaneously codify the loss of public space and 
the ability to experience loss. 
The physical remains of 9/11 constitute the subject matter of the fourth chapter as well, 
entitled “Fresh Kills.”  It examines the landfill in Staten Island that was the site to which much of 
the wreckage of the Twin Towers was taken, including unidentified human remains. By studying 
the landfill’s recent conversion to a large city park, the chapter interrogates how the imperatives 
of state ethics depend on the local built environment and the role that nature, as an analytic term, 
plays in neutralizing trauma. 
The conclusion, “Burial Grounds,” moves away from the WTC to show how the work of 
the state and public authorities continues in other areas of the city.  By examining the public 
protest over plans to expand a bus depot atop an African burial ground in Harlem, I argue that 
the absence of a sanctioned archive of the burial ground allows the state to ignore the 
commitment to public memory it champions at other sites. The careful scrutiny of such discourse 
yields insight into city projects that mobilize, for example, a rhetoric of social partnerships, 
market incentives, and eco-consciousness that is in fact neoliberal, pro-corporate, and profit-
driven. 
Each chapter traces one piece of remains after another, drawing out the materiality of loss 
that accompanies the imperatives of building and rebuilding.  The first chapter begins with the 
ways the state’s shift to neoliberal governance mirrors the material process of the creative 
destruction of New York City.  Chapter 2 focuses on the public authority as a central component 
of the creative destruction of the state, while showing how building, even on ruins – or, in some 
cases, as in the WTC, especially on ruins – is central to state ethics.  The ruins of the WTC and 
their memorialization are traced in Chapter 3, which in turn leads us to Fresh Kills landfill, 
where some of those ruins persist.  The story closes with the pending memorialization of 
centuries-old African remains in Harlem and the community struggle waged to draw connections 
between the commemoration of those remains and the state’s championing of public history and 
ethical commitment at the other sites.   
In all cases, the materiality of New York City’s ground exerts a powerful force.  Lower 
Manhattan, the site of the WTC, and Fresh Kills are both landfill, and the Harlem African burial 
ground is on sinking ground, subject to erosion from adjacent infrastructure and the constitution 
of the riverbank it lies on, as well as covered in a layer of landfill.  The ground beneath these 
building projects is itself changeable, shifting as the projects progress.  With it, the ruins and 
remains that ground contains shift, too.  A landfill is the condition of possibility to make a 
memorial, the necessary ground to absorb the ruins that must be cleared to build a structure of 
memory.  The WTC had Fresh Kills – the latter accommodated the ruins of the Twin Towers, 
including the remains of the humans they housed when they were destroyed.  Yet at Freshkills 
Park, a memorial is again produced to acknowledge the human remains that persist in the 
landfill, in turn reproducing the same problems of the National September 11 Memorial and 
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Museum at the landfill once again.  We see that refuse, as viscerally embodied by Fresh Kills’ 
trash mounds, but which is also the foundation of the earth upon which the WTC and bus depot 
stands, is the problem of the remains that persist; remains in the landfill can never be purified 
from the garbage with which it co-exists.  The state attempts to purify these particular aspects of 
the materiality of loss in New York City by conceptualizing forms of memory that can in turn 
reproduce its own legitimacy. 
Capitalism is always opening up excesses, whether they be demolishing homes for 
investment by finance capital or the creation of slums to absorb displaced people – or even the 
expansion of a bus depot, the construction of the most expensive museum in history,  or public 
financing of private real estate interests.  How is it that such projects can seem viable to U.S. 
citizens and the state at a time when unemployment is higher than ever and job creation through 
infrastructural projects does not offer the hoped-for stimulus?  What ideological work has taken 
place, or continues to, and what reach does state power have that allows these contradictions in 
spending to continue?  Does a publicly-financed project’s veneer of an ethical commitment 
suffice?  This dissertation is not an investigation about the need, or lack, for the state’s existence, 
but about excavating its evolution to its present form, through a messy combination of 
dysfunction and good and bad intentions, while illuminating the complexities in the state’s 
relationship to its own reproduction. 
 
 1 
   CHAPTER ONE  Destruction/Construction  
 
 
Creative destruction is a “perennial gale” in the economy, wrote Joseph Schumpeter.1  
His landmark coining of the term to describe capitalism’s essential fact – its incessant destruction 
of old economic structures to create new ones – elegantly sums up the “evolutionary process” of 
capitalism, “by nature a form or method of economic change” that can never be stationary.2  Rife 
with biological metaphors, Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction is attuned to the 
adaptive qualities of capitalism.  As a system of productive relations, the capitalist economy has 
an immanent ability to mutate and prevent its implosion.  However, the absence of the state from 
his formulations is a notable one and begs the question that if creative destruction is constitutive 
of capitalism, does it include the capitalist state as well?  Rather than simply reorganize them, 
capitalism alters the materiality of territorial entities and this dissertation argues that 
contemporary capitalism effects the materiality of the American state in such a way that aspects 
of the state are creatively destroyed, particularly its public finances.   
 Throughout the growth of New York City3, its builders and reformers viewed the built 
environment as both “an index and instrument of moral progress in American society.”4  
However, today it could be said that the reverse is true.  That the way new things are built is a 
reflection of general interest and public good is at best unclear, with conflicts over space the 
norm.  The universalizing and socializing effects of the capitalist state mean that as global 
capitalism evolves, it is ever more important to study how it sustains itself amid crisis and 
contradiction.  As such, this chapter focuses on the points of articulation between materialist 
state theory, the rise of finance capital, and the history of creative destruction in New York, in 
order to draw out the morality of the state that is constructed alongside and intermingled with its 
economic imperatives.  Throughout, it identifies some places where the state falls apart, even if it 
appears to come together in the last instance, and points to the ways creative destruction operates 
as a state-preserving tactic. 
  The ties between the state and capital are not simply in a co-terminous relationship, one 
unto the other.  There are other elements that do the work of tying them together, and the state’s 
creative destruction allows it to exercise a flexibility and evolution, in the terms of Schumpeter, 
that signals a fundamental tension with the majority of materialist accounts of the state.  As a 
similar study of the American state remains rare5, one function of this dissertation is to do offer 
one, and to develop this it asks what the use of public capital in private New York projects says 
about the state’s attempts to reproduce capital and hegemony.  This chapter presents the main 
elements from which it is built. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 84. 
2 Ibid., 83. 
3 Subsequently, ‘New York’ refers to the City.  The state of New York will be specified as such (i.e. New York 
State).   
4 David Scobey, Empire City: The Making and Meaning of the New York City Landscape (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2002), 10. 
5 One notable entry in materialist studies of the American state is James O’Connor’s The Fiscal Crisis of the State, 
published in 1973 (New York: St. Martin’s Press).  
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Layers of Capital and Ruins in the Empire City 
 
Amid a backdrop of a significant American recession and global financial crises, multi-
billion-dollar building projects have been cropping up throughout New York.  The sheer scale of 
Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn and Hudson Yards in Manhattan, a few of the large projects of recent 
construction and controversy, has been supported by state financing and tax breaks in addition to 
private investment.  Both have been in the public eye for several years, but construction on 
Hudson Yards, set to be built on MTA-owned land and partially on platforms above still-
operating railroads, has yet to begin (it is slated to in mid-to-late 2012).  Atlantic Yards is 
nearing completion, with its first scheduled public event to be a Jay-Z concert in September 
2012.6  The arena alone, to be called the Barclays Center, cost an estimated $1.06 billion, $511 
million of which came from the selling of tax-free bonds, with other benefits received including 
subsidies and eminent domain.7  While Hudson Yards remains a contested site, its Brooklyn 
counterpart is currently more publicly visible, due in part to its ongoing construction, its location 
in the heavily-trafficked heart of Brooklyn, and the demolitions that were necessary for that 
construction to take place.8  Similarly, the projects that concern the subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation – the World Trade Center tower complex, the September 11 Memorial Museum, and 
the MTA depot on the Harlem African burial ground – have a diverse range of funding sources 
and notable state subsidies, as well as very different public profiles.   
The public and private projects that are happening across the city represent a coalescence 
of many elements – both the technical and economic aspects of building, but also the social and 
political exigencies that arise from the intent to build.  New York is a city loaded with a past, 
each layer of built fabric more often than not overlapping with abundant and rich material 
history.  The human processes of the city, over the decades and centuries, have been laid into its 
soil, lending truth to the saying that all of Manhattan is a burial ground.  How do we understand 
the presence of such sacred space in the middle of a New York teeming with activity and 
proliferating with many visions of the city’s past and future?  
 This dissertation focuses on projects built on ruins, which are compelling sites because, 
while evoking past histories, their materiality can simultaneously and concretely call up the 
ethical commitments of the state.  In the urban New York landscape, these ruins are dense, with a 
multitude of memories and events pressed into a single city block as people come and go and the 
built environment changes with stunning speed, often not without struggle and discontinuities.9  
                                                
6 A native Brooklynite, acclaimed rap artist, and well-known celebrity, Shawn ‘Jay-Z’ Carter was one of the most 
visible and outspoken original supporters of the Atlantic Yards project, despite general community sentiment against 
it.  Part-owner of the Brooklyn Nets, the basketball team whose home arena will be the Barclays Center, he has 
continued to publicly extol the benefits of the project, though his claims, some argue, are quite dubious if not 
patently false.  See Norman Oder, “Jay-Z’s hip-hop of distraction,” Salon, October 25, 2011. 
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/25/the_jay_z_distraction/ 
7 Theresa Agovino, “Atlantic Yards Bonds Sell for $511M,” Crains New York Business, Dec. 15, 2009. 
8 In the wake of the August 2012 LIBOR rate-fixing scandal, in which Barclays was seriously implicated, the 
controversy around Atlantic Yards has only magnified.  As local New York government prepares lawsuits against 
Barclays, New York taxes are massively subsidizing the Barclays brand, as its name is affixed all over the arena and 
is also the new name of the Atlantic-Pacific subway station (a right that also appears to have been heavily subsidized 
by the MTA).  
9 In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre writes, “The production of space … acts retroactively upon the past, 
disclosing aspects and moments of it hitherto uncomprehended. The past appears in a different light, and hence the 
process whereby that past becomes the present also takes on another aspect” (1992: 65). At its most basic, space 
gives existence to social relations themselves, with social spaces overlapping and interpenetrating one another, 
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Such a city block additionally offers a contemporary cross-section of many other elements, 
including the politics and economics of urban planning, the dynamics of culture, race, and 
gender, community-based collective memory, and even significant disparities in wealth and 
living conditions.   
The history of New York’s cultural landscape, past and present, is strengthened by 
drawing on the various elements that circulate through it, for it is not simply the physical 
markers of buildings and sites, or “memory infrastructure,”10 and their current owners and 
occupants that convey and channel memory, but also the diverse public processes and 
expressions of public memory that seep into urban landscape.11  This dissertation investigates the 
politics of urban construction and history and how visions of a past and future are imposed by 
such contingents as neighborhoods, developers, and the media, and how those visions are 
mediated and processed by the state.  The break between memory and history that often comes to 
the surface through state endeavors of public remembrance in New York is, I argue, an 
inheritance that forms the urban cultural landscape as well as the future actions of the state.  A 
legacy of environmental determinism – that shaping the city will reshape residents’ lives – has 
colored New York’s built history and sometimes occluded public memory in favor of projected 
improvements to ways of living. 
Therefore, it is not only the question of how the political intervenes in the economic, and 
vice versa, through publicly funded construction that is at stake in this project, but also how 
those interventions affect, and are affected by, the cultural landscape of the city, of which an 
important feature is public memory.  Attendant to that is the intersection between public good 
and the state, and the conflict between profit-seeking and ethical commitment in a capitalist state, 
which is a central exploration of Chapter Four.  The dissertation seeks to answer how public 
discourses of place and memory threaten the discourses and sovereignty of the state, and how 
such threats are confronted by construction financed publicly, in the name of the state and public 
good. 
 These theoretical, sometimes abstract issues are addressed in the particular place of New 
York and in turn further refined by locating them in specific projects and conflicts.12  The forms 
of state as they are represented by the tangled structure of the public authority and municipal 
bond systems, for example, remain empirical forms and, as such, the purely conceptual realm of 
the state must remain in constant negotiation with them.  Along these lines, this inquiry is 
informed by cultural political economy, what Bob Jessop describes as a cultural turn in political 
and economic analysis that fuses critical semiotic work with political economy.13  Discourse on 
the capitalist state and the financial mechanisms that have proliferated under its tenure has a 
history concurrent to the objects that it is concerned with and, accordingly, it is rich, varied, and 
                                                
giving each packet of space a ‘flaky’ quality that may contain many social relationships – including memories -- and 
is continuously reorganized by new additions, with earlier characteristics of a space potentially affecting later ones, 
a kind of persistence.  This persistence of space alongside its continuous reorganization suggest that the struggle for 
meaning of a space is a constant one, while acknowledging the resonance that a particular physical place can retain.  
10 Randall Mason, The Once and Future New York: Historic Preservation and the Modern  
City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), x. 
11 Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscape as Public History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). 
12 See Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011) and Rule 
of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: UC Press, 2002) for particularly effective illustrations of 
this method. 
13 Bob Jessop, “Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies,” Critical Policy Studies 3.3-4 (October 
2009): 336-356. 
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long.  The careful scrutiny of such discourse yields insight into city projects that mobilize, for 
example, a rhetoric of social partnerships, market incentives, and eco-consciousness that is in 
fact neoliberal, pro-corporate, and profit-driven, as is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Contemporary New York and the U.S. State 
 
The public projects that concern this dissertation belong to New York’s particular 
present-day economic and political climate, characterized by peculiarities not seen elsewhere in 
the nation or the state.  In a twenty-first-century city that contains such towering wealth, it is 
unsurprising that it also has the largest income gap in the nation, one in which the top 20 percent 
of earners have an income fifty-two times that of the bottom 20 percent, versus a difference of 
ten times nation-wide.14  Perhaps less well-known are that Manhattan’s poverty rate is twice that 
of the national average, at 22 percent, and that the city houses the poorest county in the nation, 
the Bronx.  This county is located a mere fifteen miles north of the skyscrapers and high-flying 
business deals of the Financial District of the city, the site of income for the top 1% of the city: 
90,000 households with an average yearly income of $3.7 million.15  Amid this stratification, the 
nation’s most important global connections are fused.  Saskia Sassen notes that the conditions 
promoting growth in such global cities as New York “contain as significant components the 
decline of areas … and the accumulation of government debt and corporate debt.”16  The global 
city is centralized, strategically serving as a command point in the organization of the wounded 
world economy, into which it is very tightly integrated.17  The dominance of global traders in 
municipal bond markets and real estate18 yields an intermingling of indigenous New York 
resources and structures, like land and airspace, with highly mobile global capital, resulting in 
built entities that often obscure any origin at all. 
Politically, the city is more affected by state politics as a whole than many surrounding 
cities and towns because of the relative size of its economy to its already massive population, but 
it is also in the city, more than anywhere else in the state, that global capital meets local capital.  
The building, owning, and renting of expensive high-rise residential and office space is one such 
site where they converge, for the city economy rests heavily on internal financial speculation and 
the amenities it requires, which include the construction of buildings themselves as well as a 
myriad of services.  For example, every addition to office space draws in many other interests – 
banks to finance, developers to assemble, engineers and architects to design, contractors to build, 
lawyers to protect, insurance companies for titles, electricians to wire, information technologists 
to network, janitorial labor to clean, restaurants to feed, and local utilities providers for energy 
and water.  Many of these requirements bring in vast amounts of money that are further 
speculated upon, forming ever-increasing and ever-intricate chains in the city and national 
economy.    
                                                
14 Kim Moody, From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present (New 
York: New Press, 2007). 
15 Bill Sanderson and Amber Sutherland, “City’s extreme rich-poor divide,” NY Post, Jan. 19, 2011. 
16 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 13. 
17 Moody, Welfare State, 7. 
18 This is often occurs in the form of a real estate investment trust (REIT), a tax designation that exempts or reduces 
corporate taxes for publicly traded firms investing in real estate.  Today, New York structures are far less likely to 
be built, financed, owned, managed, and occupied by New Yorkers than they were two decades ago (see Tom 
Agnotti, New York for Sale: Community Planning Confronts Global Real Estate (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008)). 
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New York, and particularly Manhattan, experiences change at such speed that instability 
is a regular feature of its urban fabric, while permanence is difficult for it to retain.  Fashions are 
always in flux, with what is attractive and expensive at one moment becoming undesirable and 
cheap in the next.  When speculation proves profitable there is a boom of investment and 
development, but once the market is exhausted, real-estate speculators leave the area for another 
until it becomes attractive for venture once again.  Manhattan’s central business district (CBD), 
though it is subject to such vagaries of interest, nonetheless retains a value that is as yet 
irreplaceable for various industries, particularly those themselves dealing in speculative capital 
markets, like finance and real estate.  In addition to the constant flux of those markets, the city in 
general is always rapidly changing, in terms of its population, trends, and commercial aspects, 
for example.  Despite or because of its quick turnover of styles, New York has an allure that 
draws new people in and holds onto many who can afford to remain.   The constant changes that 
today make it an entertainment and lifestyle destination, many wrought by the extreme wealth of 
its financial elite, can be especially attractive to upwardly-mobile transplants and white-collar 
workers, now a major force of neighborhood shifts and gentrification throughout the city. 
Yet, it is land itself that is the most valuable commodity in this market bursting with 
profit-generating mechanisms.  Since New York’s land supply is mostly fixed, only occasionally 
and marginally expanded by landfills, land values are a top corporate concern, for they are 
determined not by supply and demand, but by profitability itself.  The city’s CBD – its site of 
highest geographical accessibility, and attendantly, profit – is a fourteen-square-mile area south 
of 60th Street in Manhattan.  It contains 286 million square feet of office space, a density of 20.4 
million square feet per square mile that is unmatched by any other city in the world.19  Though 
land values may not be affected by supply and demand, the market for office space certainly is, 
along with locational considerations.  But in this city, like all cities, speculation is only profitable 
until it no longer is.   
This chapter traces some of the history of New York, focusing on the nineteenth to mid-
twentieth centuries, during which the city underwent rapid and profound changes in its built 
environment.  The technology that developed at that time in turn facilitated the evolution of 
financial markets in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, ushering in the neoliberal era that 
continues to unfold.  The chapter considers some of the  arguments made about and against 
the state by neoliberalism and engages Marxist theories to illuminate the key role of the state in 
capitalist modes of production.  In particular, the work of Poulantzas is engaged to apply the 
framework of a state that actively constitutes the economy, rather than simply a juridico-political 
apparatus that guards it, and it is extended to understand the ethical operations of the state as they 
unveil themselves through the mechanisms of public finance.  Using this framework, relatively 
recent periods of financial crisis are discussed to round out the history of building and creative 
destruction that has characterized New York, and to set the foundation for the following 
chapters, which each discuss a particular public building project and facet of state activity: the 
public versus private, memory, and the moral and ethical. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Moody, 27-8. 
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An Era of Changing New York 
 
There is much commentary on New York having no room and no time, about how it 
defies and pushes out, but is also somehow supremely inclusive.  The city is personified as an 
entity that makes decisions, that has desires and preferences.  While it often includes, welcomes, 
and creates space for a diversity of people and ideas, the demand for the new made by profit-
seekers, often in the name of ‘progress,’ has also cultivated a place where “memories like rats are 
chased away” by that demand’s “ever-rising flood,” a city where “there is no room for ghosts or 
landmarks.”20,21 This spur toward such progress spiked in the nineteenth century, a precipitous 
increase that would echo the globalization beginning in the late twentieth century.  Of the areas 
affected by Manhattan’s northward expansion at this time, including the residence in which he 
wrote “The Raven” in the 1840s, Edgar Allan Poe proclaims, “these magnificent places are 
doomed.  The spirit of Improvement has withered them with its acrid breath.  Streets are already 
‘mapped’ through them, and they are no longer suburban residences, but ‘town-lots.’”22  To grow 
the economy required the demolition and total reconceiving of residential and commercial 
spaces, opening new visual and existential terrains, with little incentive to remember what was, 
when what would be was the preeminent question of public culture during the nineteenth to mid-
twentieth century. 
Such sentiments as Poe’s are typical of writings about New York, past and present, which 
often note the lack of both an active reckoning with previous history as well as a desire for 
physical persistence in the ‘consciousness’ of the city.  Some writers mourn this lack, such as 
Henry James, asserting that the New York at the turn of the twentieth century had no time for 
history.23  Others, such as the architect Le Corbusier, a contemporary of James, acknowledge the 
city’s constant replacement of various parts of itself, but celebrate it as a process of becoming 
and thrilling experimentation.  His excitement and James’ lament have continued to have their 
proponents since then, but perhaps with even more fervency as the stakes in the city have grown 
steeply along with its financial markets.  As speculative capital has entered the scene, stakes in 
the city space grow ever higher because there is huge, lopsided profit in the mix and an even 
bigger monopoly on the benefits and risks.   
It is clear that the expansive stable of opinion about New York contains a generous share 
of conflict and contradiction.  New Yorkers are in the midst of a Baudelarian forest of symbols, 
since so many different structures and areas of the city have gained symbolic heft as time has 
passed.24  These symbols are endlessly fighting with each other “for sun and light, working to kill 
each other off, melting each other along with themselves into air.”25  Yet, simultaneously, new 
meanings are always springing up, with the symbolic significance of places changing as their 
                                                
20 Max Page, The Creative Destruction of Manhattan, 1900-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1, 
quoting John Huneker’s The Pathos of Distance. 
21 Joanne Reitano’s The Restless City: A Short History of New York from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) offers a history of New York from the colonial era to 2001, with a focus on its changeable, 
multifaceted quality, arguing that the city’s restlessness has been its greatest asset, preventing outright social chaos 
and political collapse in the midst of various conflicts.  She quotes former mayor Phillip Hone in 1845: “Overturn, 
overturn, overturn! is the maxim of New York,” (1). 
22 Quoted in Michael Nichols, “Houses of Usher: Brief Surveys of a Failing Patch of Manhattan Now Known as the 
Upper East Side,” Gotham City Blotter, n.d. 
23 Henry James, The American Scene (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907). 
24 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air (New York: Verso, 1982), 289. 
25 Ibid., 289. 
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previous histories are obscured or forgotten.  But a predominating mythology remains: that New 
York is an impatient and stern, yet big-hearted, embracer of the multitude.  The duality of this 
characterization suggests that the loss of memories and history to the demands of inclusivity and 
growth are inevitable if New York is to retain the unique attributes that make it great.   
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the city’s urbanists and bourgeoisie believed New 
York destined for greatness, what historians have since labeled booster discourse.  The city was 
growing its productive capacities and gaining cultural influence, and boosters envisioned what a 
great city should look like through a blend of moral environmentalism, the nurturing of capitalist 
development, and civilizational order.26  These standards had significant bearing on the shaping 
of the city, setting a scene of unbalanced development for many decades to come.  In the first 
half of the century, New York was a closely-knit settlement at the southernmost tip of 
Manhattan, still recovering from the British occupation.  However, by the 1850s it had exploded 
into a city the likes of London and Paris, and the famously palpable energy of the city asserted 
itself.  As the city’s heart in Lower Manhattan began to throb relentlessly and furiously, wealthy 
residents started moving northward, building wide avenues and expansive homes amid parks and 
squares in order to escape the toil and slums generated by the newly industrialized part of the 
city, initializing the class segregation and crystallizing the class disparities that would come to 
characterize every succeeding decade. 
   
 
Nurturing Capital and Crisis: Civic Order, Public Benefit, and Unbalanced Development  
 
Nowhere has liberal philosophy failed so conspicuously as in its understanding of the problem of change. 
Fired by an emotional faith in spontaneity, the common-sense attitude toward change [to slow it down 
and self-protect] was discarded in favor of a mystical readiness to accept the social consequences of 
economic improvement, whatever they might be.27 
 
This expansion northward continued into the twentieth century, but it is important to note 
that Manhattan’s growth was not simply the case of an expanding real estate market trying to 
accommodate manufacturing and finance – the trade in space itself was a powerful generator of 
the city’s wealth.28  The symbolism of the city as a financial node of the U.S., as well as a center 
of wealth, wealth-creation, and renewal, continued to attract population and ever more wealth, 
elevating space to a premium commodity.  Despite material evidence of the opposite, with 
poverty abounding among the workers fueling the city’s industries, New York retained its status 
as the aspirational destination of the nation and served as a barometer of national progress, 
health, and power.  Its rise as the “capital of capitalism” is well-illustrated by the massive 
amounts of creative destruction taking place in Manhattan.29  These include such diverse 
varieties as privately-financed destruction and rebuilding on Fifth Avenue and the demolition 
and rebuilding of taller, larger garment factories and other small manufacturing enterprises in 
what is now Chelsea.  The constant renewals of built fabric came hand-in-hand with New York’s 
elevation to the premier bastion of industrial capitalism in the nation and were appropriately 
chaotic and restless, mirroring the rapid population growth at this time – the highest in the nation 
                                                
26 Scobey, Empire City. 
27 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994 [1944]), 35. 
28 Page, Creative Destruction, 30. 
29 Ibid., 31, quoting Kenneth Jackson (1984). 
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– as well as the desperate drive toward wealth-creation that bore much weight in the city’s 
consciousness.   
 In the mid- to late nineteenth century, the elites most authoritatively guiding the city’s 
growth were real estate developers, business leaders, and intellectuals and reformers of the 
gentry – all ‘boosters’ in some capacity.  They ushered in a new urbanism that reflected class-
based commitments to appropriate political, associational, and moral communities, an urbanism 
in which the metropolitan gentry “were assumed to have the highest stake in New York’s 
commercial power and civic order.”30  Scobey argues that this new urbanism helped to shape the 
class consciousness of the gentry while also being rooted in that very consciousness.  By taking 
on prominent roles in land development and public agencies, gentry were able to further solidify 
their elite status and collectivity, as well as embed their authority in the built fabric of the city – 
hegemonic31 relationships between elites and the city that have persisted in the decades that 
followed.  The change happening in the city and the new landscapes that emerged from them, 
segregated by class and in which bourgeois New Yorkers recognized one another as elites, 
encouraged the consolidation of these class bonds.  What emerges at this time, according to 
Scobey, is the construction of class through not only the materiality of economic power, but also 
the rhetorical influence of moral convictions, symbolic practices, and civic and political activity, 
with the space of the city serving as both the product of and medium for this interplay.  The 
larger project of shaping the city was to tie popular democracy and bourgeois civic norms to the 
propulsive growth of capitalist industry without sacrificing them to its flames.  Though there was 
some division between the goals of the gentry and capitalist growth through creative destruction, 
practically speaking, the systematic embedding of a reimagined democratic bourgeois class 
authority in the city’s new built fabric was an even more exciting prospect.32 
A wave of reform in the 1880s, lasting through the early 1900s, brought questions of 
preservation and neighborhood character to over-heated areas like Fifth Avenue and demands of 
slum clearance to the Lower East Side.  Rather than acting as a reaction to modernity, the drive 
toward preservation in the wealthier areas, in particular, was both a part of city-building and a 
sign of cultural crisis.  The desire to “stabilize urban culture” was an attempt by reformers and 
city builders, fully committed to the continued expansion of New York and not unsympathetic to 
the business elite, to battle immigration, radical politics, immorality, and other vagrancies of the 
street.33  Preservation was thus not just a movement of antiquarians, but a forward-looking 
attempt by various reformers to invest in the city’s progress – which, at the turn of the century, 
was committed to capitalist growth and the city’s industrial ascendancy, through the preservation 
of memory in certain parts of the city and its erasure in others.   
While areas like uptown Fifth Avenue revealed problems of over-development and 
excessively rapid change, the Lower East Side, neighborhood to laborers and immigrants, 
exposed the reverse issue of underdevelopment. The slums endured there and elsewhere as 
regular occurrences in the city until reformers and the city intervened in the real estate market, 
accelerating processes of destruction and rebuilding and in turn initiating the displacement of 
                                                
30 Scobey, Empire City, 11. 
31 As used by Giovanni Arrighi, in opposition to domination, “hegemony is the additional power that accrues to a 
dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the dominant group’s 
interests but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest” (Adam Smith in Beijing: 
Lineages of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Verso, 2007), 149) 
32 Scobey, Empire City, 11. 
33 Mason, Future New York, xvi. 
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workers to the boroughs of Brooklyn and the Bronx.  However, despite the “dominant 
vocabulary of social reform” of the period, tenements were only eliminated haphazardly, when a 
wave of gentrifying fashion moved in their direction, giving reformers a new sense of how they 
could intervene in the real estate market and assimilate new notions of how places could be 
rebuilt well into the 1920s.34   
In The Creative Destruction of Manhattan, 1900-1940, Max Page argues that creative 
destruction is not necessarily inherently bad, but that it shows how economic and social 
processes of capitalism were inscribed into people’s minds, with a persistent tension existing 
between the creative potential and destructive, corrosive effects of rebuilding.  City 
government’s powers and attitudes to city building were evolving during this time as a result of 
the entrepreneurial creative destruction that erupted at the turn of the century, with slum 
clearance beginning to emerge as a policy and ideology, bestowing legitimacy on the taking of 
property for public benefit.  By the 1930s, slum clearance became the dominant method of 
upgrading the city’s housing stock, when the federal government made significant interventions 
via New Deal legislation.  Public benefit became the calling card of the big building projects in 
the following decades, with such projects simultaneously escalating in number and scale. 
 Legendary planner Robert Moses rose to prominence just as the New Deal infused 
funding into New York, and he used the money to build projects that he had planned in 
anticipation of the disbursement.  Though never actually elected to public office, he created and 
led several public authorities that gave him the power to plan and build the city’s public works 
with relative autonomy from the public or state legislature’s approval.  The New York 
orientation toward continual progress and the ‘new’, as seen in previous decades through things 
like Fifth Avenue’s massive creative destruction and the preservation movement that followed, 
allowed as fierce and unchecked an authority as Moses’ to exist because he was able to convince 
the public that he was the vehicle of impersonal modernist forces.  Despite the destruction of 
neighborhoods by various of his highway projects, Moses ultimately professed to be working for 
the same values that New Yorkers embraced, so who would be “willing to fight for the sanctity 
of ‘things as they [were]”?35  Marshall Berman notes the grief “endemic to modern life” that he 
felt when an Art Deco building on Grand Concourse in the Bronx was destroyed for the Cross-
Bronx Expressway, one particularly dark kernel of the obsolescence of the old that Moses’ 
expansive projects demanded.36  By the 1940s, New York had become the biggest manufacturing 
center in the U.S., experiencing a building boom that saw the construction of much of the glass 
and steel towers of Midtown Manhattan and emerging as the most infrastructurally successful 
major city in the world.  Moses’ big public works projects and other New Deal-initiated 
construction, particularly highways and bridges, were lasting symbols of that progress and what 
was projected to come economically, and even socially.  However, what followed in the ensuing 
decades was quite different, blanketing New York in the darkness only hinted at by Moses’ 
aggressive projects.  
 The building-up of Midtown Manhattan, which was fed by the infrastructural  
changes of the 1930s and 1940s, was the harbinger of a movement in U.S. industry and economy 
toward technological innovation and globalization, as company headquarters and offices began 
to populate Midtown’s towers and manufacturing began to dwindle and relocate to other cities.  
The intervention of the state as in the New Deal years was supplanted by the preeminence of the 
                                                
34 Page, Creative Destruction, 76. 
35 Berman, All That is Solid, 295. 
36 Ibid., 295. 
 10 
market, thereby paving the path toward the contemporary era of neoliberal economics and 
government, with New York serving as its American lodestone.37 
 
 
Neoliberalism and the Contemporary State  
 
Neoliberalism in the present day contends that the state is no longer relevant, as it was in 
the time of Robert Moses.  It allows that New Deal programs, symbolic of an era of massive state 
intervention, were necessary in the fragile period of nation-building and coherence-seeking that 
swept post-World War II society, but that similar contemporary implementations by the state are 
not.  Instead, the expansion of the capital market is relied on as a ready source of economic 
growth that in turn improves the quality of life of all people through its trickle-down effects.  
This fundamentalism of the market arose as a political project in the 1970s, when a 
macroeconomic crisis was at work, to consolidate and rebuild class power.  It accomplished this 
not through state projects, but through privatization, with the state serving in a behind-the-scenes 
capacity, bailing out venture capitalists in crisis.  State intervention in the economy waned 
overall, reaching its nadir in the U.K. and U.S. with the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, 
and social movements were adamantly challenging capitalist class power.38  Finance capital and 
neoliberal policies emerged as solutions to crisis and to reconsolidate the class power of ruling 
elites. 
Based in classical understandings of the state, neoliberal doctrines have the liberation of 
finance as their endgame, which demands private property rights, free markets, and free trade, 
institutionally secured through the law, military, and police, for example.  Their implementation 
by the state, helmed by Reagan in the U.S., ushered in a wave of creative destruction, this time of 
the state’s functions and other “prior institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging 
traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also of divisions of labor, social relations, welfare 
provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to 
the land and habits of the heart.”39  Levels of moral hazard in the economy were raised, with the 
high probability of a state bail-out encouraging Wall Street bankers to take high risks.  This type 
of pro-market governance has become even more normalized in recent decades, as the economy 
has continued to face crisis after crisis sown by such practices.40 
  However, the neoliberal state in practice looks different than it does in theory, and New 
York City offers an excellent illustration of this through its extensive set of public authorities, 
which are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  Neoliberal theory calls for the privatization and 
deregulation of all enterprises run by the state, to the point of creating markets where they never 
before existed, like in water and health care, and pushing the rationalization of space to new 
heights.41  However, despite these tenets emphasizing the state’s overall irrelevance regarding the 
movement of markets, examples to the contrary have been provided throughout all the 
presidencies of the past several decades.  Interventions supporting the interests of business and 
                                                
37 Since 1970, the U.S. has spent 1.6 percent of its GDP on transportation infrastructure, the lowest of any developed 
nation (Council on Foreign Relations 2012). 
38 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
39 Ibid., 3. 
40 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), xi. 
41 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004). 
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politics are the so-called exceptions to the neoliberal rule of state that are most commonly seen.42  
Perhaps more noticeably, business interests often collaborate with law-making bodies of state, 
and this has resulted in pronounced changes to governance itself, which can be characterized as 
taking on a market rationality of its own.43  In order to “integrate state decision-making into the 
dynamics of capital accumulation and the networks of class power,”44 public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) have picked up what were previously functions exclusive to the state.  Through quasi-
governmental entities, like public benefit corporations – the Empire State Development 
Corporation (ESDC)45 and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority are examples in 
metropolitan New York – the state still takes the financial risk for projects but the profit is 
usually reaped by the private sector, particularly on the municipal level.  On the flip side of 
PPPs, another result of the neoliberal restructuring of state operations is that local municipal 
governments and elements of civil society, such as non-profit organizations, have likewise 
picked up state functions, but usually those without significant potential for financial returns.46   
These changes under neoliberalism indicate a shift from government, or the state 
apparatus and its power alone, to governance, combining the power of state and civil society, as 
Gramsci conceived of it.  What remains to be seen is the extent to which Marx’s prescience holds 
true, particularly when he says “the separation of public works from the state, and their migration 
into the domain of the works undertaken by capital itself, indicates the degree to which the real 
community [social fabric, for Marx] has constituted itself in the form of capital.”47  To better 
understand the state under capitalism and the shift in function it is undergoing, an investigation 
of materialist and Marxist state theory, and what it does and does not offer, is necessary.  
 
 
Materialist Theories of the Capitalist State 
 
While his later work is explicitly concerned with economy and a systematic unveiling of 
the mechanics and artistry of the capitalist mode of production, the idea of the state appears 
throughout Marx’s earlier writings.48  He critiques Hegel’s claim that the State only pursues the 
general interest and regulates competition – by limiting monopolies, for example, and providing 
legal frameworks for contracts and ownership –in order to guarantee the equal rights of all 
citizens.  For Marx, the state is not a neutral arbiter of rights, but a sphere of functions 
administered against civil society.49  He notes that bureaucrats who perform state activities use it 
                                                
42 For example, George W. Bush imposed tariffs on steel imports to improve his chances of winning Rust Belt swing 
states in the 2004 presidential election, despite his otherwise ardent support of free markets and trade (see Jennifer 
Rich, “U.S. Admits that Politics Was Behind Steel Tariffs,” New York Times, 14 March 2002).   
43 Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization.” Political 
Theory 34.6 (December 2006): 690-714. 
44 Harvey, Neoliberalism, 76. 
45 The ESDC was the target of a 2011 lawsuit for using funds too much in the private, and not public, interest 
(Bordeleau v. State, 18 NY 3d 305).  See Chapter 2 for a discussion of this. 
46 Agnotti, New York. 
47 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 
1973), 550. 
48 Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and “On the Jewish Question” are some works that particularly focus on 
the nature of the political and the state. 
49 I use civil society to describe “a system of superstructural institutions that is intermediary between economy and 
State” (Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review 100 (1976-77): 5-78, 35). 
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to their private advantage and promotion, with the state giving force to the bourgeois interests of 
private property under the guise of general interest.  
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte contains Marx’s most sustained 
examination of the state and lays out the state’s political independence from any specific class, 
but its ultimate service, economically, to the dominance of capital over labor.  Writing about the 
coup in mid-nineteenth-century France, he notes that it is the state apparatus that retained power, 
not the parties that struggled for it or the incompetent leader that eventually headed it, with a 
series of political upheavals only serving to perfect the state form.  The state emerged as 
autonomous from the classes contending for power, while the bourgeoisie retained their 
dominance in relations of production.  While the theory of the state that Marx himself offers is 
not explicitly sketched, it forms the important base – a non-instrumental view of the state in 
which it is not a mere apparatus for any class to wield that yields power, but rather an entity that 
is strategically harnessed – for subsequent thinkers who theorize the state with a materialist, 
Marxian understanding of political economy.  
The late 1960s through the 1970s saw a resurgence of interest in materialist theories of 
the state and heated debate of the meaning of Marxist state theory as the capitalist mode of 
production continued to evolve, and global capitalism was reforming itself in financial and 
geographical ways, as a crisis of capital accumulation was unfolding.  Though similarly intensive 
studies of Marxist state theory are rare now, this project does not intend to resuscitate the 
controversies of the debates of the 1970s, but rather will briefly consider its various iterations to 
better understand the overarching insights of the field. 
 Prior to the surge of Marxist state theory in that decade, the state was dealt with in 
Marxist theories of production rather summarily, and the conversation was limited to showing 
that it acts in the interests of capital and there is often a correspondence of the content of its 
actions with the interests of the ruling class.  Some analyses disregarded the specificity of the 
political and said that state actions flow from the requirements of capital (reductionism and 
economic determinism, or formalism), while others insisted solely on the autonomy of the 
political and the irrelevance of the conditions of accumulation or class struggle (politicism).50  
The important structuring question of a materialist theorization of the state remains how 
capitalism makes possible the coinciding of state functions and the interests of the ruling class, 
and a careful addressing of this problematic is not always found on all sides of the debate.  Neo-
Ricardian interpretations focus on state expenditure and utilize the surface categories of price, 
profit, and wages, for example, but reject Marxian categories of surplus value and labor time, to 
name two, as abstractions without practical significance, and logically maintain a categorical 
distinction between economics and politics.51  Critics of this approach note that there are limits to 
the ability of state expenditure to salve the fissures of capitalism due to its unproductive nature 
and the ultimately destructive requirements of accumulation.52  The state derivation debate offers 
another angle, demanding the need to found the derived political in the originary economic.  
However, in all these theories, one consistent feature is that the state develops to combat the 
                                                
50 For examples of economic determinism, see Mandel 1970 and Luxemburg 1971. For a politicist account, see 
Habermas 1975. 
51 Holloway, John and Sol Picciotto, eds. State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London: E. Arnold, 1978). 
52 See O’Connor 1973. 
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tendency of the rate of profit to fall53, a force that constantly reorganizes and manages capitalist 
social relations and their economic and political crises.  
Within this shared understanding are variations on the state’s emergence.  One is that the 
state is needed as a form “alongside and outside bourgeois society” and commodity production to 
prevent capital’s “unrestrainable passion, its werewolf hunger for surplus labor” from destroying 
labor power, its very basis.54  It in turn allows property owners to realize their common interest 
instead of competing, and the state acts in the interests of capital in general to protect the health 
of workers to reproduce labor power, since individual capitalists are unable to do this adequately.  
The state is necessarily autonomous, acting separately from the rest of society.  A second 
variation is that the state provides infrastructure and the general material conditions of 
production.  These provisions establish and guarantee general legal relations, regulate conflict 
between labor power and capital, and repress the working class by means of the law, police, and 
army, if necessary, thereby safeguarding the total national capital in play on the world market.  
While these explanations align well with the actions we see the state performing today, by 
locating them at the state’s origins they presuppose that the state as a structure can fulfill these 
functions.  The reasons for the state become conjured, in a sense, and its originating purposes 
applied post-facto, after its evolution in form has been witnessed.  
 
 
Poulantzas and the Relative Autonomy of the State  
 
These various approaches are briefly mentioned to ultimately note their overlap and 
underlying unity of purpose, despite the contestation over their differences, but also that despite 
such shared purpose they are insufficient in offering an understanding of the capitalist state that 
is alive to its contradictions and inconsistencies in action and form as it mutates and evolves to 
dodge economic crises and civil challenge.  To do so, it is essential to arrive at a materialist 
understanding of political development that accounts for the economic decisions of the state that 
challenge the capitalist imperative upon which its origins otherwise rest.  One method of 
attempting this would be a historical analysis of the evolution of capitalist society, including its 
changing forms of state and its exploitation of workers.  However, at this phase of capitalist 
development and statehood, which is also ever-evolving, a theoretical approach concerned with 
the character of the political, as offered by Nicos Poulantzas, particularly in his last work, State, 
Power, Socialism, provides a framework with which to open up for inquiry different levels of the 
state and its superstructure, following Althusser.  It is also receptive to the exploration of less 
material categories – like civil memory and state self-health – that do not find a place within it, 
but which remain significant to a rich understanding of the state today.55  Poulantzas offers a way 
to think about the hegemonic work done by the state and its dominant classes and the gap 
between that work and their class interests.  This is important to studying the questions raised by 
                                                
53 It falls not because of a statistical rule, but because the fall of profit is the “expression of a social process of class 
struggle which imposes upon capitalism a necessity of constantly reorganizing its own relations of production.” 
(Holloway and Picciotto, State, 26). Or, according to Poulantzas, it is not an empirical and measurable expression of 
the fall and not always a concrete form, but simply a tendency, and therefore counter-tendencies must be introduced 
to fight that (SPS, 174). 
54 Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1, Trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 252. 
55 Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977) 
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New York, particularly how the state’s contribution of funds to projects has effects reaching well 
beyond the material.  
For Poulantzas, there is no aspect of social life that does not constitute itself in relation to 
the state in some way.  He is the only Marxist state theorist who offers a sustained defense of this 
throughout his body of work, and his conceptualizing of the state as relatively autonomous offers 
a way to extricate publicly financed projects at least partially from the capitalist imperative 
toward accumulation, which allows a more open exploration of it while still maintaining the 
capitalist state as a central object of study.56 He acknowledges the fact that a number of state 
functions, such as social security, cannot be reduced to political domination alone.  Why then, he 
asks, do the bourgeoisie seek to maintain their domination through the state, one which it is by 
no means always contented with?  His formulation, while not providing clear answers about the 
American state, nonetheless offers the most fruitful extension of Marx and a framework from 
which to consider its unique contemporary manifestations. 
Taking up Marx’s suggestion that the state is an entity more complex than an apparatus to 
be administered by the class in power, for Poulantzas, the state emerges out of an evolution of 
the economic base as “the condensation of a particular class relationship of forces,” and the 
contradictory relations among various social classes are inscribed in the very materiality and 
functioning of the state, not externally to it.57  Power is derived from these relations, ideally 
concentrated in the state, but is not a quantifiable substance that can be wrested from any 
particular entity.58  The state is but one of several institutional entities within a social formation, 
but it alone is responsible for maintaining the cohesion of an uneasy intermingling of class 
relations that ultimately constitute it – for the state is not an instrumental Thing or willful 
Subject, but a structure of relative autonomy from the classes that support it and the rest of civil 
society in which it intervenes as suits the perpetuation of capitalism in a given social formation, 
but not from the social relations of production as such.59  The state is not reducible to class 
relations, though they always effect it, but it also exhibits a materiality and opacity of its own 
and cannot be emptied or abstracted into an entity without class struggle.  It concentrates within 
itself the political and ideological relations that are already present in the relations of production 
– relations of dominance – and thus inscribes them in its very materiality.  
                                                
56 Poulantzas is clear about the state needing to provide some concessionary base for mass consent.  He writes: 
“…even fascism was obliged to undertake a series of positive measures, such as absorption of unemployment, 
protection and sometimes improvement of the real purchasing power of certain sections of the popular masses, and 
the introduction of so-called social legislation.  (Of course, this did not exclude increased exploitation through a rise 
in relative surplus-value – quite the contrary.)” (SPS, 31).  By the end of text, he also suggests that dominated 
classes can eventually secure real centers of power in the capitalist state itself. 
57 Poulantzas, SPS, 257. 
58 Against Foucault’s criticism that Marxists ignore the power relations in institutions outside the state, like hospitals 
and sporting stadiums, Poulantzas included these various apparatuses within the strategic field of the state, rather 
than external to it.  These various entities become partially constituted as political powers by the state, though they 
may not occupy privileged sites of political power; rather, power is delegated to them by those who do occupy those 
privileged sites.  The state comes to permeate every sphere of society, fundamentally changing the traditionally 
private nature of those other institutions, because it is the strategic site of organization and center of power of the 
dominant class’ relationship to the dominated classes.  The state, however, possesses no power of its own, but the 
power associated with it has a precise basis, as power always does for Poulantzas, unlike the dispersed, immanent 
power relations that Foucault suggests cannot be tracked to any particular organizing instance, like the state (SPS, 
147-9).  
59 Poulantzas, SPS, 131.  
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In other words, the capitalist state represents the political practice of the dominant 
classes, whose aim is to constitute their economic and political interests as the general public 
interest, or class unity.  How such unity is secured is the bigger question animating Poulantzas’ 
work.  With multiple producers competing to accumulate capital, which is itself fractionally 
divided, the capitalist class cannot politically dominate other classes without the state.  He 
suggests an alliance of classes and fractions is forged, in which one class or fraction is 
hegemonic.  Such an uneasy alliance of “contradictory relations enmeshed within the State” is 
called a ‘power bloc,’ a contradictory unity of dominant classes under the leadership of a 
hegemonic one that appears to ‘possess’ state power and sway state policy.60,61  The organization 
of the dominant classes, and the attendant disorganization of the dominated classes, is the 
primary political function of the state, for “the State is through and through constituted-divided 
by class contradictions.”62 Once a hegemonic relationship is established, fractions can 
collectivize themselves into a force that seeks interest beyond their particular economic ones and 
thereby cohere the diverse interests of various other classes and fractions, making a bloc.  The 
capitalist state is the major means of cohering the social formation on the national or territorial 
levels as well, requiring constant state intervention. 
It is thus not a monolith, an unfissured entity, but is in fact itself divided, with class 
contradictions present in its material framework and its organizational patterns “while the State’s 
policy is the result of their functioning within the State.”63  Unlike the rigid state of Lenin, 
Poulantzas presents the modern capitalist state as a more flexible site of contestation.  If the 
working class does not establish institutional preconditions for exercising its class power, the 
bourgeoisie will take it instead; it is not a matter of simply seizing control of (capitalist) state 
machinery, but transforming it from within and coordinating actions within and outside the state.  
Poulantzas breaks with Althusser’s conception of the state as a legal guardian of the self-
regulating economic sphere by instead asserting that a class’ presence in the State only 
guarantees some parcel of political power insofar as that class helps ensure the active 
constitution and reproduction of the economic sphere.  
For him, there is a class utilization of the state, not a class’ power over the state, for it 
exhibits a material framework that cannot be reduced to political domination but within which 
such domination is inscribed.  This framework originates in relations of production – “the dual 
relationship of economic property and possession” – and the social division of labor, and it has 
                                                
60 Ibid., 133. Relatedly, Poulantzas on bureaucracy: “According to Marx, Engels and Lenin, the members of the 
State apparatus, which it is convenient to call the ‘bureaucracy’ in the general sense, constitute a specific social 
category—not a class. … Their class origin—class situation—recedes into the background in relation to that which 
unifies them—their class position: that is to say, the fact that they belong precisely to the State apparatus and that 
they have as their objective function the actualization of the role of the State. This in its turn means that the 
bureaucracy, as a specific and relatively ‘unified’ social category, is the ‘servant’ of the ruling class, not by reason 
of its class origins, which are divergent, or by reason of its personal relations with the ruling class, but by reason of 
the fact that its internal unity derives from its actualization of the objective role of the State. The totality of this role 
itself coincides with the interests of the ruling class. … When Marx designated Bonapartism as the ‘religion of the 
bourgeoisie’, in other words as characteristic of all forms of the capitalist State, he showed that this State can only 
truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse fractions of this class, precisely in 
order to be able to organize the hegemony of the whole of this class” (“Problem of the Capitalist State”, New Left 
Review I/58 (1976): 67-78, 13). 
61 In New York, the mayoral administrations of the past several decades have served as shorthand for the political 
and economic leadership of the city.   
62 Poulantzas, SPS, 132. 
63 Ibid. 
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always been present in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production.64  And 
while the relations of production delimit the field of the state, the state also “has a role of its own 
in the formation of these same relations.”65  The capitalist state’s relative separation from these 
relations which produce it – unlike, for example, the feudal state which intimately controls them 
– maps its relation to social classes and class struggle, which for the capitalist state means that 
state power is that of the bourgeoisie.  Therefore, though all of the state’s actions are not 
reducible to political domination, their composition is marked by it.  The class powers that are 
expressed through relations of production are organically articulated to the politico-ideological 
relations that concretize and legitimize them.  Social classes are only distinctions in the social 
division of labor, which encompasses relations of production and politico-ideological relations.  
They do not exist prior to their opposition in struggle, so to approach the State with reference to 
the relations of production is “to chart the original contours of its presence in the class 
struggle.”66  Poulantzas makes a very Gramscian formulation, though the latter is clearer on the 
opening created by the fractional unity of the state – that the dominant group’s interests prevail 
“only up to a certain point.”67  It is this ambiguity – the gap between the dominant class’ interests 
and its hegemonic work – that is worth exploring.   
Just as there are many states, there is no single or general capitalist interest, but rather 
many sorts of capital that are divided into fractions managed by a hierarchy of power.  A given 
fraction does not necessarily share identical strategy or interests, and the cohering of 
complexities into a general interest is contingent on political organization and leadership.  
Political praxis and its deviations, problems, and kinks are what need to be contended with, 
instead of simply assuming that capitalism has a long-term managerial effect on state power.  
What is necessary to maintain accumulation is not ironclad, and as such the gaps that emerge 
suggest points where the state can destruct and recreate itself without jeopardizing the overall 
standing of the state or relations of production.  Under capitalism, political authority is not 
embedded in its territorial sites of significance, such as land or the laboring body, as much as it is 
formally outside them, while constantly intervening in them and in no way actually fully outside 
or separate.  Nonetheless, the state’s relative autonomy is necessary to capitalism’s survival, 
since the creative destruction and recurrent crises of the capitalist mode of production could not 
fully, feasibly sustain the political-ideological system. 
Poulantzas’ formulations of the state offer a base from which to consider the New York 
City municipal state, and the U.S. national state, as they have evolved from the 1970s and the 
actions they have undertaken in the name of the ‘general interest.’  Whether the general interest 
as illustrated by their behavior emerges in the Poulantzian sense is to be seen in the specific 
projects that are analyzed in subsequent chapters.   
                                                
64 Ibid., 26. 
65 Ibid., 25. 
66 Ibid., 27. 
67 “It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for 
the latter's maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and 
presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the "national" energies. In 
other words, the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and 
the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on 
the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups -- equilibria 
in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly 
corporate economic interest” (Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Eds. And Trans. Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 181). 
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Crisis and Post-Crisis: the Ascendancy of Finance Capital in the State  
 
Indeed, essentially, what is problematic is the fact that the established order is not problematic; and that 
the question of the legitimacy of the state, and of the order it institutes, does not arise except in crisis 
situations.68 
 
New York’s story is one of unbalanced development. While the immediate post-World 
War II period saw a drastic change of the city’s built environment, the following decades were 
the time of a transforming workforce, with migration in and out of the city.69  With all its land 
built upon, the cost of operating in New York grew ever-higher and resulted in the movement of 
industry from the city center to outer rings of the metropolitan region, such as New Jersey and 
Westchester County.  This industrial exodus was followed by ‘white flight,’ with middle-class 
white residents moving to similar regions, or particular neighborhoods in Queens and Brooklyn. 
Thus, the post-war national ascendancy of the city in the 1940s was followed by the political 
struggle of the 1950s and 60s, with the emergence of black and Puerto Rican nationalism, 
women’s rights, the antiwar movement, and the growth and organization of the city’s enormous 
public-sector workforce and hospital workers. These forces all expanded the city’s notable public 
provision – including services favorable to the working class, like free education – and added to 
the social democratic ethos that New York was known for.  However, with this evolution of the 
city and its government also came the faltering of the business elite’s influence and its agenda 
taking a backseat to the city’s other concerns as social and fiscal problems came to a head, 
despite large exemptions of property taxes and the implementaton redevelopment policies 
favoring corporate and real estate needs.  Starting in the 1960s, the city began to collect yearly 
budget deficits, devising temporary balancing solutions and bottoming out in bankruptcy, with a 
full-blown budgetary crisis blooming in 1975.70  Tolls and transit fares were raised, hospitals 
were closed, tuition was implemented at the City University for the first time in its history, and 
many city services were cut back, including sanitation, daycare, fire protection, and police 
patrol.71  The city’s budget grew from $2.7 billion in 1961 to $13.6 billion in 1976, growing at an 
                                                
68 Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field” in State/Culture, ed. 
George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 56. 
69 Due to the Immigration Act of 1965 and the movement of Asians, Caribbeans, and Latin Americans into the U.S. 
70 From 1970 to 1974, the increase of the city’s long-term indebtedness was accomplished through the underwriting 
of municipal bonds by seven city banks.  However, in 1974 those banks reversed their decisions by dumping billions 
of dollars of their bond holdings into the market, eventually leading to a complete collapse of the bond market in 
1975.  The result was a city that was technically bankrupt and unable to borrow to meet its financial obligations.  
Causes for such borrowing by the city were not only its social expenditures, but also the “growing practice” of 
putting large private development projects like the World Trade Center, Battery Park City, and Times Square under 
state-created authorities, effectively subsidizing CBD development by putting pressure on long-term debt and 
thereby also magnifying the effects of increased short-term debt (Moody, Welfare State, 59). These authorities were 
tax-exempt even though most of the underlying infrastructure of the projects was paid for by bond-raised city money 
because despite being private projects, they had public dimensions.  Additional tax incentives were given out to lure 
occupants when the WTC did not fill up, with the lost taxes from the WTC alone estimated at $700 million by 1979. 
Its reliance on real property taxes was significantly below that of most other large cities, only at a little more than 50 
percent of its total local revenue compared to almost 80 percent for the nation’s twenty largest cities. Moody 
suggests that “Had the practice of shifting expenses to the capital budget and of increasing long-term debt to 
subsidize CBD construction been avoided or discontinued early enough by increasing property tax assessments on 
commercial and industrial property even fairly modestly, the reliance on short-term, high-interest debt would have 
been much less, the debt service burden been significantly lightened, and the fiscal crisis quite likely avoided” (55). 
71 Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the  
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average annual rate of 10.2 percent between 1971 and 1975, when the city’s economic base was 
rapidly declining as businesses relocated outside the city.72   
 In response to the city’s bankruptcy, the business elite “refined its ability to act as a 
class” and established more direct control of its interests by organizing cooperative legislative 
action around defeating bills having to do with consumer protection, labor law reform, and tax, 
regulatory, and antitrust laws.73  Various business leaders contributed to a revolution in 
governance in the city, pushing the state to change its management of its finances in order to bail 
out the city, but also to unify the capitalist class and support its interests.  Under the guidance of 
several of them, the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) and Municipal Assistance 
Corporation (MAC) were created to help restructure the city’s short-term debts and execute a 
three-year financial plan that would result in balancing the city’s budgets.74  Simultaneous to the 
implementation of these financial goals, the governance of the city was also permanently altered.  
The EFCB and MAC, by directly intervening in the finances and budget, indirectly became 
“alternative administrations” of overall governance for the city by seeking financial changes with 
political implications – important parts of ‘the crisis regime.’75  Formed first, the MAC sold its 
own bonds as a state agency backed by the city’s retail sales and stock transfer taxes, but it was a 
failure, pushing the city toward default.  To fight the impending economic short-circuit, the 
EFCB was created, comprised of city and state political leadership as well as a generous swath of 
New York’s business elite, and it made sure investors from the MAC schemes were repaid, 
ultimately shifting the city’s spending priorities in a direction business had wanted for years.  
Through the imminent collapse of the city’s finances and, attendantly, sections of its bureaucracy 
and other state apparatuses, the dominant fraction, as represented by the EFCB, was able to 
rebuild not only the leadership of the state but its very structures, both juridically and politically, 
in a way that reframed the city’s political economics. 
 The post-industrial shift from manufacturing to finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE), and 
service sectors, encompassing nonprofit social services and government, overlapped with the 
aftermath of the crisis.  From 1977 to 1987, the increasing importance of finance relative to 
production, massive migration from Asia and Latin America, rapid technological change, 
centralization of financial markets, and overall internationalization of the economy affected New 
York tremendously.  The city in the mid-1970s was a kind of rehearsal for the neoliberal 
reorganization of national priorities that would come to happen under Reagan – the reassertion of 
the capitalist class’s power in the home of global capitalism. Amid all this economic and political 
foment, the state had to be held financially accountable to the process of capital circulation and 
surplus value production, and the New York government was disciplined by various forces 
within the U.S. financial system.  The “fiscal disciplining” of New York led the way for 
promoting financial deregulation and budgetary austerity nation-wide as solutions to property 
crashes and the collapse of financial institutions in 1973, of which a near-perfect echo is the 
2007 crisis and its aftermath.76  One conclusion that may be drawn is that fiscal crisis offers the 
                                                
New York City Financial Crisis (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 1. 
72 Ken Auletta, The Streets Were Paved with Gold (New York: Random House, 1979), 31. 
73 Moody, Welfare State, 5. 
74 Bailey, Crisis Regime, 2. 
75 Ibid., 8, 10. 
76 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York: Verso, 2006 [1982]), x. 
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means by which the “discipline of capital can ultimately be imposed on any state apparatus that 
remains within the orbit of capitalist relations of production.”77 
The 1975 crisis offers a sketch of the beginnings of New York’s contemporary stage of 
political economy.  The take-off of financial and speculative capital – central to the financial 
crisis of 2007 – also began at this time, and it is important that the state’s activities in New York 
are theorized with those events in mind.  The city, post-crisis, becomes defined by the crisis and 
its legacy of state reorganization.  Julian Brash describes two variations on how the crisis has 
normalized itself in New York today.  One is its ever-presence, in which the post-crisis regime is 
in permanent fiscal difficulty, experiencing constant budget shortfalls and attended by crisis 
rhetoric that encourages the continuance of the post-crisis consensus.78  With a heavy reliance on 
taxes generated by the FIRE industries, which are susceptible to booms and busts and a 
simultaneous array of tax cuts and abatements – fixtures of New York policies today – public 
funds are precariously underfed.  The financial health of post-crisis New York rests on the 
success of its “economic monoculture” – a double-edged sword that is its strength and 
vulnerability.79   
The second way the 1975 crisis has normalized itself is rooted in the law.  In response to 
the crisis, city law was written ordaining that the budget be balanced.  As Brash puts it,  
 
A temporally discrete political intervention was transformed into a naturalized legal fact, one that 
pushes city policy in accordance with the budgetary probity demanded by the post-fiscal crisis 
consensus.  The crisis has become legalized.  [Mayor] Bloomberg periodically demonstrates this 
when, faced with questions about controversial proposals like raising taxes or cutting services – 
he often says only this: ‘The law requires us to balance the budget.’80  
 
He continues:  
 
In fact crisis, of such great discursive benefit to the victors in the struggles of the 1970s, has been 
normalized. … The city’s political leaders have made calls for a return to normalcy.  The 
municipal markets show no immediate sign of depriving the city of needed capital.  Corporate 
capital shows no sign of abandoning the city.  The post-fiscal crisis consensus remains in place.  
The new ‘crisis’ remains on the plane of moral discourse, and therefore virtual (though by no 
means ineffectual).81 
 
The post-crisis period is dominated by a “morality of austerity,” made more acceptable by the 
city government’s appeal to unity when, according to Brash, it actually serves to obscure other 
maneuvers.82  Such demands for unity through austerity make redistribution, or a new 
reorganization, harder to demand.  The ethic of shared sacrifice demanded by austerity forecloses 
redistribution in lieu of the more ‘equal’ action of sweeping cuts in the untargeted, general 
interest.  The legal imperative to balance the budget in the post-crisis city offers an ethical 
excuse and rhetorical tool to demand generalized austerity, even if the budget does not actually 
get balanced.  As Brash points out, the moral dimension of crisis purposefully obscures its 
                                                
77 Ibid., 153. 
78 Julian Brash, “Invoking Fiscal Crisis: Moral Discourse and Politics in NYC,” Social Text 21:3 (2003): 59-83. 
79 Ibid., 77. 
80 Ibid., 77. 
81 Ibid., 78. 
82 Ibid., 75. 
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political nature, and this is an element that gets replayed in the 2008 consumer debt crisis as 
well.83  The 2008 crisis has not been shown to alter the state’s attitudes to capital and finance, nor 
reorganized key leadership, in any easily discernible ways.84, 85  
Austerity is patently ineffective for recovery, but finance capital is opposed to state 
management of the economy through public expenditure.86  Though American finance capital has 
no objections to $13 trillion of state support to stabilize itself, it begins to cite the virtues of 
austerity once the question of public finance for resuscitating the economy is raised.  In this era 
of the hegemony of finance, where the dominant fraction of the state is the elite of the financial 
world, Keynesian state intervention in managing demand recedes as the elites themselves evolve 
different wants from the state.  I suggest that in the case of the American state today the 
dominant group, which is billionaires rich through finance and speculative capital, wants to be 
served differently by the state, because something else – other than capital accumulation – is at 
stake. 
The question that remains is what exactly is sought through the state that is only partially 
related to the continued accumulation of capital, for without the exogenous stimulus of state 
expenditure, or further geographic expansion, to sustain it, capitalism as it exists now is bound to 
weaken.  Prabhat Patnaik writes that the elite push for austerity because they are fearful that a 
proactive state correction of the economy would undermine the global market’s confidence in 
them.87  The dynamics at play here are even more complicated, however, because if there is in 
fact a loss of confidence in the capitalist elite, then the state’s intended revival of the economy 
through a stimulus may not actually encourage private investment and spending (the expected 
stabilizers that a stimulus generates) which in turn leads to the requirement of a prolonged 
stimulus.  However, there is another element to consider, for the stimulus resources required by 
the state are borrowed by it through financiers in exchange for government securities.  The 
finance elite’s opinion of the state’s creditworthiness thus comes under scrutiny, suggesting the 
loss of confidence of the elite in the state.  Ultimately, their mutual success is intimately 
intertwined.  
 
 
                                                
83 In 2008, the crisis began in the United States, in New York, and spread worldwide.  As subprime mortages 
defaulted en masse, Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, filed the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history, at $600 
billion in assets on September 15, 2008.  AIG, an insurer, nearly collapsed until it was bailed out by the federal 
government with $182 billion, the largest federal bailout in history. It is still soon to analyze its long-term effects on 
the city’s decision-making, especially since 2011 saw a second wave of crisis in the form of sovereign debt and the 
effects of that are still playing out across Europe. 
84 Michael Bloomberg is still in office.  One policy that he implemented in the wake of the crisis was an amendment 
to the term-limit law, so that he could run for a third term in 2009.  Admittedly, this is a significant political move, 
and I delve into its meaning more in Chapter 2, in relation to his role as the first ‘CEO mayor.’ 
85 The construction projects I look at were proposed before the crisis, and despite the city’s struggles with deficits 
and massive debt since then, they remain on the table, or are already partly constructed. 
86 The Great Depression of the 1930s marked the beginning of a new exogenous stimulus for capitalism: state 
expenditure, as exemplified by the New Deal and its many programs that included some social welfare measures.  
Patnaik argues that state intervention in demand management has now also run its course as a desired economic 
stimulus, because the emergence of international finance capital has diminished the scope it can have (Prabhat 
Patnaik, ‘Austerity Versus Stimulus,’ Monthly Review, Sep. 21, 2011).  However, it must be noted that both types of 
stimulus assume the beneficial potential of state expenditure, and thus an attendant beneficence, and disregard of 
profit, by the state. 
87 Patnaik, Austerity. 
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Toward an Ethical State? 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, scholars, activists, and the public alike have located a 
certain imperative in the state to confront finance capital, to ensure that it does not become 
bound by the caprices of the financial elite.  Disregarding for a moment the fact that they are 
inextricably tied, this demand is important to consider, specifically in regard to how it resonates 
with Marx and his mention of “political life’s moments of special concern for itself.”88  He posits 
an allegorical morality that crucially keeps the political community and the state in balance. This 
allegorical morality is described in Rousseau’s The Social Contract as the individual’s desire to 
substitute physical, independent existence for a limited, moral one that necessitates membership 
in a greater whole rather than independence.  Though Marx does not mention the particular 
workings of his conception of morality and how it gains its force, perhaps it can be extended to 
the dominant group’s wranglings with other dominated groups within the state.  In order to fight 
fiscal stimulus, which is a threat to the dominant fraction’s power in the state as well as an 
overall threat to the stability of the state, the morality of austerity is mobilized and, in a 
surprising turn, idealizes the political. 
Once again, it is useful to return to a variation on the concept of fractional unity, this time 
in the work of Carl Schmitt, best-known for theorizing the concept of the political.  He writes, 
 
If state unity becomes problematic in the reality of social life, this leads to a condition 
unbearable for every citizen, for because of this the normal situation vanishes and with it the 
presumption of every ethical and legal norm.  The concept of state ethics then gains a new 
content, and a new task emerges: consciously bringing about that unity – the duty to 
collaborate on realizing a bit of concrete, real order and returning the situation to normal.  
Then besides the state’s duty, that lies in subordination to ethical norms, and besides the 
duties towards the state, another, very different duty of state ethics emerges: that is, the duty 
for a state.89 
 
For him, ethics emerges in the properly-made distinction between friend and enemy, arguing 
against a universal set of ethical values to which politics must be subject. The fundamental 
decision that any political order makes will be one that establishes a normal situation from a state 
of exception or conflict, and its glue is its ethic.  Considering New York’s financial crises of the 
past few decades, and the influence of the dominant fraction in the state throughout the city’s 
history, one can note that the state has not been in the normal situation when the interests of the 
dominant fraction were threatened in any way. However, as the constituents of power and the 
harnessers of the state, it is vital for the dominant fraction to idealize the political, as it were, and 
try to maintain a normal situation through the assertion of hegemonic fractional unity.  
Therefore, the duty for the state that Schmitt suggests emerges, despite a loss of confidence in its 
present strategic use.  Such loss of confidence eventually is overturned in the wake of a crisis, 
and moments of creative destruction rebuild the state in a way more suitable to maintaining 
unity. 
The moral dimension animated by the state, post-crisis, is something that extends beyond 
financial discourse and into the built fabric and landscape of the city, much like the boosterism 
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of the bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century.  As in the earlier eras of industrial New York, a use 
and abuse of collective memories by the city’s builders – political, ideological, economic, 
physical – continues.  The moral call to unity and austerity plays on the aspirational soul and 
history of New York, and a perpetual kindling of what kind of place it could be, and is, become 
closely bound up in the buildings that get constructed, as we will see now with the new World 
Trade Center.   
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   CHAPTER TWO  Unmeasured Authority 
 
[The Port Authority] was an entity unlike anything ever before seen in the United States.90 
 
 
The first World Trade Center’s two towers were completed in 1973 and felled in 2001.  
Construction on the first of its replacements is slated to finish in late 2013.  Where there were 
two nearly-twinned towers on the sixteen-acre WTC site, there are now four new towers as well 
as the National September 11th Memorial and Museum.  Those sixteen acres, out of New York 
City’s 205,951, are the site of the nation’s most famous ruins.91  Famous because they are 
contemporary, exceptional in a U.S. city, and highly symbolic, they occupy a place in the 
memory of most adults around the world living today.   In New York, the footprints of those 
ruins remain, now memorialized in stone, steel, lights, and water as the 9/11 Memorial.  The 
footprints – square depressions, “roughly corresponding” to the roof plans of the towers, honed 
from the buildings’ battered foundations – have shaped the future of the sixteen acres they 
occupy, as well as that of the surrounding landscape of Lower Manhattan.92  Not only delimiting 
the memorial space, the footprints have inspired a concrete plan to follow for future capital 
investment and construction, as this chapter details.  They are the beginning of everything else 
that has happened in and around the site.  The footprints have had their effect through the 
mediation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and hence of the state.  As the 
chapter shows, the relationship between urban reconstruction and state formation is mobilized by 
what seem to be non-state actors, or by something that we cannot quite classify as state or non-
state – the Port Authority.   
“Reflecting Absence,” the jury-selected winning memorial plan, is composed of an 8-acre 
field of trees in which the footprints are marked by two square reflecting pools, each “large 
voids, open and visible reminders of the absence.”93  At the perimeters of these pools, the names 
of the dead are inscribed on bronze panels.  The WTC Memorial Jury noted that the design 
“made the voids left by the destruction the primary symbols of our loss.”94  This symbolic value 
generated by the footprints is manifold, marking their work in the state-sanctioned 
memorialization process, in private healing and mourning, and in the reimagining of the site.  
Beyond their memorial value, the footprints also have become the starting point for the 
reconfiguration of Lower Manhattan’s retail, residential, and commercial spheres, structuring the 
flow of people and capital around the WTC site and greater Lower Manhattan.  They are 
emblematic of the past loss of lives that occurred at the site, but are also the platform from which 
the other WTC buildings – including 1 WTC, the once-named Freedom Tower – and a revised 
financial landscape can be launched.  The footprints do both memorializing and financial work.  
The reflection of absence paradoxically functioned to assert that the American nation-state was 
resilient and powerful enough to recover from the decimation of one of its economic centers, 
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both economically and geopolitically.   The precise images of the footprints presented a tangible, 
physical symbol – a ground zero – that called for triumphal repair by the injured nation-state.  In 
this way, the footprints no longer remain only to facilitate mourning and healing, a grappling 
with 9/11’s pain, but are mobilized as what I call “markers of public authority” – symbols of 
justification for rebuilding a nearly $3 billion financial tower with state funds and are, in turn, 
hegemonic devices that reassert American imperialism and capitalism.   
I call them “markers of public authority” because those charged sixteen acres are owned 
by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, an agency of the two states; the twin-
towered WTC symbolized the power of the Port Authority’s structural framework.  The Port 
Authority’s marquee construction, the Twin Towers were the biggest construction project of 
their time and remained iconic structures, emblematic of national and financial power as well as 
the Port Authority’s own ability to be an organization capable of such grand ventures.  Their 
remaining footprints, huge, square, and gaping, are footprints in the technical sense, the traces of 
two edifices. They are the markers of 9/11, the event, yet they are also the marks of a particularly 
old and potent public authority and that authority’s plans for the future of the site.  They are the 
work of the planners and actors making them, bearing the authorship of the Port Authority.   
This chapter asks: do the footprints of the Twin Towers, and their memorialization as 
such, act as crystallizations of the state’s ethical commitments?  In replacing the Twin Towers 
with 1 WTC, how does the Port Authority uniquely manage to mobilize economy and ethics 
while serving as a key, third actor in the network of public-private relationships between the 
state and private sector? 
The common critique of public authorities, including the Port Authority, is their 
perversion of democracy and constitutional non-compliance.95  By maintaining a separation from 
constitutional checks and balances, issuing revenue-backed debt (in violation of the 
Constitution’s full faith and credit clause for indebtedness), and operating without 
institutionalized oversight, public authorities are seen to pervert democracy through their very 
contradicting of the Constitution. That particular approach to democracy – positing a normative 
ideal against which the operations of public authorities are evaluated as if they are external, not 
constitutive, of democracy – is not the main concern of this chapter.  Instead, the chapter 
investigates the inclusion of public authorities in the general state structure.  It discusses the role 
public authorities play in modern American government and their conflict with the espoused 
principles of that government.  It asks: what does the elision of public authorities’ functioning 
and the elision of their difference – while they remain singular in their structures, relative to the 
rest of government – do for the state?  The state acts through them in “shadowed,” “backdoor” 
ways, in alliance with the private sector, in order to offer concrete public goods.  Precisely how 
does it do so while also presenting an image of itself as functioning singularly, even as it relies 
on quasi-state structures and extra-state principles to maintain this image?  This chapter theorizes 
this procedure as one aspect of the technology of “creative destruction” examined in Chapter 
One.   
The conflict with principles of government that is signaled by public authorities is not 
simply a contradiction with the Constitution.  Instead, it signals something about how the state 
functions through the Constitution and about how democracy functions.  A central component of 
healthy democratic functioning is a benevolent state, one that is ethically committed to equality 
and public good.  By subverting constitutional principles via public authorities, an image of the 
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state’s health is maintained and democracy is buoyed.  What emerges from the footprints is a 
publicly-funded project that helps unveil the shadow government of extra-state authority.  This 
authority is characterized by an ambiguous location between public and private forces, yet the 
concrete, actual processes of decision-making and construction that the Port Authority is 
engaged in, which I discuss in this chapter, expose a more productive relation between public, 
private, and ambiguous third. 
In the case of public authorities, a fully-functioning image of the state is constructed 
through the obfuscation of debt, the reliance on experts in the face of democratic inefficiency, 
and the corporate business form of agencies that are public in both name and guiding principles.  
In other words, by delegating its expected functions to the extra-state public authority form, the 
state is simultaneously destroying its standing as, and potential to ever be, a successful 
democratic state and building an image of a state invested in the public good that does not 
necessarily exist in actual form. Public authorities do not subvert American democracy, but are 
constitutive of it.  They do not represent a “disintegration of government,” but constitute it, and 
this has consequences on the question of democracy.   
As the evidence in this chapter shows, public authorities, rather than simply disintegrate 
government, offer an institutional ambiguity and flexible organization that is adaptive to capital, 
responding to market trends and consumer demands.  They also offer a way to deal with regional 
issues that respect no political boundaries. They go places that the state, proper, cannot.  An 
investigation in 1990 by the New York State Commission on Government Integrity called public 
authorities an “insiders’ game” in which it was “difficult to get at the most rudimentary 
information.”96  Despite more recent attempts to shed light on their doings, which this chapter 
discusses, the public’s understanding of authorities is itself constituted by shadow. 
I use the footprints to mark a discursive break with the enormous event that is 9/11 by 
localizing and grounding the analysis of the WTC in the materiality of the site itself and the 
effects that materiality has had upon the built environment neighboring it.  This chapter discusses 
the Port Authority’s97 relationship to the footprints of the Twin Towers and what that 
relationship illuminates about the agency and the public authority form more generally.  I argue 
that in the face of destruction, like that viscerally exemplified by the footprints, the Port 
Authority, as it rebuilds its material losses with 1 WTC, rebuilds the state itself.  The three sets 
of actors that come together in the footprints – public (state), private (financial), and ambiguous 
third (public authority) – are also responsible for the reconstruction plan that has emerged at the 
site.  I argue that the Port Authority secures a bridge to the private sector for the state and that 
through this bridging, the state claims the ethical.  The ethical commitment of the Port Authority 
to rebuild the WTC is revealed to be that of the state, as it colored by the private sector.  
Uncovering this transmutation of the bearer of the ethical commitment helps us to more clearly 
see both the state and what symbolizes recovery for it. 
This chapter develops this argument through the following steps.  First, the present-day 
WTC site is introduced, as is the climate of Lower Manhattan.   The history of public authorities 
in the U.S. is then sketched, with an emphasis on New York’s particular encounter with them.  In 
order to understand how the Port Authority authored the footprints themselves, we must 
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understand the history of the organization, and the chapter addresses its unique origins.  The final 
section of the chapter analyzes the actions of the Port Authority at the WTC site over the past 
dozen years, and offers a way to think the capitalist state’s ethical commitment through the 
workings of the quasi-state Port Authority. 
 
 
The built environment and the state: reconstructing the World Trade Center 
 
 1 WTC, designed primarily by New York firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill and 
consulting design partner David Childs, generated outcry over its lone tower, its original, 
reactionary name (changed by Port Authority ex-director Chris Ward), and the design itself, 
which some critics have called paranoid and alienating. The 104-story tower reached a 1,776-
foot height on May 9, 2013, when a spire was added to the top of the construction.  The building 
is owned by the Port Authority, with the private Durst Organization holding a ten percent stake 
in it.  It is an ambitious commercial real estate venture, with over 55,000 square feet of retail in 
addition to millions in office space, yet it is the symbolism of the building that the designers and 
media focus on.  According to Childs, “it will serve as the marker of the 9/11 memorial on the 
skyline,” implying a calling up of the memorial whenever a person catches sight of the tower.98  
Alternate designs for 1 WTC included THINK architectural team’s more explicit focus on 
symbolism and memory, a vision of latticed “scaffolds erected to protect the ghosts of the lost 
twin towers.”99  The latticework would reach taller than the original towers and surround the 
footprints without touching them, preserving them for a memorial.  The footprints emerge in this 
design and the winning design, among others, but what is unique about THINK’s design is that it 
is not focused on office space, unlike the eight other designs offered for Ground Zero.  Ten 
million square feet was Silverstein’s non-negotiable number for office space, “at a time when the 
city already [had] millions of square feet of unused office space, when a proposed World Trade 
Center [had] no potential tenant, and no one [knew] whether a single corporation will venture 
back to that site to move into a skyscraper.”100 THINK accommodates it in smaller buildings 
around the perimeter of the footprints, with the designers citing the primacy of New York City’s 
cultural need, rather than economic one.101  The latticed towers were designed to serve a role like 
that of the Eiffel Tower – an empty building to become the symbol of a city. 
Silverstein famously signed a 99-year lease on the WTC just weeks before 9/11, under 
whose terms he would pay the Port Authority $3.2 billion over the tenure of the lease.  The lease 
required him to rebuild and the insurance payouts he received were crucial to that.  On public 
land, yet built by a private citizen for personal profit with subsidies from the state, Silverstein’s 
millions of feet in office space are unique.  Reporter Eliot Brown notes that “the quest to rebuild 
has repeatedly demanded new public assistance as the years have added up since 9/11, both for 
the [site] infrastructure and for the private office towers planned by Silverstein.”102  In 2010, a 
deal was struck to fix a financing gap, with the city, state, and Port Authority putting in $210 
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million in equity, $390 million in less risky debt coverage, and more than $400 million in rent 
abatements.  This public assistance was not the first public contribution to get the private office 
towers built, but the fourth, preceded by $2.6 billion in tax-free Liberty bonds in 2002 (over 
$600 million in revenue lost), a large-scale Lower Manhattan reconstruction plan with special 
breaks for WTC in 2005, and new leases in 2006 by the city government and Port Authority on 
office spaces that are far more expensive than they would usually pay.  Brown notes that “at each 
point, the implication was that the market would not bring these towers up on [its] own, so the 
public needed to step in with aid to clear a path for construction. And at the discussion of each 
round of assistance, the decision to add on a new subsidy had some rationality, with officials 
saying they were too entrenched to start over and rethink the broader plan.”103  Between 
subsidies, assumptions of risk, and other incentives, the various forms of public assistance on the 
towers total over $2 billion.  The amount of public assistance for the private WTC towers is 
exceptional, and far more than was ever advertised when the rebuilding plan was sold to the 
public. 
Cost overruns on public infrastructure are common to public-private partnerships.  Initial 
development plans are proposed to the public with promises of particular, stable subsidy levels 
and expected long-term gains from rent.  Yet conditions change and costs nearly always only 
increase.  Once it seems too late to shelve a deal, a developer in turn requires more aid and the 
public sector becomes the default source for it – and the public sector is in a difficult position to 
refuse when the completion of a public building project (that is, of course, being built privately) 
hangs in the balance.  In Lower Manhattan, subsidized commercial office space for private profit 
has fallen under the aegis of public authorities – the Port Authority, primarily, as well as newer, 
smaller agencies like the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) and the Lower 
Manhattan Cultural Council (LMCC).  Yet who will own the WTC?  It is being built for private 
profit, yet the public elements of it are also undeniably palpable – in its symbolism and its 
material presence and ramifications. 
 With this heady mix of public, private, authority, and state, the lines between them are 
blurry.  Ambiguous jurisdictions and grey areas abound.  If the state is trying to crystallize its 
ethical commitment to public good by financing projects with some kind of public dimension, 
whether it is publicly-owned or not, then what does this tell us about state power?  It is revealing, 
and through an investigation of the cultural use of funds, not just fiscal policies, new insights into 
the capitalist state and political economy can come to light.   
In a 10-year anniversary address of 9/11, New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg 
asserted the full revitalization of Lower Manhattan, the neighborhood that extends out from the 
footprints.  He announced that there were more businesses there in 2011 than in 2001, and more 
people living in Lower Manhattan than since 1920, making the ongoing revitalization of the 
neighborhood “one of the greatest comeback stories in American history” and standing as “our 
greatest moment to those we lost on 9/11 and to our unshakeable faith in the moral imperative of 
protecting and preserving a free, open, democratic society.”104  Soon after 9/11, plans for 
redevelopment of the WTC were underway, but so were plans to make “the WTC Site and 
Downtown a World-Class Retail Destination.”105  When every new resident, business, student, 
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and house of worship honors the spirit of those lost and “the values that define our city, and … 
the Constitution that sustains our great nation,” as Bloomberg declares, we are confronted with 
the blurring of honoring spirits with the simple fact of pursuing personal, economic interests.   
When Droga5, a large advertising and marketing agency, decided to relocate its 
headquarters from Midtown to a Silverstein Properties-owned office building in Lower 
Manhattan, it made the headlines of business news.  Governor Cuomo and Mayor Bloomberg are 
quoted widely, saying that Droga5’s move downtown is part of the resurgence of Lower 
Manhattan as a business destination.  Yet it is important to remember that the deal was 
sweetened by city and state grants to stimulate job growth in Lower Manhattan.  Droga5 
partnered with the Empire State Development Corporation and NYC Economic Development 
Corporation, both public authorities, as well as the World Trade Center Job Creation & Retention 
Program, in order to obtain funds to finance the creation of 154 new jobs by 2017 and, by 
extension, to soften the impact of relocation costs.106 
According to the Downtown Alliance, more than 390 companies have relocated to Lower 
Manhattan since 2005, representing a wide array of industries.  The footprints of the Twin 
Towers take on a different resonance in consideration of these relocations.  Philip Nobel argues 
that the acceptance of the footprints as sacred ground – what he calls “ghettoizing the locus of 
sanctity” – was essential for big business.107  With memory harbored at the site via the memorial, 
it was installed and stabilized, clearing the way for the resumption of commerce around it. 
New York City is home to several other large, subsidized construction projects, such as 
Yankee Stadium and Atlantic Yards.  The WTC is an especially interesting object of study, 
however, due to its custodian: the Port Authority.  One of the oldest public authorities in the 
country, it has a complex history which begins nearly a century ago.  Additionally, the WTC is 
most explicitly tied to national memory and trauma, while retaining a deeply local resonance as 
well.108  The mega-engineering that has taken place and continues to unfold at these various sites 
unveils ruins.   We need to return to the history of the public authority organizational form to 
begin understanding how the Port Authority has been able to cultivate its unique relationship 
with the site. 
 
 
Public authorities: what they are and their history 
 
Public authorities are also known as government corporations and special districts.109 An 
English institution grafted onto American public administration in the early 20th century, the idea 
behind public authorities is empowering an agency to sell bonds in order to construct particular 
public works.  When a building project is completed, tolls or fees are charged until the bonds are 
paid off, at which point the agency would typically be shut down and turn its public work 
completely over to the state.  Public authorities are autonomous government agencies with 
independent decision-making power, as well as independent financial resources, yet they are 
neither part of traditional local city or county governments nor segments of state or federal 
government.  Instead, they are part of the government with operations distinct from all other 
governmental arms.  Public corporations modeled after private firms, their goal is bringing 
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market incentives and business-administrative techniques to the public sphere.110  In 1947, 
political scientist and public administration expert Luther Gulick offered a definition broad 
enough to encompass the diversity that we see today: “An authority is a government business 
corporation set up outside of the normal structure of traditional government so that it can give 
continuity, business efficiency, and elastic management to the construction or operation of a self-
supporting or revenue-producing public enterprise.”111  The New York State Comptroller’s 
Office calls public authorities corporate instruments of the State created by the Legislature to 
further public interests.112  
Public authorities today control many essential services, including transportation, 
housing, water, sewage, power, education, and hospitals, as they have for several decades.  The 
exact number of public authorities is virtually unknown, but it is in the tens of thousands.113  
Information on them is sparse, scattered throughout the nation, “the terra incognita of 
government.”114  With enormous debt, rivaling that of the federal government, and similarly high 
operating costs that are substantially borne by the state primarily through tax-free bonds, public 
authorities are nonetheless rarely subject to the electoral or legislative systems and have thereby 
been at odds with the constitutional foundations of U.S. government for decades.  Free from the 
surveillance and general oversight that the state turns on parts of itself and its citizenry, public 
authorities instead assemble a ‘shadow government’ alongside the entities we typically recognize 
as government, argues Donald Axelrod, one of few scholars to do research on public authorities 
within the past 25 years.           
While the study of public authorities has languished, the authorities themselves have 
continued to grow in size and debt.  A definitive agreement on the characteristics of the public 
authority, or special district or government corporation, does not exist.115   It is the fastest-
growing form of government in the U.S. yet also the least understood.116  The titles of agency, 
system, fund, bank, trust, district, board, commission, and company, among others, all describe 
public authorities, making them slippery entities to pin down.  Their definition by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, which is responsible for keeping track of the data of governmental units, 
does not include the word ‘state,’ and specifies a substantial independence from government.   
Ideologically, public authorities can trace a lineage originating in American 
Progressivism.  Public enterprise was at an apex of popularity in the early 20th century and 
Louise Dyble notes that “their creation was an expedient means of achieving public ownership 
and active government.”117  While many scholars point to the functional qualities of public 
authorities, such as their “pragmatic” problem-solving, their ideological appeal was – and 
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remains – a powerful element for their supporters.118  Progressive theorists blamed corruption on 
faulty governmental structures that allowed private economic interests to dominate politics, and 
instead sought, via public authorities, a corporate, hierarchical structure that was adapted to serve 
public interest instead of private profit.  Woodrow Wilson, one of the most outspoken 
Progressives, wrote in 1887 that government programs could best carry out their plans if their 
leaders were given “large powers and unhampered discretion,” warning against the opposite 
tendency of distributing power widely to ensure democratic accountability.  He argued that if 
power is “dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured … and if it be obscured, it is made 
irresponsible.”119  This account of power is reflected by the mandarins that run public authorities, 
with accomplished bureaucrats serving as the heads of most agencies.  
As an insulated agency of government, the public authority is oftentimes viewed as an 
affront to democratic principles.  Its relative autonomy from both constitutional accountability 
mechanisms and their unique financial structure separate them from the average units of the 
state, as I suggested in the previous chapter. The U.S. Constitution prohibits debt in many states, 
particularly New York.  Public authorities enable a way to get around such prohibitions with 
“creative” and “innovative” financing, which is a euphemism for obfuscation, according to 
detractors.  They become the “chosen instruments” for navigating the politics of debt, operating 
with two main techniques: to call accumulated debt “authority debt,” and never state or local 
debt, or to never call it debt at all, in turn raising the potential for defaults.120  On the other hand, 
others argue that a public authority, at least in transportation and terminals, is more like a factory 
than a school.  The decision on where to place an airport and how big it should be, for example, 
should depend on elected officials and voters.  However, advocates of public authorities assert 
that certain other matters – how to construct it, bringing aircraft in and out, routing ground traffic 
outside the airport, security, etc. – should be decided mainly by experts, not by public vote or 
public officials, lest the public make decisions not in its best interest.  
A conflict with democratic principles, and a sidestepping of U.S. Constitutional ones, 
animates the controversial status of public authorities.  These ongoing conflicts can be credited 
to authorities’ remarkable ability to adapt to a given political context while still defending their 
underlying interests.  Public authorities have developed their own kind of culture and each 
exercises a distinct repertoire of behavior that shapes their goals and the priorities of their 
decision-makers.121 However, public authorities have had some central issues since their 
beginnings in the U.S. and that persist today, as we will see with the Port Authority. 
 There are three primary targets for critics of public authorities: the decentralization and 
bureaucratization of the state that they both represent and encourage; their generation of a cost 
burden that disproportionately affects the non-wealthy; and the lack of accountability and voter 
approval in their decision-making.  The advance of bureaucratization is a familiar critique of 
government, raised most famously by Weber, and public authorities embody the key qualities of 
such rationalization, including the ability to fight off reform and protect their interests as 
individual agencies.122  Due to the independent power each one has, an authority could mobilize 
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its resources and live on indefinitely, despite unpopularity among voters.  In alliance with other 
local governments, authorities are capable of forming a protective fortress around a decentralized 
form of government, especially in metropolitan areas.   
 The stakes of an ever-encroaching bureaucratization include the foreclosure of 
democratic possibility.  In the case of public authorities, the question becomes whether public 
decisions have been removed too far from the democratic process.  Bureaucracy has been the 
basic organizational form of the contemporary U.S. state since well before the rise of public 
authorities and, if Weber’s critique of the state in general (under all political formations, not just 
democracy) is accepted, the recognition of the legitimacy of the state – and, in turn, public 
authorities – cannot be understood as a free act.  Refining Weber’s formulation, Pierre Bourdieu 
contends that the state monopolizes both physical and symbolic violence, relying on a pre-
reflexive agreement and offering one explanation why public authorities persist as the so-called 
“fourth branch” of government.  Instead of bureaucrats usurping the universal, which is the 
traditional Marxist interpretation of bureaucracy, Bourdieu suggests that the “obligatory 
reference to the values of neutrality and disinterested loyalty to the public good” have very real 
effects which “impose themselves with increasing force upon the functionaries of the state as the 
history of the long work of symbolic construction unfolds whereby the official representation of 
the state as the site of universality and of service to the general interest is invented and 
imposed.”123  This work is accomplished with the bureaucratic field itself, aligning both the 
explicit purported function of public authorities and the state’s symbolic construction and 
legitimacy.  Only in crisis does this legitimacy get questioned. 
 Now, more than ever before, there is a growing reliance on public authorities by states.124  
As federal and state debts mount, public authorities offer a way to address the problem of debt 
limits, by telling the city or state that they will not be affected because the authority has sole 
responsibility for its bonds.  The authority’s projects are to “pay for themselves.”125  However, 
the reality of authority financing is far more complex and insidious, despite taglines that claim 
otherwise.   
Public authorities generate a cost burden that is borne by the public, particularly the less 
wealthy.  The bulk of this rests in the fact that they pay for themselves through user fees.  At the 
time of their creation, the fees were only intended to be charged until the authority was paid off, 
at which point the authority would be disbanded and control of the utility in question would be 
completely handed over to the state.  However, Robert Moses turned this around and inaugurated 
the continuation of such fees, keeping authorities running even after they were paid off.  In 
addition, he began a practice of trading in old bonds for new ones to raise more money and build 
more projects; this way he (or any other builder, though they were rare in his era) would no 
longer need to go to city, state, or federal governments for funds. Between the late 1930s and late 
1950s, he took over or created 12 of these new breeds of public authority – for parks, tunnels, 
highways, and more – integrating them into a powerful extra-state machine and doing so by 
bringing thousands of businessmen and politicians into its workings and making them rich in the 
process.   
 While bondholders were able to avoid state and local taxes on their interest, this tax-
break was subsidized by taxpayers through fees and, of course, taxes. As federal taxpayers, the 
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public as a whole shoulders the cost of authorities by exempting interest on municipal bonds 
from U.S. taxes.  The average person’s taxes subsidize the biggest authorities in the country, and 
her fees pay for the burgeoning costs of all authorities. Such fees include utilities fees, such as 
for water and gas, and bridge tolls.  State and local taxpayers “pay three times”: by subsidizing 
state and local tax breaks, by subsidizing federal tax breaks, and by paying fees.126  While the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 cut the amount of tax exemption, losses in revenue on municipal bonds 
were still in the billions, per year, in 1992.  However, the most adversely affected are poor and 
working-class people – user fees cut more deeply into their incomes, disproportionately. Tax 
reduction benefits the rich who are able to join the municipal bond market in the first place. 
 Other winners in the public authorities world are its big supporters: brokerage houses, 
law firms, financial advisers, banks that sell and underwrite bonds, bond-rating organizations, 
bond insurance firms, building contractors, real estate developers, engineering and architectural 
firms, insurance companies, and labor unions that do large-scale construction projects. It is thus 
that authorities become “beehives of political patronage” and hide the realities of state and local 
finances.127  Bond investors are winners as well, though their tax-free interest also comes with 
risk of defaults and advance refunding of bond issues that could jeopardize their holdings and 
gains.  It is among this assemblage of interests that deals for projects are usually negotiated, 
instead of competitively bid for.  An “extraordinary reliance” on such negotiated deals has raised 
charges, time and again, of “undue political pressure, unnecessary high costs, and unfairness.”128  
However, as with the example of airport construction mentioned earlier, many claim that bond 
issues are so complex that they require unusual expertise, approaches, and fees; thus time is 
saved to negotiate with the most qualified firm rather than open it up to a bidding process.  While 
time is saved, the costs for projects escalate and remain borne by the general public.  
Additionally, issuing private contracts acts as a kind of concealing device that keeps certain 
expenditures from the public. 
Marshall Berman compares Moses’ networked machine of public authorities to U.S. Steel 
and Standard Oil, all of them “triumphs of modern art … system[s] in perpetual motion.”  Yet, it 
also “…carries the contradiction between ‘the public’ and the people so far that in the end not 
even the people at the system’s center – not even Moses himself – had the authority to shape the 
system and control its ever-expanding moves.”129 The unelected heads of public authorities, like 
Moses and Felix Rohatyn of M.A.C., outrivaled governors and mayors in the exercise of power, 
yet grew organizations whose debt obligations, and ability to attract ever more debt, became 
unmanageable.   
Perhaps the most widely-voiced critique of public authorities, because it is the most 
apparent, is the lack of accountability and voter approval that public authorities enjoy.  
Authorities are managed by professional administrators, who “have all of the independent 
initiative of corporate executives” yet remain insulated from public opinion and electoral 
politics.130 In general, their governing boards are appointed rather than elected; while in theory, 
citizens are shareholders of these government businesses, their operations are designed to deflect 
public curiosity.  Most public authorities are authorized to issue bonds, without voter approval, 
and the debt service for these bonds is usually supported by tolls and fees.  In certain cases, such 
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as in New York State, the state also assigns specific revenue streams to an authority to pay debt 
service.  Each authority has varying levels of autonomy from the state, based on its particular 
legislative mandate.  Some authorities are entirely self-supporting and operate fully outside the 
budget process, rendering their operations nearly opaque, while others rely on state 
appropriations to fund operations, which offers a modicum of transparency.  Many authorities 
conduct business outside of the usual oversight and accountability requirements for operations 
including, but not limited to, employment practices, contracts and procurement procedures, and 
financial reporting, as well as appointments to an authority’s board of directors, given by elected 
officials for varying terms.131 There is no public voting or discussion about these procedures.   
State comptrollers and auditors, the source of much of the data on public authorities, are 
often considered “toothless watchdogs,” who are effectively unable to loosen authorities from 
the protection of whichever group may be controlling and protecting them, such as the 
governor’s office.132  Arguments to retain authorities’ independence cite the need to keep them 
out of politics, backing a clear demand with a vague, obfuscating rationale.  The question of 
where accountability lies remains unclear.  As former New York Governor Hugh L. Carey, who 
investigated the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) in particular, as well as other 
authorities, declared that “public authorities in New York have been allowed to create debt 
obligations without adequate consideration, supervision or control by the executive and 
legislative branches of govt.”133   
  It is for this reason that various scholars, journalists, and political figures have declared 
public authorities a shadow government.134  As the story of the Port Authority shows, the 
creators of the first public authorities were politicians who sought a way to deal with pressing 
problems, like housing and transport, which were not being addressed by the system that existed.  
It is incorrect to claim that public authorities originated in a conspiracy to siphon public funds.  
However, as they exist now, they have failed in numerous ways, including an uncontrolled debt 
burden potentially nearing $1 trillion, money laundering, regressive fees that burden the poor, 
bail outs for bankrupt authorities, corruption, subversion of the statutory missions of authorities 
with new, often dubious, ventures, misleading voters, and failing to monitor the performance and 
costs of authorities.   
 
 
Disciplining authorities: New York’s encounter with public authorities 
 
 New York has had a leading role in disciplining authorities.  The public authority as a 
state institution was subject to state discipline, and discipline is one such site that shows the 
encounter between the two.  Axelrod similarly notes the need for a framework of accountability 
that explicitly spells out the relationship between government and public authorities.  As public 
authorities serve many indispensable functions today – from water provision to road maintenance 
– bringing them squarely into the realm of government would need to be done without gutting or 
smothering them.  Various states have attempted to discipline authorities, with methods 
including giving the governor veto power (New Jersey), creating central agencies to monitor debt 
(Texas, Kentucky, California), creating special units in budget offices to oversee authority 
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budgets (New York), conducting full-scale audits (Illinois), and simply restricting the number of 
public authorities (Wisconsin).135  
Different judicial and legislative attempts have been made to rein in authorities, as well.  
The federal Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 was the last and only major nation-
wide attempt to regulate authorities.  New York, however, has displayed great willingness to 
change unchecked authority power, with notable attempts of varying degrees of success 
beginning in the 1970s.  The Public Authorities Control Commission was created to oversee 
authorities on behalf of the governor and legislature, with a litany of recommendations, including 
getting rid of moral obligation bonds and accountability by the boards. It failed, however, and 
only was able to write a report due to the governor and legislature turning down its proposals, 
“which would have had the effect of upsetting a well-established patronage system and cozy 
relationships with private groups that thrived on authorities.”136  
Instead, the PACC was disbanded and token oversight was established with the Public 
Authorities Control Board (PACB) in 1976. Still in operation, it only monitors a portion of New 
York’s authorities.137  It approves bond issues for that portion, but it does not review the 
feasibility of projects or the performance of authorities.  A statement against public authorities 
was issued in a 1986 Newsday by former chairman of the UDC William J. Stern, who broke with 
then-Governor Mario Cuomo, and it would mark a change in momentum for reform.  Stern 
writes, 
 
Two arguments have always been given for establishing authorities: They insulate public 
activities from overt political pressures and they can issue tax-exempt securities and thus 
circumvent the borrowing constraints placed on the regular state government.  In recent years, the 
credibility of these arguments has been shattered.  
Management of public authorities is rife with inefficiency and patronage without the 
accountability required of elected officials.  Moreover, the ability of public authorities to 
circumvent borrowing constraints led directly to the state’s fiscal crisis in 1975.  Currently, the 
debt of the public authorities is 6 ½ times the size of the state’s general fund debt.  Is it any 
wonder NY has the lowest credit rating of any state? 
 Authorities are all vehicles for the redistribution of income.  They shift wealth from the 
average taxpayer to those who are best at accessing and manipulating government – usually more 
affluent New Yorkers.  The worst aspect of this ‘upward redistribution’ is that it tackles state 
problems in an indirect and ultimately ineffective fashion.138 
 
This statement began a press frenzy that swung the Assembly Committee on Corporations, 
Authorities, and Commissions into words of its own in 1987, voiced by its chairman, Oliver 
Koppel:  “Public authorities have taken on a character and life of their own. Sometimes they 
become fiefdoms of individuals. They also transcend individuals because of self-perpetuating 
entities that try to insulate themselves from political influences and people.”139  However, no real 
reform took off. 
The past decade has seen the most reform activity, specifically with the 2005 Public 
Authorities Accountability Act (PAAA) which increased reporting and auditing requirements on 
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public authorities, called for board member training and the disclosure of executive salaries, 
required each authority to adopt a code of ethics and to make their annual reports available 
online, and restricted their power to dispose of real property for less than fair market value or 
without public bidding.  The reporting requirements remain in place today, but with high rates of 
noncompliance. Of filed reports, more than 18% had significant data errors and were sent back to 
the authorities for corrections.  Mistakes included: incorrect entries for the amount of debt retired 
during the year and inaccurate staffing, salary and compensation information.  In addition to 
these new obligations, the PAAA also created the Authorities Budget Office (ABO). 
The ABO, originally created to conduct studies and analyses, gained many new 
responsibilities with the 2009 Public Authorities Reform Act (PARA), including the 
establishment of a definition for public authorities, the development of a comprehensive 
inventory of authorities, the collection of their mission statements, and the review of their 
potential for consolidation or elimination – in other words, a taking-stock and possible-revamp of 
New York’s authorities.  Notably, the act also clarified that board members have fiduciary duty 
to carry out their responsibilities with a reasonable degree of diligence, care, skill, and 
independence.  Hailed as one of the most significant reform measures in decades by government 
watchdog groups, PARA gave the ABO the power to initiate formal investigations, subpoena 
authorities, and publicly censure noncompliant authorities and suspend or remove board 
members.140  The bill’s chief sponsor – former Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, who spent 
months battling the city over the legality of $3 billion in public financing for the new Yankee 
Stadium – noted that if PARA had been in effect earlier, many authority negotiations would have 
been forced into greater transparency.  He notes that “The authorities are the real true source of 
state debt …. Nobody knew what they did or who was in control.”141  While the reforms in New 
York have undoubtedly shed more light on authorities, it is uncertain whether the fundamental 
problems with authorities will be ameliorated.  Comptrollers and auditors can only recommend, 
not command, change, so their impact remains to be seen, unlike bond-rating and bond insurance 
companies who have immediate disciplinary measures at hand. 142  This is particularly true when 
the judiciary is under political pressure to keep funds flowing for public projects.  Is Axelrod to 
be believed when he writes that, “Not for a moment will elected officials dismember their own 
creatures when they serve political and policy ends and are the only means of leapfrogging over 
constitutions, laws, and voter resistance”?143  
 The New York State Comptroller’s office notes outright that, as of 2009, over 94 percent 
of all State-funded debt outstanding was issued by public authorities without voter approval.144  
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New York City issues more bonds than any public authority or state and local government in the 
U.S., second only to the federal government.145  Collectively, New York State’s public 
authorities spend more than $50 billion annually, and have nearly $250 billion in debt 
outstanding.146  In 2011, the most recent year for which data is available, 44 state authorities 
reported generating $21.8 billion in revenue from fees, rents, tolls and other service charges, but 
ended the year with $141.9 billion in outstanding debt, of which 36.7 percent was issued on 
behalf of state government. In 2011 alone, state public authorities issued more than $14 billion in 
new debt. At the same time, local public authorities issued $14.5 billion in debt, and ended the 
year with $91.4 billion in outstanding debt.147   
 According to the ABO’s 2009 report, its first after PARA, authorities range from the 
huge MTA, which employs more than 74,000 workers, to small agencies like the Nassau County 
Interim Finance Authority, which has five workers.  More than 80 agencies, like the Seneca 
Tobacco Asset Securitization Corporation, have no staff whatsoever.   In 2009, ABO identified 
130 authorities that seemed to be performing no functions and should be dissolved.148 
 For many critics of public authorities, the tendency of states to use authorities as ‘cash 
cows’ is a severe problem.  This was particularly true of New York in the 1990s, in the wake of a 
recession that gave authorities new access to resources.  Where once states bailed out authorities, 
authorities were involuntarily opening their treasuries to states, further blurring accountability.  
Cuomo diverted $2 billion in authority reserves and surpluses to the general fund of the state 
over a four-year period, as well as billed the authorities for services that were rendered by the 
state, like bond issuance and budgeting, and sold Attica Correctional Facility to UDC for $200 
million.  Last year, 2012, Cuomo used over half a billion dollars in authority money to pay 
ongoing state bills.  The use of authorities as cash cows was also true of M.A.C. and New York 
City after the 1975 crisis, at which time over $4 billion was transferred from M.A.C. to the city.  
Important to note is that none of this redistribution of authority funds took place with open 
budgeting and appropriation processes.  The main players were, and continue to be, the governor, 
the mayor, and the heads of authorities.149 It is telling that New York City Mayor Mike 
Bloomberg sought to block PARA in 2009. 
 New York relies heavily on public authority funds, acquired through debt issues without 
voter approval, in order to pay its own expenses and provide services to its constituents.   In his 
2013-14 budget proposal, Cuomo wants to create a new bond financing program backed by sales 
tax revenue.  State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli believes it will increase back-door borrowing, 
but Cuomo’s administration counters that New York has always relied on authorities for some of 
its general funding.150  There are considerable issues at stake in this tendency toward so-called 
backdoor financing, or situations in which authority money is used for the state’s general fund 
and expenses.  When states take and utilize authority funds, the burden of running government 
shifts from the general taxpayer to the user of authority services, bringing us once again to the 
uneven burden authorities place on lower-income people in general.  The second issue that this 
tendency raises is the existence of surpluses in the first place.  Public authorities are not profit-
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making enterprises.  Why not lower fees, or pay off bonds earlier to reduce the debt load?  Why 
not eliminate fees altogether once the bonds are paid off?  This inclination of the state to shift 
ever more functions over to authorities – force-feeding their cash cows – is one of the animating 
problems of this dissertation.   
 
 
 The Port Authority: from powerful engine to empty vessel 
 
From before its birth to its present incarnations, the Port Authority has undergone many 
transformations.  One of the oldest and largest of the world’s specialized regional governments, 
its early history is singular: 
 
…a vigorous engine of economic vitality – a public organization both marvelous and disturbing 
to behold.  Marvelous, because it had accomplished great feats of engineering and carried them 
forward under a banner of interstate cooperation, with unexpected speed and without direct 
burden to the taxpayer.  Yet disquieting, when measured by important American values, because 
the new agency avoided close democratic controls and symbolized – indeed endorsed, showed the 
benefits of – efficiency as a goal, a goal that might best be achieved if democracy in its usual 
forms were put “on hold.”151 
 
The Port Authority, while still the PNYA, achieved efficiency previously unseen from an agency 
affiliated with the state.  FDR backed the PNYA and had called its “disinterested and capable 
service” a model for all government agencies, with its methods pointing toward a more 
“honorable administration” of government affairs.152  Under FDR’s approval, the PNYA became 
a partial model for the Tennessee Valley Authority and hundreds of other state and locally-
created public authorities in the 1930s.  The quote from Doig above calls up American 
democracy and its arrest by the authority’s operations, yet it is in fact efficiency that emerges as 
an American value for FDR.  The threat to democratic principles remains the main thread of 
criticisms of public authorities, coming from the public, government, and scholars alike.   
 According to Doig, the Port Authority’s story exemplifies certain themes in American 
political development: the recurring attempt to build “nonpolitical” government agencies fueled 
by technical expertise and efficiency; a public willingness to approve executive decisions by 
government officials in the name of cohering the political system and addressing social 
problems; a tendency – at times contradictory – of relying on incentive-driven capitalism and 
individual self-interest in order to spur economic development, with government programs 
designed to cater to these market forces; and an overarching optimism that the American people 
and political system could find a winning solution to even the most daunting of problems.153  
The early 20th century saw the Port of New York booming, facilitating the huge amounts 
of trade pushing the city’s growth into the largest in the country.  However, overcrowding and 
congestion in the New York harbor precipitated its decline in 1920.  Aging docks and piers were 
unable to handle the modern vessels flooding the harbor, now the world’s busiest.  Additionally, 
it was not designed for direct rail-water shipment, with most railroads terminating in New Jersey 
but 90% of docking facilities in New York City, and such shuttling between the two via barges 
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added to operating costs.  As the New York harbor’s traffic waned, other, more modern ports 
were being built along the eastern U.S. seaboard and gaining increasing shares of maritime trade.   
In response to this decline, the states of New York and New Jersey cooperatively 
undertook the development of the Port of New York Authority (PNYA) in 1921, an entity 
“unlike anything ever before seen in the United States.”154  Originally suggested in 1918 by 
Julius Henry Cohen, the counsel of the joint commission was created to explore ways out of the 
political and legal conflict between the states spurred by port crowding.  A powerful bi-state 
agency was proposed to improve terminals and associated transportation facilities, and it would 
be allowed to issue bonds and charge fees for its services.  Over the next several decades, the 
agency would grow immensely and construct many large-scale projects, but in a form very 
different from its first conception.   
Immediately prior to taking the presidency in 1913, Woodrow Wilson served as governor 
of New Jersey and was an avid proponent of vigorous and experimental state activity, alongside 
the importance of capitalism, individualism, and competition in cultivating individual success 
and a healthy society.  Such themes were important in the birth of the PNYA, shaping its rhetoric 
and, often, its reality.155  Unsurprisingly, the primary support for the creation of the regional port 
authority came from business leaders, who hoped the agency would be able to overcome political 
and geographic obstacles that they found injurious to commercial expansion and profit.  The 
question then becomes how an agency can overcome such obstacles without subverting or 
manipulating the law.  What did the PNYA have to become in order to achieve these tasks?  
   Between 1918 and 1921, Cohen’s design for the PNYA was mostly dismantled.  
Originally conceived as a powerful engine for modernizing the port district, it was transformed 
into a “nearly empty shell,” with too little power or funds to carry out the missions it was tasked 
with, primary of which was the enhancement of cooperative bi-state planning and the 
development and implementation of improvements to the region’s rail-freight system.156  
 Cohen’s original proposal in 1918 allotted huge powers to the PNYA.  After initial 
approvals by the two state legislatures, and a two-thirds vote by the region’s citizens (conducted 
through local governments), the agency could issue regulations governing construction, 
commercial transactions, and other Port District activities, as well as block state actions 
inconsistent with a plan for the comprehensive development of the Port area.  He designed it for 
independent action, with unsalaried commissioners to be appointed for six-year overlapping 
terms so that the Authority’s policies could not be altered by the states’ replacement of officials.  
Its revenues were to be drawn from its own self-supporting projects, to insulate it from the states’ 
monetary control, and the governors were given no review or veto power over decisions.157  
Jameson Doig, a historian of the Port of New York, writes of Cohen’s vision: 
 
With these safeguards for its independence, coupled with its substantial regulatory and operating 
powers, the PNYA would be an exemplar of the reformer’s vision: insulated from intraregional 
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jealousies and the many vagaries of politics, the Authority’s skilled staff of engineers and 
planners would analyze, monitor, and shape the modernization of the Port and the economic 
growth of the surrounding region, guided only by principles of efficiency and the public 
interest.158  
 
In this way, it would thus realize the reformist hopes of Wilson and other Progressive types, 
which were oriented toward efficiency and a stronger central government.  Commissioners 
would ideally be “distinguished members of the business and legal communities – men and 
women who would have the fortitude to defend the agency’s integrity against pressures from 
state officials.”159   However, the relation between these institutions and the state is not a fixed 
one.  Any change that occurs would necessarily be internal to the relationship, with actors trying 
to negotiate the terms from within the relationship, as the WTC rebuilding shows. 
Even more precautions were in place in Cohen’s draft.  Once state legislatures approved 
plans for port development, no change could thereafter be made except by approval of the 
agency.  States could not make grants of land within the Port District without agency approval, 
as substantial parcels of land in the port area were owned by the states themselves.  Perhaps most 
significantly, Cohen’s proposal was innovative in its allowing of a voting role for cities and 
towns in the port district, but with only New York City, containing more than half of the district 
population, able to block the PNYA’s policies on its own.  Other towns and cities could not stop 
decisions, even if they combined, and the courts could be turned to by the PNYA and its findings 
would be binding, even if one-third to all of the cities and towns other than New York City were 
opposed.  Any violation of an approved PNYA regulation by an individual, city, or corporation 
would result in a fine up to $5000 or imprisonment.   
 However, Cohen’s plan for a well-insulated, powerful PNYA did not survive.  State and 
local officials “raised the banner of ‘democracy’ and the necessity for ‘public accountability’” 
and the original idea emerged after three drafts and two years as something very different.160  It 
was well-received by some, who believed doing the quick work of maintaining the commercial 
supremacy of the harbor required that an “autocratic head” be vested with “well nigh absolute” 
power, as espoused by an editorial in The Brooklyn Eagle, but it was nonetheless systematically 
dismantled by the mayor John Hylan, taking over from reformer John Purroy Mitchel.  Hylan 
campaigned against government reform and so-called efficiency experts, both of which were 
supported by patronage-based local government.  After public meetings and private hearings by a 
bi-state review commission hobbled Cohen’s design, all its regulatory and enforcement powers 
were stripped.  No changes were permitted except by and with approval of the legislatures, 
regulations would all have to be approved by both state legislatures, and all railroad and terminal 
activities would be under the control of the states’ utility commissions that would in turn treat the 
PNYA like a private corporation.  Additionally, the PNYA could not acquire or operate transport 
projects without the approval of a comprehensive plan by both state legislatures.  The message 
sent by Hylan’s reforms was clear: the states and their legislatures were calling the shots, not the 
agency itself.  What emerged is a public authority that did not offer much of a threat to the 
existing pattern of state power and prerogatives. 
 Though Cohen’s vision was not accepted, it still colors our perception of the Port 
Authority as autonomous.  It remains with the Port Authority today, even though the idea was 
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abandoned.  The autonomy of the agency was viciously opposed by the state, but yet it was 
maintained by the state, as we see in today’s Port Authority, which does not bear any visible 
presence of the state.  This invisibility of the state, I argue, is how democracy maintains itself.  
The state uses the public authority form to do certain work for it without implicating itself, with 
the public authority serving as the constitutive outside of the state.  The public authority becomes 
a site the state disavows, yet it remains constitutive of it and internal to it.161   
New York Governor Nathan Miller, however, who found local New York City 
government inefficient and incompetent, defended state intervention in municipal affairs and 
tempered New York City officials’ opposition to Cohen’s vision.  Regarding the original 
design’s dismantling, he said, “The municipalities have been created by the States.  They are the 
mere creatures of the State, and when it becomes necessary for the State to step in to rescue those 
people in their own interests, the State not only has the power, but, in my judgment, it is the 
moral duty of the State to do it.”162  For Miller as for Cohen, the city municipality was not the 
heart of government, as many of the city’s politicians argued.    
Woodrow Wilson wrote in an 1887 article on administration that “Our duty is to supply 
the best possible life to a federal organization, to systems within systems; to make town, city, 
county, state, and federal governments live with a like strength … keeping each unquestionably 
its own master and yet making all interdependent and co-operative.”163  The federal state and city 
meld, but only if each state were permitted to remold its economic practices and institutions – to 
adapt them to changing social and economic needs.  Such arguments for experimentation and 
interdependence are exemplified by the Port Authority’s successful defense of tax-exempt 
municipal bonds, which became a key force in protecting the ability of cities and states 
nationwide to finance their preferred capital needs.  The Port Authority was also the first agency 
to rely on revenue bonds and user payments (rather than general taxes) to carry out large capital 
projects.  After its first decade of success, the model was put into widespread use, such as with 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, across the U.S. and abroad.  Thus, many things about Cohen's 
proposal remained.  
To create a draft for the PNYA, Cohen had drawn upon international legal principles, 
because he found American states very successful at retaining their complete and independent 
sovereignty in all matters except those expressly delegated to the federal government.  For 
Cohen, any questions between states were treated as questions between nations, abiding by the 
canons of international law in discernible ways, and so he thought it useful to build the inter-state 
agency with an attention to the sovereignty that individual states vehemently clung to.  
Reflecting this, his plan illustrated the Progressive impulse of insulating and concentrating 
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political power, one that could withstand the fierce independence of the states and their 
unwillingness to be governed or monitored.  The PNYA was to be an entity with a power 
exceeding that of any individual state, as well as another, qualitatively different one, one more 
akin to the federal government’s power to make top-down decrees. 
Thus, the PNYA was to be a very powerful independent agency, one that could harness 
the power of the states as well as its own newly-created autonomous powers.  Cohen’s plan 
channeled the early Progressive era of reform advocating the insulation of government agencies 
from, according to Wilson, “the hurry and strife of politics,” in order to better operate according 
to principles of business, with top officials given “large powers and unhampered discretion” to 
carry out their duties.164  Hylan’s new vision of the PNYA blunted this power, yet gave it a huge 
geographic scope.  The Port District, then and today, extends in 25 miles in all directions from 
the Statue of Liberty, yielding 1,500 square miles of land and water in New York and New 
Jersey, including New York City, Newark, Jersey City, and 300 other smaller cities and towns in 
seventeen counties.  In 1920, within this area the international trade made up over 40% of the 
nation’s total and it contained over 8 million people.  The PNYA was to patrol this terrain, plan 
the modernization of the piers, and improve overall efficiency of trade in the area.  Under the 
Port Compact, which received the consent of Congress in 1921, it had the power to build, buy, 
lease, operate, and levy use charges for terminal and transport facilities in the Port District.   
However, because it was prohibited from levying taxes, it was unclear how the newly-
formed PNYA would obtain the resources to build, buy, and expand.  The solution offered was 
bond issuing, a solution that would come to shape the PNYA indefinitely and decisively.  The 
only power that remained with the PNYA after the dismantling of Cohen’s 1918 draft was the 
power to borrow money upon its own bonds.  Therefore, things that got built, like piers, were 
paid for by leasers.  Leasers would contribute the revenue to pay off operating expenses, which 
we see still to this day with the WTC.  While Cohen’s proposal had given the PNYA the 
regulatory powers to encourage, and even force, the railroads and the cities to yield their narrow, 
competitive perspectives when they conflicted with the PNYA’s prescribed development of the 
Port District, the PNYA that emerged was only able to exert influence through its bonds.  Its 
bonds could only be sold if investors believed the PNYA could operate the new projects while 
breaking even, with a slight surplus, and that would only be possible if private interests, 
including the railroads, agreed to use these new facilities and cities of the Port District agreed not 
to build competing ones.165  This limited power contributed to its failure throughout the 1920s to 
coordinate rails, modernize piers, and build tunnels. 
Thus, Hylan’s revision to Cohen’s original plan was not immediately successful, 
struggling throughout the first decade of its existence. The railroad plan failed and was scrapped 
in 1931.  However, its failure did not spell the end for the PNYA due to its construction as “a 
sort of empty vessel,” into which various ideas on inter-state transportation issues might be 
offered and allowed to incubate or perish.  “And so,” writes Doig, “it became a target of 
opportunity, and an object of affection, for individuals and groups in the surrounding 
communities – and inside the agency – who saw the PNYA as an instrument to use in achieving 
their own goals.”166  Despite the initial failures of the revised plan, the PNYA grew to achieve 
some of Cohen’s original aims for it, including stable management and financial stability.  Over 
successive decades these came at the expense of local democracy and thoughtful urban planning, 
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with Robert Moses only the most visible of officials run amok in Port Authority funds and 
building socially-exclusive projects with them. 
In the 1950s, then-Governor of New York David Rockefeller167 and other business 
leaders began exploring ways to revitalize lower Manhattan and, in consultation with Port 
Authority staff, began to draft a world trade and financial center development.  Under the Port 
Compact of 1921, the Port Authority could not acquire property, or finance or construct facilities 
like office buildings, but the agency’s interest in the project was high.  A report compiled by the 
agency in 1961 – at the business coalition’s request – concluded that a trade center “would offer 
‘greatly improved coordination’ of world trade activities” but that its surpluses would be so 
marginal that the project to build it could only be undertaken by a public agency.168 Then-
Executive Director Austin Tobin used the Port Authority’s power of eminent domain to seize the 
sixteen-acre site and erect the Twin Towers, frustrating the city’s private real estate developers, 
who were angry that a regional transportation agency would flood the city with more than ten 
million square feet of office space for lease.  Rockefeller was able to justify the Port Authority’s 
central role in the trade center project by relying on its “world trade” theme and a plan for the 
Twin Towers was unveiled in 1964.  The 110-story buildings displaced the Empire State 
Building as the world’s tallest skyscraper.  Thus, the WTC was born.  However, its price kept 
escalating, from $355 million to $575 million by 1966, with costs escalating every year until 
they topped $1 billion.  Paralleling today, many outlets expressed concern that the WTC would 
divert the Port Authority’s resources away from public transportation needs.  
The PNYA became the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ; 
heretofore called the Port Authority) in 1972, to quite belatedly reflect its bi-state standing.169  
By 1997, then-Governor Pataki wanted to break the agency up into small pieces.  In its first 
several decades, the Port Authority found success, providing support for the idea that democratic 
accountability could be met through deeds and rational planning, rather than sensitivity to 
immediate public demands.  However, as Doig notes, “it is an unsteady brew, requiring that 
supervising officials, in this case the two governors, demonstrate a kind of disciplined oversight 
– resisting the natural tendency of elected leaders to use the agency for short-term political gain, 
while at the same time monitoring the agency’s proposals in relation to the governors’ broad 
policy goals.”170  The evolution of the Port Authority from the original design to its current, 
businesslike version leaves it prone to business and short-term gain by the governors appointed 
its heads, as several decisions made at the new WTC site further show.   
 Officially, the Port Authority is “authorized and directed to plan, develop and operate 
terminals and other facilities of transportation and commerce, and to advance projects in the 
general fields of transportation, economic development and world trade that contribute to 
promoting and protecting the commerce and economy of the Port District.”171  Its subsidiary 
agencies are New York and New Jersey Railroad Corporation, Newark Legal and 
Communications Center Urban Renewal Corporation, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation 
(PATH Corp.), and WTC Retail LLC.   
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The Port Authority is run by twelve unpaid commissioners, six appointed by each state’s 
governor, serving for overlapping six-year terms.  The governors retain the right to veto his/her 
state’s commissioners.  Board meetings are public.  Traditionally, the board chair is a New 
Jersey commissioner, and the executive director — effectively the agency’s C.E.O. — is selected 
by the New York governor.  The agency has nearly 7,000 employees, and a purview that 
includes all three major New York regional airports, cross-Hudson bridges and tunnels, PATH 
trains, and the WTC site. The WTC site has been a dominant presence in the Port Authority’s 
board meeting minutes since 2001.  Despite its problems, many argue that no viable substitute 
exists for the Port Authority and for addressing interstate, interregional, intraregional issues.172 
 
 
The evolved Port Authority and the new World Trade Center 
 
The current Executive Director of the Port Authority is Patrick J. Foye, a Cuomo 
appointee.  His predecessor Chris Ward, who served in the post from 2008 to 2011 under the 
appointing of David Paterson, is largely credited with jump-starting the stalled WTC building 
projects.  However, despite his record of port and airport improvements, as well as consistently 
flat budgets, he faced criticism from both New York and New Jersey leadership for the cost 
overruns at the WTC site.173  In the audit of the Port Authority, released on January 31, 2012, he 
was repeatedly referred to negatively, though never by name and only as the “previous executive 
director.”  However, Ward was well-liked and respected by the public and those following the 
rebuilding closely, since his leadership marked a notable turnaround in the progress of the site.  
From its beginning until 2008, building made little notable headway, mired in delays, re-designs, 
and escalating costs. When Ward took over the agency, there was a marked shift in momentum, 
with him releasing a thirty-four page document that outlined all the problems with the site, only a 
month after taking his new position.  During his three-year tenure, Ward negotiated a financing 
deal with Silverstein on the various towers at the site, brokered a lease for 1 million square feet 
of office space in 1 WTC with Condé Nast, the magazine publisher, and reworked the PATH hub 
design with its architect Santiago Calatrava in such a way that $600 million could be saved and 
its completion speeded.174   
1 WTC is the most expensive office tower in the world, costing over $3.8 billion, and the 
tallest tower in North America.175  It was first proposed to cost $2 billion.  Its high costs are 
attributed to the heavily reinforced, windowless podium that the building sits atop, as well as the 
thick core of concrete and steel around its elevator shafts, both expensive, unusual security 
features.  By comparison, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai – also known as the world’s tallest 
skyscraper – cost $1.5 billion to build.  Formerly known as the Freedom Tower, until Ward 
scrapped the title, 1 WTC is the marquee office building of the site.  
 A minority share of the tower – about 10 percent equity – was sold to the Durst Group in 
2010, when the estimated value of the tower was pegged at $2 billion.  Because estimates for 
completing the tower rose past $3 billion, the Port Authority struck the deal with the city real 
estate developer to get help finishing and managing the tower.  Durst paid the Port Authority 
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$100 million for the equity share, as well as a $15 million management contract that gave Durst 
75 percent of any money saved by cutting construction costs up to $12 million and 50 percent of 
those thereafter.176  Durst unsurprisingly found costs to cut, compromising elements of architect 
David Childs’ design (which itself was the result of a drawn-out battle with site architect Daniel 
Libeskind).  As of May 2013, 1 WTC is still struggling to find tenants.  Because of the high cost 
to build, starting rents are $70 per square foot, up to $80, versus an average of $60 elsewhere in 
the city.   
 Cost increases are attributed to leasing expenses, unexpected construction costs, 
financing costs, and fees to consultants and Durst.  The total site cost estimate in February 2012 
was almost $15 billion, compared with the $11 billion estimated in 2008.  The Port Authority is 
bearing most of the costs for the overall WTC site, funded through its main source of income, its  
have long been planned, including airport improvements, in order to keep the WTC site afloat 
and ever-so-slowly progressing.177  Costs of the project have reverberated in the New York and 
New Jersey region as increased tolls and neglected infrastructure projects. From 2012 to 2015, a 
rise of 56% in tolls was announced by the Port Authority, which openly admitted that such 
increases were needed to cover higher-than-expected costs at the site.  The WTC continues to 
dominate the Port Authority’s budget, over a decade after rebuilding began. 
 
Liberty Bonds 
Site building is also being financed by $4.6-$4.9 billion in insurance payouts, distributed 
among the Port Authority and its affiliates, as well as by bank loans and tax exempt debt 
provided by the federal government.  The latter comes in the form of Liberty Bonds, instated by 
the federal government after September 11 to aid in rebuilding and encourage developers to 
return to lower Manhattan.  In the years since, the Liberty Bond program has given out tax 
exemptions on $8 billion in debt to help build over a dozen apartment and office towers.  Liberty 
Bonds were first sold in the U.S. as war bonds during World War I. Purchasing the bonds then 
was a symbol of patriotic duty, with even Charlie Chaplin making a film promoting their 
purchase.  Today, they are federally-authorized bonds awarded to private developers for real 
estate construction in the wake of September 11 and do not have any presence elsewhere in the 
country.  
Most of the largest Liberty Bonds awarded went to the WTC site: to Silverstein, $475 
million for 7 WTC and $2.59 billion for 2, 3, and 4 WTC, and $700 million to the Port Authority 
for 1 WTC.178  However, the Liberty Bonds were not only awarded to rebuild the site.  $1.65 
billion went to Goldman Sachs for its 200 West Street building in lower Manhattan.  Rounding 
out the top ten awarded were five other downtown projects, with bonds ranging from $100 to 
$200 million.  Somewhat confusingly, other awards were given to buildings nowhere near the 
neighborhood, including $650 million to the Durst Group for the Bank of American building in 
Midtown and $90.8 million to build the Bank of New York Mellon building in Brooklyn.179   
 After September 11, the federal government – George W. Bush and Congress – awarded 
$20.5 billion in aid to rebuild, with almost $8 billion of that allocated to Liberty Bonds.  
However, no government – neither federal, state, or local – guaranteed repayment of the bonds, 
which are exempt from all taxes.  Though the bonds are 1% lower interest than standard bonds, 
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investors prefer to buy the Liberty Bonds because their savings on taxes ultimately yield more 
profit.180  The federal government gave up $1.2 billion in tax revenue for this purpose, while 
state and local gave up tens of millions.  Interestingly, state senators did not ask for aid in 
another form, even though the Port Authority can already borrow tax-exempt.  Instead of using 
the majority of the bonds to defray 1 WTC costs, Bloomberg and then-governor George Pataki 
chose the other companies to give the bonds to.  Only 59 percent – $3.8 billion of the $6.4 billion 
in Liberty Bonds issued since 2003 – went to the WTC rebuilding, and most of that was given to 
Silverstein.   
 In an email, Silverstein emphasizes the importance of such federal funding for office 
space, saying “the Liberty Bonds made available to the World Trade Center site are only enough 
to support rebuilding a little less than 60 percent of the office space lost on 9/11. In an ideal 
world, more such resources would be made available to help jump-start construction of the 
remaining 40 percent of the office space that was destroyed by terrorists.”181  Liberty Bonds are 
“ideal” for office space, and they are a resource that is not abundant enough for the office space 
that must be replaced, according to him.  The presumptive need to replace office space and the 
necessary role of the state in it are juxtaposed in his statement. 
 
The Silverstein and Port Authority Deal 
Silverstein Properties is currently building two towers on the site and plans to build a 
third when it has a tenant.  Silverstein famously signed a 99-year lease on the WTC site just 
weeks before the towers were destroyed.  He has always maintained that he was contractually 
obliged to rebuild 10 million feet of office space, particularly when charges for different building 
– such as residential – were raised, but the Port Authority took over the 1 WTC project from 
Silverstein Properties in November 2006.  The Port Authority is also going to help Silverstein 
finance 3 WTC when he finds tenants. 
 The shift in rebuilding was done in order to make the project financeable and feasible.  
However, it cost the Port Authority and New York state $1 billion to take it over.  Though 
Silverstein “gave back” the tower and one other building to the Port Authority – about 38 percent 
of the 10 million square feet he had the rights to – he still built it, for a fee of at least $21 million 
that was completely unaffected by any escalating building costs.  It was a solid victory for 
Silverstein, who was able to receive the majority of Liberty Bonds and still build and manage the 
other towers on the site.  In 2005, Bloomberg asked a news panel if one could “imagine the 
stink” if Silverstein were given “half a billion dollars or a billion dollars in profit to get him 
out?”182  That is essentially what happened in this deal.  Though Silverstein had to give up some 
of his insurance proceeds, they were only proportionate to the land he lost, yet he also lost $200 
million in rent payments for development rights to 1 WTC, which he no longer has.  He will also 
give up 15 percent of profits if he sells or recapitalizes any of towers that he has.   
However, the victory for Silverstein came not only in the fees but also in turning the 
responsibility of renting the tower over to the Port Authority.  It is an extremely risky building 
project, but Silverstein’s responsibility ends as soon as it is finished and his fee is collected.  No 
one involved has yet released how much this deal will cost in public dollars, but the Port 
Authority is paying for the cost of 1 WTC’s construction, which is nearly $4 billion.  Some of 
the cost is being directly contributed by the state, about $250 million, and some comes from 
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Silverstein’s insurance payout.  But eventually, the Port Authority plans to recoup its costs by 
renting space in the tower to tenants.  Chris Ward’s signing of Condé Nast was significant, but 
the remaining prospective tenants are government agencies relocating from other parts of 
Manhattan – which is not necessarily as encouraging a real estate development as one would 
want in the face of such staggering expenses.183 
 Journalist Matt Schueurman considers Bloomberg’s “half a billion dollars or a billion 
dollars” a fair estimate for the added cost borne by the Port Authority to take over 1 WTC.184  
Such an expenditure by the Port Authority leads some, such as business group the Partnership for 
New York City, to call the deal an implicit acknowledgment that the tower is more of a political 
statement than a business proposition, as well as that the tower requires public subsidy and 
public ownership in order to rise.185  Responsibility for a tower so political cannot be left to the 
private sector, but it is unclear whether it is because of the financial implications (though surely 
the private sector could raise the needed funds) or the symbolic weight of the rebuilding that in 
turn demands a moral contribution.  Former Port Authority chairman David Samson offers some 
insight.  He said, at a 2011 board meeting, “We are also rebuilding the WTC site as a symbol of 
our nation’s success, strength and resilience, and as an economic force for the New York/New 
Jersey region. Of course, it is our moral obligation to the families of the victims lost that day that 
we rebuild, and we have committed more than $11 billion for the project.”186  The moral 
obligation to rebuild is the agency’s to bear and the financing and owning of a tower – even with 
added expenses from buying it from Silverstein – offer some movement toward that obligation’s 
fulfillment.  As tower architect David Childs notes,  
 
I used to walk over there and look at the site and think about it. People would go in and look 
down and it was sad. Now they go and they look up and they're smiling. There is this piece that 
says, 'We did it' — and that's what that tall tower is. People fly over it, they drive, they come 
across on the ferry and they look at it and they feel good. They smile. I feel good about that. We 
came back and we rebuilt it, and we should feel good about it.187 
 
The insurance payout Silverstein won in 2004, to rebuild what he was contractually 
obligated to, made him the single most important person in the WTC site’s redevelopment, 
because it gave him not only the right to build but also the private funds to do so.188  If he had 
not received the insurance payouts he needed, the Port Authority was rumored to be drawing up 
contingency plans for the $10 million in monthly lease payments that they relied on from 
Silverstein.  The tower would have presumably been financed by another developer, though how 
this would have turned out is not at all clear.  Silverstein never publicly offered to give up the 
tower, and instead the media portrays the deal as emanating exclusively from the Port Authority.  
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Preserving 1 WTC had many detractors, whose criticisms ranged from the unnecessary addition 
of office space into a saturated market, to the public subsidy of that office space, to the fact that 
the market (i.e. Silverstein) – and not the Port Authority – should have redesigned 1 WTC to be 
more commercially viable.  In these critiques, the mantle of symbolism does not play a part.  The 
Port Authority does not plan to make a profit out of the site – only to recoup its costs.  As Robert 
Yaro, head of the Regional Plan Association and the Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New 
York, two organizations focused on planning and infrastructure in and around the city, says of 
the WTC site and the main tower: “It was as much about making a political statement as it was 
an economic decision. … This is not a project that's standing on its own--it was never intended to 
be.”189 
Marshall Berman says that Robert Moses loved the public, but not as people.  His great 
modernist achievements of the 1930s were followed by a steady decline in high-quality projects, 
which Berman locates in the rise of public authorities in the years following.  Now able to raise 
virtually unlimited sums of money to build with, Moses’ ego ran far afield and resulted in 
projects, vast in size and number, which were unaccountable to public wishes.190  Several 
decades later, Bloomberg’s major mayoral campaign tactic in 2001 was to make his self-made 
billionaire status into an asset for the city, claiming that what New York City needed was a 
tycoon who would use private sector management techniques to make city politics and projects 
more efficient and accountable.  Yet twelve years later, after three terms in office, a different 
outcome has emerged.  Under his tenure, for example, the annual borrowing costs of the New 
York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), responsible for the city’s water, shot 
up by 176 percent to $1.37 billion, driven by cost overruns on building projects.  Bloomberg 
epitomizes the public-private partnership, both in his person and in his official activities. 
Chris Ward himself concedes that with big projects, local officials often rush to name 
costs before they know exactly how much they will actually run.  Almost always, low estimates 
define what the public thinks project costs will be, both in the DEP case and with the WTC site.  
Ward’s successor, Foye, echoes a similar sentiment, with the lowballing of public works’ costs 
having hurt the credibility of public agencies.  Though he does not mention the Port Authority by 
name, its implication in his statement is clear.  He proclaims that, “As Governor Cuomo [Foye’s 
appointer] has said, the public sector must be accountable and transparent to the public. … 
Multi-billion-dollar projects by starchitects that don’t yield a substantial social return equivalent 
to the amounts invested don’t cut it anymore.”191  After enduring fire for the past decade over 
cost overruns and massive delays, the Port Authority has taken efforts to reform its fiscal health 
and public image. 
 
Attempts to Improve and the Port Authority Audit 
 The Port Authority raised PATH fares and tolls at its Hudson River crossings, with one 
increase taking effect in September 2011, another in December 2012, and the next to take effect 
December 1, 2013.  When the American Automobile Association (AAA) filed a lawsuit against 
the Port Authority to overturn the hikes, asserting that the WTC was not a transportation 
expense, the Port Authority changed its story, instead saying that the hikes were to support 
interstate transportation rather than its original claim of offsetting WTC cost overruns.  However, 
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in a press conference Cuomo stressed that the WTC site was always the reason for the hikes, 
contradicting the very agency he heads.  He said:  
 
You know, New York City papers, frankly, “Oh, come on it’s only $500 million?” … Oh, it's 
only $500 million? Go tell Albany it’s only $500 million, go tell Syracuse it’s only $500 million, 
go tell Rochester it’s only $500 million? Go tell Binghamton it’s only $500 million. It’s more 
money than they’ve gotten from the state in a decade! Only $500, only $400, only $300. You 
know, we wasted a tremendous amount of money there. … the answer can’t be, 'Whoops, sorry, 
we blew another $500 million, we’ll just raise the tolls.' The taxpayer, the tollpayer, is not an 
endless, bottomless well for government to dip into to cure their incompetence.192 
 
Such waffling has been one of the reasons suspicion of the Port Authority has grown more 
recently.  In the years immediately after 9/11, the Port Authority was regarded as not being very 
forthcoming about its plans for the site.  One particular facet of those plans – a bus depot in the 
bathtub of the foundations, which is regarded as a burial ground by many victims’ families – was 
especially reviled and the Port Authority was criticized for undertaking a plan that “[made] sense 
to nobody except the Port Authority,” as I will discuss in the following chapter.193   
 Such suspicion and public outcry over the Port Authority’s decision-making and progress 
on the WTC site spurred the agency’s Board of Commissioners to order an audit.  Released on 
January 31, 2012, it tabulated cost overruns of $4 billion since the 2008 recalibration of costs.194  
At 1 WTC, overruns were about $850 million, while those at the Memorial totaled about $833 
million.  The audit focuses heavily on “costs spent on behalf of third-party stakeholders” and the 
collectability of those funds.195  However, multiple commentators note that the audit is extremely 
vague, both in causes of overspending and audit methodology.196 For example, Port Authority 
said the cost of opening the memorial by 9/11/2011, the tenth anniversary, was $500 million, but 
details are never provided in the audit or in interviews.  Steve Cuozzo, the New York Post WTC 
columnist, says all that is definitely learned is that the Port Authority is a “big, badly managed, 
fat-in-the-middle agency given to cost overruns, inefficiency and accountable to no one.”197  The 
Board of Commissioners said that part of the cause of the cost overruns was a lack of 
transparency, but there are no further details, such as the relationship between the lack of 
transparency and cost overruns.   
The audit was done in the wake of the toll and fare hikes to mollify constituents, and 
thereby shifting anger toward outgoing Executive Director Chris Ward.  Ward good-naturedly 
noted that, 
 
Government has to reinvent itself all the time…. Good for them for raising questions about the 
Port Authority. All I can say is, imagine what the audit would be, what the conclusions would be 
if the world looked at the site on the 10th year anniversary and it wasn’t complete and President 
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Obama was working his way through an incomplete site and the families were there and it’s been 
10 years and the memorial was not done.198 
 
The mandates that Ward faced while director, particularly to open the memorial by September 
2011, were elided as the evasive actions he may have taken were more closely scrutinized.  
According to a former Port Authority planning director and his assistant, who worked there from 
2007 to 2010, short-term political agendas are causing the Port Authority to “indulge in 
excesses” beyond its mission.199  It is important to note that governors can veto budgetary and 
key decisions.  The agency has an entrenched dual-power structure where each state’s governor 
acts through his representative.  The former employees say that the Board of Commissioners gets 
bypassed and governors’ wishes are relayed directly to staff – not the independent leaders 
envisioned in the Port Authority’s creation.  The agency then becomes a vehicle for governors – 
heads of states – to act without voter approval.  
In an attempt to improve transparency, the Port Authority cited new economic 
development plans and tax-increment financing to fund projects based on future tax projections.  
Among the new plans, says Foye, is an increase in public-private partnerships, including at 
LaGuardia Airport (NY), Newark Airport (NJ), and the Goethals Bridge replacement.  The Port 
Authority also put all Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from 2011 online.  They 
have continued to put up successive years, though whether it is comprehensive is unclear.  Some 
of the requests that are up are not fulfilled, with the Port Authority representatives citing the 
absence of that information in their records.  However, they are difficult to sort through, scanned 
as images and thus making them non-machine-readable and, attendantly, searchable.  The Port 
Authority has also opted not to remove the personal information of people making the requests, 
which may affect a person’s decision to make a FOIA request in the first instance. 
However, despite these passes at increased transparency and conveying a high-
functioning cooperative agency, the Port Authority’s decisions appear to be the governors’, and 
with regards to the WTC site, nearly always it is the New York governor making the calls.  
Pataki essentially handpicked Libeskind’s “Memory Foundations” site plan in 2003, when he 
was still governor.  And so it is to the footprints that we return.   
 
 
Conclusion: mobilizations of memory 
 
 Public-private partnerships emerge at the WTC site in a slightly unusual way – through 
the “melding of memory and profit,” the “theme of the site.”200  1 WTC is heavily fortified and 
security is very tight, excluding the general public; the memorial is difficult to enter, requiring a 
reservation and heavy security clearance; the museum will cost upwards of $20 for admission; 
and Towers 2, 3, and 4 are home to high-end shopping.  The expensive cost to build the site is 
reflected in the space itself – public space must pay for itself, somehow, whether through fees, 
retail, or contained admittance policies.  The footprints re-emerge here as entities that generate 
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the memorial yet also dictate the economy of the rest of the site.  The memorial is based off the 
footprints, and its location and cost have governed the other decisions at the site to some extent.   
 Philip Nobel analogizes the conflation of the place of the Twin Towers’ destruction and 
the day it happened – represented in the tourist’s query of “how do we get to nine eleven?” – 
with the footprints and the WTC tower.201  “Nine eleven” is inadequate to describing the 
experience of the day of the attacks or the physical site itself, just as the sanctity of the footprints 
is simply a “product of the rampant political opportunism that drove and defined the 
redevelopment process.”202  When then-governor Pataki declared the unending sacrality of the 
footprints in summer 2002, it was a forced concession, Nobel notes.  An election was coming 
that fall and perceived inaction at the site had been politically flexed by Cuomo, Pataki’s 
opponent, months before. Pataki’s enshrining of the footprints, therefore, was a reaction to 
victims’ families vocally demanding a much larger space for the memorial and the positive 
political attention Cuomo had drawn to himself in response to these demands.  Pataki used his 
role as the head of the Port Authority to unilaterally choose a design for the site that emphasized 
the footprints, which had become his political calling card for re-election. 
 While President Obama may write of the site, “We remember. We rebuild. We come 
back stronger!,” as he inscribed on the Presidential Beam installed in 1 WTC in August 2012 and 
which was also signed by Michelle Obama, Cuomo, Christie, and Bloomberg, the ‘we’ of his 
statement has another resonance.203  The shadow of the state is installed into the tower itself, a 
performance of the creative destruction of the state in the Port Authority.   
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     CHAPTER THREE  Wounded Landscapes 
 
 
And again, the empty space that was, I now saw and admitted, the obvious: the ruins of the World Trade 
Center.  The place had become a metonym of its disaster: I remembered a tourist who once asked me how 
he could get to 9/11: not the site of the events of 9/11 but 9/11 itself, the date petrified into broken stones.  
I moved closer.  It was walled in with wood and chain link, but otherwise nothing announced its 
significance.204 
 
 
Basically and radically, any valid memorial is less a reminder of the past than an invocation of the 
Redeemer, of the Forthcoming, of the messiah/Mahdi/Christ, with whose coming all memorials are going 
to become irrelevant.205 
   
 
“9/11” is today figured as a wound to the nation, and it has been since the localized 
events of September 11, 2001, in New York City, Shanksville, P.A., and Washington, D.C.  This 
figuring as a wound especially resonates with the wreckage of the September 11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York, where the ground at which the Twin Towers once met their 
foundations was opened, creating indelible passages into the earth that remain central to 
understandings of 9/11.  The names “Ground Zero” and “sacred ground” further evoke a marking 
or wounding at the World Trade Center (WTC) site.  Yet, in the final instance, what 9/11 refers 
to is ambiguous.  It is a date, but without year, repeating itself annually.  It is also a near-
duplicate of the North American emergency telephone number.  Its reference to the events of 
September 11, 2001 and their afterlives is 9/11’s normalized use today. As Derrida asserted 
about the name in October 2001, 9/11 is a metonym for that which we do not know, that which 
we do not know how to qualify or name; he identifies terror and trauma as that which is beyond 
language and which the open designation of 9/11 is needed to hold.206  
  Language becomes a crucial tool for naming what cannot be named.  Names index the 
unspeakable without describing it and they compel repetition, offering figures to mobilize 
around.  Once naturalized in the social and political lexicon, they are repeated without question 
of the meaning behind the figure.  Yet 9/11 is a figure that announces that we do not know what 
we are talking about, and its ambiguity echoes the instability of our understandings of the events 
of the day, as well as those that followed.207  In re-locating what is behind the figure of 9/11, this 
chapter examines the reconstruction of the WTC site and its effects on the grammars of 
governance and space in the city, considering the ways that rebuilding, design, and museal 
practices reorient public space, public memory, and state power.  In particular, this chapter 
focuses on the official memorialization of 9/11 by following the work of the visual, economic, 
and memorial discourses at the National September 11 Memorial and Museum and that work’s 
inextricable links to the state.  Despite the ambiguity of the meaning of the figure 9/11, there are 
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efforts to fix it.  This chapter shows how the memorial plaza is part of what is held in the figure, 
enhancing and expanding it at the site of memorialization.   
As Peter Marcuse writes about the original WTC, “the private sector may have been 
behind what was done,” with David Rockefeller promoting the WTC concept in order to shore 
up Chase Manhattan’s real estate investment in Lower Manhattan, yet its development was not 
moved forward by the market, but by the state.208  In the 1960s, the site was condemned by the 
state, and about 800 small businesses and the 30,000 jobs they provided were displaced through 
eminent domain.  City streets were closed to create a superblock, and the WTC planning and 
design was paid for by the state.  After it was built, the demand for its space was so low that the 
state leased the space back to itself.  A similar pattern is at work at the reconstructed site today, 
with market forces having moved companies to New Jersey, downtown Brooklyn, and Midtown 
Manhattan, and Silverstein and the Port Authority still attempting to fill the offices of their 
respective buildings.  The Port Authority and the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, a 
public authority that shares the stage with the Port Authority, are not acting according to market-
driven incentives, but are following the private sector’s pushes.  Marcuse, too, notes today’s 
parallels with the WTC past: “When it is in its interests to do so, the private sector operates in the 
public sphere, market be damned, and that is what is in the offing here.”209  The authority by 
which these actors operate illustrate a reconfiguration of state power over the past several 
decades that has favored a corporate model of governance and luxury real estate developments. 
In a post-Giuliani New York, a city altered by the vigorous privatization and deregulation 
of state enterprises, big redevelopment projects have defined the landscape.  This post-1990s 
“Bloombergification” of New York City has shifted the public narrative away from cultural 
history and public memorials and toward real estate values.  Thus, the building of the 9/11 
memorial plaza has a historical relevance not only within the tradition of museal and memory 
studies, but also as part of this transformation of New York into what Julian Brash calls “the 
luxury city.”210  It is a city that is structured not simply by production or local communities, but 
by circuits of capital incorporating real estate values and speculation, the service economy, and 
global financial markets, which in turn become localized zones of production.  
The emphasis on the processes of rebuilding inexorably draws us to the wound requiring 
the care of memory and physical rehabilitation.  Yet, who or what is wounded – what is the site 
of trauma?  If it is as Jenny Edkins writes, that “trauma time collided with the time of the state, 
the time of capitalism, the time of routine,” producing “a curious unknown time, a time with no 
end in sight,” what may be learned about the state, trauma, and capitalism as their collisions are 
untangled?211  And what, if rebuilding on wounded landscapes is popularly conceived of as a 
process of trying to harmonize the commemoration of trauma with political stakes, do the co-
presences of the state, trauma, and capitalism in the process of rebuilding at the WTC site tell us 
about one another?212  I argue that in the wake of its failure to protect citizens from being killed 
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and as a reaction to shame over its own permeability, the capitalist state uses non-profitable 
memory practices to shore up its political legitimacy.   
Wendy Brown describes an ethical gap between economy and political life motivated by 
the legitimacy crisis faced by the capitalist state.  The state can bypass possibilities of such a 
crisis through strategic actions that shore up its perceived independence from the market 
economy, a condition of its legitimacy as a state.  Overt state bailouts and subsidies, such as 
those of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, clearly demonstrate state allegiance to particular social 
and economic interests and threaten to reveal the state as a capitalist one.  They can thus be 
tempered by the ethical gap, by which the state can call upon such moral and political principles 
as equality and freedom that configure a different vision of political life than the market 
economy within which they inevitably fall, as I argued in Chapter 2.  Non-profitable memory 
practices may seem to contradict the capitalist state yet they indicate what Brown writes about 
the ethical gap. In this chapter, I argue that the U.S. capitalist state operates within this ethical 
gap, depicting itself in an ethical frame and only enhancing the legitimacy of the capitalist 
state.213  
To consider the ethical gap in another way, we can look to Pierre Bourdieu, who writes, 
“A possible point of departure for reflections on ethics is the existence of universally witnessed, 
metadiscursive or metapractical, second-order strategies that agents employ in order to appear (in 
act or intention) to conform to a universal rule, even when their practice is at variance with 
perfect obedience to the rule or when it does not have perfect obedience to the rule as its 
principle.”214  It is within this frame that this chapter approaches the state, offering an 
intervention in theorizations of the state, with the state’s memory practices at the WTC site 
serving as a lever with which to do such work.  Following Bourdieu, I argue that operating 
within the ethical gap further serves to codify the loss of the ability to experience loss and the 
chaotic, disjointed national experience of dealing with 9/11.  My argument departs from 
architectural and cultural critiques of the memorial plaza, which encompass its severity in 
comparison to other contemporary memorials, the museum’s underground location, and, of 
course, its cost, as well as the larger critique all of these others indicate: that the memorial plaza 
monopolizes mourning and is simply an example of the public being failed by the state.  Instead, 
this chapter is mobilized by what the memorial plaza does and unravels both the explicit and 
implicit claims about what that work is, unearthing conflicts of memory and the retrenchment of 
the state.  
This chapter shows how the memorial plaza induces vertigo and overwhelm in its 
visitors, sensations that still dominate the public and state understanding of 9/11 and the WTC 
destruction.  Whether or not the memorial plaza is a mourning place is secondary to what it 
exposes: the chaotic, disjointed national experience of dealing with 9/11.  Despite its fraught 
process, the construction of the memorial and museum has been a compensatory project 
attempting to lend legitimacy to the state in the wake of economic and political crisis.  Ideologies 
of healing, patriotism, and the nation inform the multiple projects on the WTC site, as well as 
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dominate the media and public discourses concerning the memorial and museum.  However, 
whether such projects have been successful or not is less at issue than the fact of the constant 
retrenchment of the state through such projects.  This chapter sidesteps a sole focus on the 
ideological elements at work in order to unearth the retrenchment of the state through its ethical 
norms, vis-à-vis the city and post-9/11.  Even though the state is an Enlightenment object that 
has been thoroughly deconstructed, it is nonetheless still at work.  In the neoliberal era, it is 
impossible to discuss the state’s work apart from political economy and, as such, I consider the 
role of finance in the reconstruction and memorialization processes, specifically through the 
method of close-reading micro-details that emerge from those processes. By following the 
various techniques utilized at the memorial plaza, the chapter shows how codifications of space 
and memory become installed in the urban landscape to reproduce the state.   
As Chapter 2 discusses, the public authority form – which encompasses the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, 
two of the key players at the WTC site – is a structurally opaque entity that subverts democratic 
principles as spelled out in the Constitution.  This chapter probes the calling-upon of such 
principles by the public authorities rebuilding the WTC site as support for decisions made at the 
site.  It also shows how relying on those principles to gesture toward inclusion actually results in 
the memorial plaza codifying exclusion in the city’s public spaces.  Critic Adam Gopnik notes 
that, “It was always going to be hard to distinguish its clumpings of trees, benches, and memorial 
fountains from the ornamental bumps and abscesses that are the standard skirtings of Manhattan 
pillar-in-the-plaza construction. Shadowed by a big, cheerful building, their presence becomes 
one more of the site’s contradictions: a memorial park that in some ways resembles a 
conventional plaza ‘amenity.’”215  If the memorial resembles a plaza amenity, are all public parks 
around skyscrapers always-already a memorial, with the 9/11 memorial plaza just a bigger 
version?  And does the memorial plaza, alongside other POPS, reconcile us to our exclusion 
from the private buildings that enable their creation?  I argue that the memorial plaza parallels 
the privately-owned public spaces (POPS) scattered throughout New York City, a purported 
public space modulated by the private, corporate office towers surrounding it.  Setting aside the 
narrative of 9/11 that the memorial plaza proposes, the chapter shows that the plaza consolidates 
state power through the simple fact of its materiality and occupation of space in neoliberal New 
York City.   
 This chapter makes four intertwined arguments – that the state reveals its commitment to 
ethical remembrance through the figure of 9/11; that in the face of shame over its permeability, 
the state shores up its legitimacy through the ethical gap; that the memorial plaza codifies the 
loss of the ability to experience loss while also reflecting the chaotic, disjointed national 
experience of 9/11; and that, despite its public financing, the memorial plaza concretizes the 
demise of public space in New York City.  All four are revealed by tracing the ethical work of 
the capitalist state in a site where this is particularly evident, the reconstructed WTC site.  Thus, 
the ethical mantle of memory ties them together, gathering the practices of the state that call on 
ethics as they physically transform the WTC site.  The chapter uncovers a homology between the 
actors investing in the plaza and the memorial and museum themselves, which affects not only 
the experience of the plaza but also the shaping of the archive at the museum. 
Since September 11, 2001, many accounts dealing with the day and its aftermath have 
been given, in written texts, conversationally and in speeches, and through artistic expression of 
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all kinds.  They have considered the motivations behind the attacks, government conspiracies, 
and the best options for moving forward at the site, environmentally, infrastructurally, 
economically, culturally, and personally, as well as the controversies surrounding their 
implementation.  They offer up the testimonies of witnesses, politicians, and experts of various 
fields.  The wealth of information on the attacks of that day, and their local, national, and global 
impact in the days that followed, gives this chapter much of its form.  However, the chapter 
departs from much of that work by focusing specifically on the rhetoric of the site, the effects of 
the memorial plaza, and its role in cultivating the relationship between cultural memory and the 
state.  Those aspects, coupled with the framing power of the discourse around the WTC, are the 
core of this chapter.  What follows highlights these particular valences of 9/11’s prismatic story 
and asserts that there are critical insights to be gained from such valences that go beyond the all-
too-common refrains that the rebuilding process is complicated and public space will always be 
contested.  Instead, it explores how creative destruction reterritorializes memory and ruins, 
codifying them in the new WTC site. 
 
 
The memorial 
 
Immediately after the attacks on the Twin Towers on 9/11, there were several calls for 
preserving the ruinous site entirely, as a memorial.  However, they quietly disappeared in the 
successive months.  The proposals of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), 
created in the aftermath of 9/11 to manage the reconstruction of the site, instead uniformly called 
for huge office and retail spaces, with little acknowledgment of the once-heralded sacredness, or 
what some call aura, of the ruins.216  This aura has been wound tightly into the politics of the site, 
the two unlike entities emerging as inextricably bound to the other.  The site is saturated with 
memory of life before 9/11, of the daily interactions of people and capital that occurred there.  
However, it is also inundated with memory of its destruction and the present absence of the life 
that used to occupy it.  As the construction of 1 WTC, the 9/11 Memorial, and other buildings on 
the site finishes, there are several new flows of activity populating the site, multiplying 
interactions with the persistent aura of 9/11’s destruction.  The aura is not what remains, but 
what interacts with the present. 
Daniel Libeskind, the architect of the site’s master plan, though not of any of the 
buildings themselves, says that “from the beginning, the core of the site—a place where people 
perished—was sacred, a characterization commencing immediately after the attacks and 
recurring consistently since then when politically convenient.217  The 9/11 memorial had to be the 
site’s centerpiece, a space for reflection that incorporated the chasms left by the towers’ 
collapse.”218  “Reflecting Absence,” the jury-selected winning memorial design of an 
international competition, is composed of an eight-acre “field of trees” in which are situated two 
square, one-acre pools housing large, rushing waterfalls.  The pools mark the “footprints” of the 
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Twin Towers, each “large voids, open and visible reminders of the absence.”219  At the edge of 
these pools, the names of victims are inscribed on walls at the water's edge.  On the perimeter of 
the site, five skyscrapers ring the memorial and museum currently under construction.  Libeskind 
claims that what is emerging at the site “reaffirms New Yorkers’ democratic spirit, intrinsic 
optimism and determination to embrace the future.”220 
Other people have argued that nothing should have been built at the site, leaving it, and 
its “natural auratic throw,” intact.221  Instead, the memorial plaza’s schema serves to signal the 
large tower, 1 WTC, looming above everything in the city, an architectural investment 
contributing to the global skyline and the architectural competition it generates.  This chapter is a 
study of the scopic orders that circulate at the site and how they interact with the work of the 
state in (1) controlling the market for space; (2) establishing a state ethics; (3) undermining or 
bolstering the state form via the ideologies represented in the built environment; and (4) 
attempting a mending of the public, the state, and the subject through reparative, memorial 
architecture.  The chapter explores the multiple senses in which these investigations all reflect 
the wounding precipitated by 9/11, as well as how wounding has been mobilized to open an 
ethical gap between capitalist economy and polity in contemporary New York City. 
To do so, we must first look to the materiality of the memorial plaza itself. Today, the 
WTC site spreads over several blocks of Lower Manhattan, with buildings distributed among six 
blocks of varying sizes.  Prior to the destruction of the Twin Towers, the WTC site complex 
created a massive superblock, interrupting and completely blocking off Greenwich and Fulton 
Streets.  Those streets are unblocked in the new site, restoring the street grid – one of the site 
plan’s much-heralded features.  The memorial plaza encompasses the two waterfalls-in-pools, as 
well as strips of trees throughout.  The museum pavilion, a mostly-glass two-story-tall structure, 
is located roughly between the pools, and two smaller structures for underground ventilation abut 
the western edge of the memorial plaza.  1 WTC and 7 WTC sit to the north of the memorial 
plaza and where the Twin Towers were located, with 2 WTC – designed by Foster & Partners 
and to be the second-tallest building in New York City – and a proposed performing arts center 
to join the northern cluster.  Bordering the eastern side of the plaza are 3 WTC, 4 WTC, and the 
above-ground portion of the Santiago Calatrava-designed, new transportation hub.  5 WTC will 
sit a bit further from the plaza than most of the other structures, to the south.  As of now, 4 WTC, 
a well-received skyscraper designed by Fumihiko Maki, and 7 WTC, an office tower which 
shares architect David Childs with 1 WTC, are the only two buildings, other than the museum, 
that are finished and operational.  Both are entirely owned, developed, and operated by 
Silverstein Properties, and the Port Authority is 4 WTC’s major tenant. 
The arrangement of the site follows a simple geometry, with the pools, trees, museum, 
and transportation hub in the center and the office towers surrounding them on three of four sides 
of the square site plot.  Occupying the largest percentage of ground area at the WTC site, the 
memorial spreads over approximately half of the site’s sixteen acres.  However, whether it is the 
centerpiece of the site, as Libeskind proposes, remains debatable, dependent on one’s subject-
position and geographical location on the site. The pools and plaza are built of enormous 
quantities of steel and concrete, shades of cool grey studded with 400 trees.  8,151 tons of steel 
were used in the memorial’s construction, more than what was used to build the Eiffel Tower.  
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Bronze slabs surround the pools, engraved with the names of those killed in terrorist attacks at 
the WTC, the Pentagon, and near Shanksville, PA on February 26, 1993 (six people) and 9/11 
(2,977 people).  The waterfalls descending into each pool are the largest man-made waterfalls in 
the nation, pumping 52,000 gallons of water per minute, though the memorial is seeking a Gold 
LEED certification for green building, design, and construction from the U.S. Green Building 
Council.  Such statistics are featured in a dedicated website created by the memorial foundation, 
focused entirely on numerical factoids about the memorial, from the number of granite panels 
lining each pool (3,968) and the number of teachers who have taken part in educational programs 
(12, 800).222  Numbers, as celebrated in the website and other promotional materials, express 
something for the memorial foundation, not least of which is a spectacular quality.  The poetics 
of such an embrace of numbers, however, lurks elsewhere behind the cheer of their declaration, 
as we will see when we explore the numerical presence at the museum.  
The surfaces of the skyscrapers surrounding the memorial are predominantly constructed 
of reflective glass, copying and echoing the memorial plaza and each other in myriad angles.  
The WTC site is a spectacular space in this and several other ways, from the large size of the 
pools to the staggering height of the skyscrapers – all conspire to dazzle the eye and ear.  While 
the skyscraper is the architectural form that embodies spectacular capitalist space, the memorial 
also shares in some of the skyscraper’s effects, albeit in a less startlingly vertical fashion.  The 
size of the pools is amplified by the furiously rushing waterfalls occupying them.  To a hearing-
abled person, the noise that the waterfalls generate is impossible to ignore, with the tremendous 
volume of water ceaselessly falling in a dull roar.  By evening, the memorial pools are 
dramatically lit, a vivid display.  The memorial was clearly designed with a display of size in 
mind, with the designers indicating that the “enormity” of the pools was intended to emphasize 
the “vast scope of the destruction.”223  
Architect David Childs noted that his shiny, reflective 1 WTC, now nearing completion, 
“will serve as the marker of the 9/11 memorial on the skyline.”224  Whether this is true or not is 
anyone’s guess, but its inverse has been occurring since 1 WTC, edging the memorial, began 
going up: the memorial serves to signal the towers surrounding it.  Though the memorial is the 
focal point in the WTC site plan and, from the ground, exhibits spectacular qualities, the 
memorial is nevertheless not necessarily the centerpiece.  One enters the memorial plaza and, in 
viewing either of the pools, is surrounded by the skyscrapers, most immediately 1 WTC and 4 
WTC.  There is a symmetry to the site that favors the perimeter, where the skyscrapers reside, 
and the height of the towers coupled with their mirrored exteriors creates an effect that fragments 
the purported center, the memorial.  Even the museum’s entry pavilion is constructed primarily 
of reflective glass, allowing visitors to look out to the memorial and already, within its first 
weeks, drawing people outside the building to peer into the pavilion, close enough to press their 
bodies against the glass.  But perhaps even more significantly, the glass allows those inside to 
look through the pavilion’s ceiling to view 1 WTC.  The new tower is visible through the 
museum, giving it omnipresence as visitors attempt to engage the past towers at the museum and 
memorial. 
In preliminary outreach on memorial planning in 2001-2002, participants said they 
desired a “beautiful, calming, neutral place of sacred ground.” They also “hoped for an uplifting 
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and optimistic process that was celebratory of the rebirth of downtown Manhattan,” while also 
memorializing “heroism, resilience, and sacrifice” and the loss experienced by downtown 
communities.225  Some opposed a war memorial (typically, a built structure like an obelisk or 
wall), while others supported one.  Some thought the former WTC’s main plaza should be the 
memorial’s site, while others supported the footprint approach.  Some wanted to keep the WTC 
artifacts at the site, others wanted them transported to other memorial sites.  What emerged from 
the preliminary outreach was a desire for a social, fluid experience – “a place for stories” as 
opposed to “just another granite fountain.”226  From this, one can infer that a successful 
rebuilding of the site, including the memorial itself, would incorporate this social, fluid 
dimension; this also resonates with the recommendations of much contemporary urban theory 
and city planning.  Libeskind calls his WTC site master plan a “tour de force of democracy,” a 
cultural response to September 11 distinguished from the “myriad” other political and economic 
responses.227 It is, according to him, a space that commemorates the past and moves New York 
into the future.  According to others, who include architects and community members, the site is 
a place that is anything but democratic.228   
One such voice comes from New York New Visions, a coalition of 21 national and local 
architecture, design, and planning agencies, representing 30,000 individuals and 350 NYC-based 
professionals, civic leaders, and “concerned citizens” engaged in a “pro-bono effort to address 
the issues surrounding the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan.”229  Its initial response to the Port 
Authority and Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) plans for redevelopment 
was very critical.  A few months prior to its critique, NYNV wrote a report offering guidelines 
for the rebuilding process, comprised of seven key principles, the first of which was the necessity 
for an open memorial process.  The report noted that a “successful rebuilding” of Lower 
Manhattan, “if carried out with sufficient high purpose, would also be a memorial in itself.”230  
NYNV suggested a process under transparent public leadership, unlike the opacity of the LMDC, 
and urged the acquisition of funding from the federal government, as well as the government’s 
recognition of the WTC site as one of national significance, for presumably financial and 
symbolic reasons.  There was not a clear distinction between successful redevelopment of the 
WTC area and the building of a successful memorial.  Other than the first rebuilding principle 
emphasizing an open memorial process, the reconstruction of the site was approached 
holistically, with an implied fluidity at the site.  However, what has emerged today is something 
quite different. 
The towers in themselves are monuments to capital and nation if not expressly memorials 
to what was lost on 9/11, all of them expensive and 1 WTC deliberately built to a 1,776-foot 
height to echo the year of America’s independence from England.  They are disarming, 
generating “a state of complacent daydreaming,” as has long been the affective function of 
skyscrapers.  In the wake of disaster, particularly the destruction of the Twin Towers, the 
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ruination that haunts capitalism manifests itself.  The next-coming, future ruination continues its 
haunting with new skyscrapers, a fetish of global capitalism par excellence.  If the fetish is “an 
object that conceals the void,” then the relationship between the new WTC towers, the memorial 
pools, and the devastation they sit upon is complicated when we consider which ruins and which 
fetishes the state is trying to mediate through the official memorialization process.231  The ruins 
of the Twin Towers are the remnants of what used to be state property, privately profited-from, 
and they become public as they become ruins.  The ruins restore unknowability, and 
unpossessibility, to space.  They belong to everyone and to no one, the suggestion of a commons, 
yet the Port Authority, LMDC, and other state functionaries have been quick to turn those ruins 
into formally designed space, made private through an infusion of public money, as I discussed 
in Chapter 2.  Why?   
The initiation of site construction in 2006 with One WTC, the premier tower, positioned 
economic forces as the primary actors in the processes of progress and healing.  The committees 
deciding the fate of the WTC site inaugurated that schema of value almost immediately after 
September 11th, making their plans to build more towers known to the public in early 2002.  
These economic forces assumed the ruins of the footprints as the platform from which the new 
towers could be launched.  The ruins, and the pain, suffering, and wrongdoing they represented, 
are now enshrined in the museum, serving also as symbols of justification for retaliation via 
foreign wars and for rebuilding financial towers with billions of public funds.  Thus scars, 
absence, and ruins were mobilized not only in search of mourning and healing, but also as 
hegemonic devices that reasserted the symbolism of American capitalism – skyscrapers.  The 
ruins of the site were to be triumphed over, to assert that the American nation-state was resilient 
and powerful enough to recover from the decimation of one of its economic centers. What is 
offered is a stabilized remembrance, conflicting with the instability the gaze encounters with the 
material ruins. In this moment of the instability of the gaze, the state’s investment in the visual, 
economic, and memory discourses at the site comes together, and the site’s materiality, its 
relationship to nationhood, and the vagueness of the enemy share a correlation toward the 
unstable.  This instability is important, and I will return to it in the final section of this chapter.   
 
 
A new public authority for Lower Manhattan: the LMDC 
 
Though the Port Authority owns the WTC site’s land, another public authority was 
established in November 2001 to manage the rebuilding of the site: the LMDC.  It was also 
tasked with generally overseeing the revitalization of Lower Manhattan. It is a subsidiary of 
Empire State Development Corporation, another public authority that shaped Times Square 
redevelopment, as discussed in Chapter 1.  Served by sixteen board members, eight appointed by 
the New York Governor and eight appointed by the Mayor of the City, the LMDC is the vehicle 
for coordinating planning and allocating federal aid, with board appointments weighted toward 
business executives and high-up officials from other public development agencies.232  In short, it 
is a state and city agency responsible for allocating federal funds.  The board members at its 
creation did not include any architects, planners, cultural leaders, educators, or families of 9/11 
victims.  Of its eleven members, there were four Wall Street executives (including an ex-director 
of Goldman Sachs), three former Giuliani administrators, one friend of George W. Bush, one 
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construction union leader, one downtown resident, and one person of color, an African American 
of unspecified professional affiliation. They were overwhelmingly “captains of industry,” 
illuminating the role that the LMDC’s creators intended for the agency: a public authority that 
could “get things done” in the tradition of the Port Authority’s origins and Robert Moses’ 
legacy.233  An outside city planner was also added, chosen opaquely, according to architect and 
critic Michael Sorkin.  The LMDC’s major activity, the WTC Memorial and Redevelopment 
Plan, was funded through HUD grants under a $2.783 billion appropriation from US Congress 
for recovery at the site.  Armed with the powers of eminent domain and to override most local 
zoning and land-use regulations, the LMDC is a potent entity through which federal 
reconstruction and recovery funds, as well as state aid, were funneled through as they made their 
way to the WTC site.  
Unlike the Port Authority, a nearly century-old bi-state public authority, the LMDC is a 
contemporary authority with a narrower scope – revitalizing Lower Manhattan post-9/11 – and 
much-narrower practical activities, which have mostly involved managing funds and 
redeveloping the WTC site.  The members of the LMDC and the other actors at the site have not 
always agreed, and the WTC site is an artifact of that.  The site offers a way through which we 
can in fact memorialize the battles at the site.  The LMDC supported a plan by Larry Silverstein, 
the site leaseholder, to quickly rebuild an office tower on an adjacent parcel of land while the 
main planning process was still in progress, indicating the agency’s prioritization of replacing 
lost office space, perhaps spurred by the Port Authority’s desire to generate $120 million in 
revenue annually.  The six design plans commissioned and unveiled by the LMDC in July 2002 
all centered on commercial office and retail spaces, an expression of the rise of the privatization 
of urban planning via the public-private partnership embodied by the LMDC.  Around the same 
time, a civic alliance of over seventy-five business, government, community, and civic groups 
was convened by the Regional Plan Association, and it reached one unequivocal conclusion: that 
more public involvement was necessary in the reshaping of Lower Manhattan.  Chastened by the 
alliance’s efforts, the LMDC and Port Authority began again, with a new outreach campaign, 
and city officials also began pressing the Port Authority to trade control of the WTC site for the 
land under Kennedy and LaGuardia airports, which the Port Authority was renting from the city, 
signaling an attempt to make the site more overtly public through a city-guided development 
process, which could be subject to land-use laws mandating community participation.  The trade, 
initiated by Mayor Bloomberg, failed, with the Port Authority remaining the client of the 
reconstruction projects and Silverstein the lease-holding private developer with a vested interest 
in the client’s decisions. 
Architecture critic Herbert Muschamp suggests that the LMDC, the vehicle of such 
machinations, is deserving of more scrutiny than the “small” plans that were proffered by it.234  
Since the Koch mayoral administration throughout the 1980s, the city’s Department of City 
Planning has deteriorated into a de facto economic development engine, which already exists in 
the forms of the Economic Development Corporation and the ESDC as well as various business 
improvement districts (BIDs), such as the Alliance for Downtown New York, which have also 
subsumed planning within profit-making, commercial agendas, making the LMDC multiply 
redundant, according to Muschamp.  The LMDC must justify its existence by appearing uniquely 
suited to its assigned tasks, relying on strategies intended to bolster its image of expertise, 
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including “cultural programming” and patterns of secrecy.235  Yet the fundamental authority by 
which it, and others like it, operates is illustrative of a reconfiguration of state power in the past 
several decades that has favored a corporate model of governance and luxury real estate 
developments (see Chapter 1). 
 The memorial competition required competitors to submit designs within a narrow set of 
limits.  Designs were to recognize each individual who died, house unidentified remains, offer a 
contemplative space, and acknowledge those who contributed to “rescue, recovery and healing.”  
The general stipulation of the memorial design contributions was that they have “enduring and 
universal symbolism” and be unique and historically authentic.236  Requests from politicians and 
LMDC administrators were overlaid upon the formal requirements, and they consisted of the 
physical expression of liberty and democracy and that the memorial “reaffirm life itself” and the 
“universal ideal of American freedom,” rather than only honoring the dead.237  Thus, the 
competition itself circumscribed the parameters of any viable memorial, and those parameters 
required an emphasis on nation and democracy, while playing on the event’s global significance, 
simultaneously offering a site of remembrance and a future-oriented scene.  
The official selection committee was decided upon by the LMDC and comprised of 
thirteen members, one of whom had a loved one killed in the attacks, with the remaining dozen a 
mix of artists, architects, philanthropists, and politicians.  Arad and Walker’s “Reflecting 
Absence” was chosen from 5,201 entries from around the world.  The competition opened in 
April 2003 and the plans for “Reflecting Absence” were unveiled in January 2004.  The 
memorial was required to abide by parameters established by Libeskind, the winner of the 
competition to design the overall site plan.  A multi-phase process beginning in July 2002 and 
ending nearly a year later, the site plan competition was far more contested than the memorial 
selection.  Initially, the LMDC released six “preliminary design concepts,” followed by the 
solicitation of a land use plan for the site.  Seven teams, culled from 406 entries, were selected 
by the LMDC, and they offered nine designs in total (with the THINK team offering three plans).  
Upon release of the plans was a period of public outreach, with an exhibit of the designs at the 
World Financial Center Winter Garden its most widely-attended public event.  Designs were also 
placed online, drawing millions of virtual visitors, according to the LMDC.238  In February 2003, 
two designs were made finalists: Libeskind’s and THINK’s, shared elements of which were 
skyscrapers, famous architects, and 10 million square feet of office space (the amount demanded 
by Silverstein).  The LMDC and the Port Authority – the implementer of the plan and the owner 
of the site – made the announcement. 
The centerpiece of THINK’s plan was two 1,665-foot towers, built in a lattice-work 
design inspired by the Eiffel Tower.  Within the latticed towers, buildings would be constructed, 
including a museum, a performing arts center, and other public spaces.  The selection committee 
chose the plan but the decision was reversed by Governor Pataki, who was quoted as saying 
“Those towers look like death to me. … There’s no goddamn way I’m going to build those 
skeletons.”239  Libeskind’s design was ultimately the one chosen by Pataki.  Despite the Port 
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Authority’s site ownership and responsibility for implementing the site plan, the decision-maker 
was the Governor.  Pataki is largely responsible for what exists at the site today, with his 
personal preference taking a significant role in representing the state, politically and 
aesthetically. 
 
 
Financing of the memorial and museum 
 
Despite its name as a “national” monument, being something owned by the public, the 
National September 11 Memorial and Museum is actually a private, not-for-profit entity.  A  
public-private partnership has been established to fund it, with various fundraising campaigns 
and public monies financing it.  In addition to $350 million raised in April 2008, $250 million 
was contributed by the LMDC (for the Memorial & Museum), $80 million by the State of New 
York (for the full cost of the Museum Pavilion), and additional funds by The Port Authority of 
New York & New Jersey.240  To date, the memorial foundation has raised over $470 million.241  
The building costs for the memorial and museum total over $800 million, and the memorial and 
museum together will have a $63 million annual operating budget.242  Other comparable 
memorials have cost much, much less – the Oklahoma City bombing memorial cost $29.1 
million and the World War II memorial, considered excessive at its time, cost $175 million.  
Actual costs for the memorial and museum have been more than double those projected at the 
project’s conception.  Their annual maintenance is enormously expensive compared to other 
nationally significant memorials, like the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, whose maintenance cost 
in 2011 was $140,000.243  Some reasons for the expense are the structural challenges of building 
over an active rail line, security costs, and so-called ‘starchitect’ fees.   
In October 2006, Bloomberg became chairman of the board of the National September 11 
Memorial & Museum, after cost projections reached upward of $1 billion and the building 
processes had repeatedly stalled.  His purported goals were to rein in costs, collect pledged 
donations, including $10 million from American Express, and re-start the stalled building.  At 
the time, critics called him an aspiring “emperor of 9/11.”244  Upon joining the board, he made a 
personal loan of $15 million, at a low rate of 0.3 percent interest, and then began courting other 
donors, promising them that the museum would get completed.   
The memorial and museum pledged to raise its budget privately but has decided to lobby 
for city, state, and federal funding.  At this time, it is expected that two-thirds of the operating 
budget will come from museum admission fees ($24 a person for non-family), gift shop sales (of 
such items as commemorative stones, coins, books, and necklaces), and concessions, with the 
other third coming from annual fundraising.  The museum admission fees are expected to replace 
the foundation’s biggest revenue stream until now, donations and transaction fees collected when 
visitors book timed tickets for the memorial plaza.  The ticket sales and concessions are expected 
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to cover about two-thirds of the annual operating budget of the foundation, with a gap of about 
$20 million remaining that must be funded by private donations.  In summer 2014, shortly after 
the museum’s opening, the construction fences around the memorial plaza will be removed, 
making the memorial open freely to the public and eliminating the timed ticket system and its 
accompanying income stream.245 
Attempts to gain city and federal funding have been unsuccessful thus far, with 
Bloomberg – chairman of the memorial foundation – saying that the September 11 attacks were a 
national event and Congress should therefore fund the museum.  In his speech at the museum’s 
opening, Bloomberg urged people to contact their Congressional representatives to complain 
about the lack of federal funding for the Memorial Foundation’s $63 million annual operating 
budget.  Unlike other major cultural institutions, including the national Holocaust and Pearl 
Harbor museums, the museum does not have an endowment or government funding, and 
Bloomberg’s indictment of the federal government’s withholding of funding is simultaneously 
an attribution of guilt for the public’s suffering of the $24 admission fee, as well as, more 
implicitly, the burden faced by the museum to draw visitors with such a cost for admission.  
Daniel Inouye, a Hawaii senator, introduced a bill in 2011 to have Congress provide up to $20 
million per year in federal funding to the memorial and museum foundation and which would 
also allow the National Park Service to take control of the memorial grounds site if the New 
York and New Jersey governors approved it.  The bill was blocked by another senator, who 
argued for equivalent cuts in the federal budget and asked for the city and state to commit funds 
first.  New York senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Charles Schumer have been crafting a revised 
funding bill in 2014.  The foundation is also seeking a federal subsidy for security costs – an 
issue that seems to lend itself to government funding more than other costs – which total $10-12 
million per year.  Part of the operating expenses of the memorial and museum – a nonprofit 
entity – include the salaries of its employees.  The top eleven officials make at least $190,000 a 
year, with four of them making over $300,000, thus requiring $2.8 million in salaries for less 
than a dozen people.246  
While the Port Authority does not own or operate the memorial or museum, it is building 
the museum and has contributed hundreds of millions to the construction of its infrastructure.  
Generally, the foundation is responsible for the cost of the memorial and museum and the Port 
Authority is handling the costs of site-wide infrastructure.  The memorial is so expensive that the 
Port Authority, not known for its frugality, is demanding $150 million from the memorial 
foundation to cover its own outlays.247  It has also said that the memorial foundation owes it $156 
million in construction costs for the museum.248  Prior to that request, it also threatened to shut 
down funding for the museum if the museum did not pay a larger share of the infrastructure 
costs, with Port Authority officials expressing concern that the museum didn’t have enough 
money to finish the job.  However, the museum countered that the Port Authority was 
responsible for the cost overruns and believed it was instead owed more than $100 million 
because of the delays. Beginning in September 2011, the Port Authority stopped approving new 
contracts and contract extensions; the issues were arbitrated outside of court.  Such disputes over 
cost overruns are responsible for the delays on the museum’s opening, which was originally 
scheduled for September 2012, a year after that of the memorial.   
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This brutal argument over who was to finish the museum indicates that government 
spending is ethically imperative only to a point.  What the acceptable amount of spending should 
be remains unclear, however.  The Port Authority clearly announced in 2011, through its former 
Chairman Peter Samson, who resigned in March 2014 amid scandal: “We are … rebuilding the 
World Trade Center site as a symbol of our nation’s success, strength and resilience, and as an 
economic force for the New York/New Jersey region.  Of course, it is our moral obligation to the 
families of the victims lost that day that we rebuild, and we have committed more than $11 
billion for the project.”249 The crux of the project is the knotty intersection of success and 
progress in economic terms and the reification of 9/11 as a painful wound to the nation.  Samson 
expresses morality in capitalistic terms.  Instead of giving money to the families of the deceased, 
the memorial and museum become the focus, and attendant diversion, of giving funds.   
 Some families have spoken out against the costs of the memorial and museum, calling it a 
“memorial-industrial complex characterized by gross mismanagement, bloated salaries and out-
of-control spending” that would be better served by the National Parks Service’s management.250  
One group, 9/11 Parents and Families of Firefighters and WTC Victims, has been especially 
critical of the memorial foundation, noting that, as of 2012, the Port Authority agreed to take 
only $50 million of the $300 million owed to it by the foundation, leaving the balance for 
taxpayers “to pick up the tab for the cost overruns by a private foundation.”251  The group is 
similarly critical of Inouye’s Congressional bill that would give the foundation $20 million 
annually.  What emerges is a picture of a memorial foundation that is not only sitting on funds, 
but also misusing them, and thus not in need – or, implicitly, deserving – of state financial 
assistance.   
 
 
The museum 
 
The other half of the memorial plaza is what is officially titled the “National September 
11 Memorial Museum.”252 Opened in May 2014, officials estimate more than 2.5 million visitors 
at the museum per year.  As of July 10, 2014, it has had 400,000 visitors since its opening.253  
Lead architect of the museum is Davis Brody Bond, a Lower Manhattan firm which also 
designed other “important public memorial complexes” including the Martin Luther King Jr. 
Center in Atlanta and the Civil Rights Institute in Birmingham, Alabama.254  It encompasses 
110,000 square feet of gallery space, all located underground.  The entryway to the museum – 
the Memorial Museum Pavilion – has its own, separate architect, Snøhetta, a global firm with 
offices in Oslo and New York.255  
                                                
249 “Port Authority Chairman Samson’s Comments Delivered Today at the Port Authority Board Meeting,” 
PANYNJ Press Release, Aug. 19, 2011. 
250 Graham Rayman, “9/11 Family Group Wants National Park Service to Take Over WTC Memorial,” Village 
Voice, June 12, 2012. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Though official nomenclature is inconsistent, sometimes switching to 9/11 Memorial Museum or September 11 
Memorial Museum, this is the most common assignation. 
253 National September 11 Memorial & Museum email communication, July 10, 2014. 
254 “Museum Architects,” National September 11 Memorial and Museum, accessed May 15, 2014, 
https://www.911memorial.org/museum-architects.  
255 This is interesting for two reasons.  One, the chosen firm embodies global movement of capital and design.  
Second, the threshold to the museum is marked in a way that exposes the blurriness between the memorial and the 
 65 
The museum is tasked with several things: honoring the dead and survivors, preserving 
the archaeological site and artifacts, and offering a “comprehensible explanation of a once 
inconceivable occurrence.”256  Overlaying these tasks is the necessity of speaking to different 
audiences, including those who witnessed the attacks in New York City and elsewhere in the 
U.S., international witnesses, and youth and young adults.  Alice Greenwald was appointed 
director of the museum in 2006, after working at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
Washington, D.C. for nineteen years, part of which time she spent as its associate director.  Of 
the September 11 museum, she says “It’s not always an authoritative museum.  It’s about 
collective memory.”257  One member of her cabinet of nine advisers, who meet 2-3 times a year, 
said the overriding question for him is what message visitors would take away: “Are they going 
to leave with any sense of why this happened and its consequences?  Or will they be moved 
solely by the sheer power of the catastrophe?  If it’s only the latter, then the museum is a 
failure.”258  The official mission of the museum is:  
  
…to bear solemn witness to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and February 26, 1993. The 
Museum honors the nearly 3,000 victims of these attacks and all those who risked their lives to save others. 
It further recognizes the thousands who survived and all who demonstrated extraordinary compassion in the 
aftermath. Demonstrating the consequences of terrorism on individual lives and its impact on communities 
at the local, national, and international levels, the Museum attests to the triumph of human dignity over 
human depravity and affirms an unwavering commitment to the fundamental value of human life.259  
 
These two expectations of the museum – that of the cabinet member and the official statement – 
conflict, with the former emphasizing a sense of historicity and the latter, the act of remembering 
the dead and an ambiguous triumphalism.  The why of 9/11 is notably missing from the official 
mission and is one of the features distinguishing descriptions of the task of the memorial from 
that of the museum.   
 
 
The mathematics of collective memory 
 
Thus, we see that the museum has a role to fill that is distinct from the memorial, at 
which there is no mention of the terrorist attacks that destroyed the Twin Towers.  Yet the 
museum is still attempting to avoid any active politicization, exemplified not only by its mission 
statement but also its constitution and curation.  One example of the museum’s active avoidance 
of explicit politics is the strategic utilization of technology in its exhibits, especially that called 
“Timescape.” Particular moments are highlighted when an array of relevant news articles is 
projected on a wall.  The actual selection of which moments to highlight has been delegated to a 
statistical algorithm, for the precise reason of avoiding a political conflict over the content of the 
exhibit at any given time.  The founder of Local Projects, the coders of the algorithm used, says 
that “the system lets the curators say they haven’t set an agenda” and sometimes includes 
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“nothing that a curator would have put in.”260, 261  The algorithm sifts through news articles, 
uncovering 9/11-related bits of information and connecting them, with the goal being the 
extraction of insights about current affairs. It is a mechanization of the contextualizing of history.  
Unlike a curator, the algorithm purportedly does not over- or under-emphasize any themes – “it 
simply shows events for what they are, in news headlines.”262  
In order to evaluate this claim, we must consider the mathematics at work more 
generally.  An algorithm is a structured description of how to calculate a particular value, such as 
credit-scoring, or find a solution to a task – here, the selection and organization of information 
referencing 9/11.  While the neutrality of using an algorithm is championed by the museum and 
certain reviewers, such an assertion elides the value judgments inherent to the very building of an 
algorithm.  These include the selection of method (how the collected data is mapped), the setting 
of parameters (how the data is mined), and how misclassifications are dealt with.  None of these 
are neutral or impartial, but instead active decisions made by a person exercising his or her 
particular values and ethical and epistemological judgment.  In the case of “Timescape,” the onus 
of the ethical is deflected from the museum to Local Projects.  Perhaps most starkly, the timeline 
begins on September 11, 2001, a kind of big-bang historicization of the event and what 
conditioned it before and after the towers were destroyed.  Local Projects’ describes its 
algorithmic approach as “narrative future-proofing,” creating an exhibit – and, by extension, a 
museum – that resists obsolescence through the intelligence of the algorithm, as well as its ability 
to incorporate future events and news articles and “make sense” of them.263  The use of data here 
reformulates collective memory, intimately intertwining computer code with remembering. 
The neutrality proposed by the museum and Local Projects raises questions about the 
parameters within which the museum’s assumed visitors fit.  “Timescape” offers a mythical idea 
of a narrative without any narrative stakes and thereby anticipates a specific kind of subjectivity.  
The exhibit lends itself to a normative subject to whom the proffered narrative would make 
sense, such as a tourist from middle-America – a “neutral” visitor who consumes this picture of 
America and 9/11 that does not forthrightly ostracize or offend anyone, a picture of sanitized 
context.  What gets stifled is the complexity and diversity of historical experience – including 
individual encounters, politics, and interpretations – that cannot be encompassed in the ethics of 
algorithms.  The algorithm is meant to subdue the challenges of “too much” meaning, which 
includes the many ways of experiencing mourning, grief, and rage.    
 This subdual of those challenges is achieved with different tactics in other parts of the 
museum.  One of the museum’s primary exhibits, and the largest in terms of artifacts presented, 
is the “Historical Exhibition.”  It is a chronological representation of the events comprising the 
response to and recovery from the attacks, beginning at 8:46 am on September 11, when the first 
plane hit the North Tower, and ending May 30, 2002, when the final object was cleared from the 
site.  Other events on the timeline include the advent of the Patriot Act, the assemblage of the 
9/11 Commission, and September 12, 2001 – the start of war in Afghanistan.  The exhibit is 
comprised of several connected galleries that snake along a mostly-prescribed path, each room 
crammed with video, audio, photo, and other salvaged artifacts of the site.  The materials used to 
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document the event number upwards of 10,000, and advisory signs and tissue boxes accompany 
particularly sensitive imagery.   
Similarly to “Timescape,” but without an explicit utilization of algorithms to do so, the 
“Historical Exhibition” presents a narrative that appears to shy away from active, potentially-
inflammatory curatorial decision-making merely by the sheer number of materials used to 
recount 9/11, minute by minute in some sections of the timeline.  The firm Thinc, which 
designed the exhibition, said that, “We don’t ever want to re-create that day … It’s not about 
screams and sirens. You’re at the site, but you never lose sense of the fact that you’re there 
today, not back then. The there and then of the day comes through testimony, not immersive 
experience, which would be sensationalizing and exploitative, and potentially traumatizing.”264  
What the exhibit offers in lieu of such immersive experience is a barrage of the markers of 
witnessing – documentation of what was seen, the ways it was recorded, the crowdsourcing of 
witnesses’ experiences (represented in an audio exhibit visitors must cross through toward the 
entrance to the larger exhibits).   
The act of witnessing organizes and distributes “customary historical truths and 
judgments” as “resources of social, political, and moral influence.”265  In this way, it is a 
discursive practice that is not dependent on direct witnessing of an event, but simply on the 
technologically reproduced or enhanced experience of witnessing, as many of the crowdsourced 
exhibits offer.  The witness becomes virtually present and, gathered in large numbers, creates a 
familiar past, “organiz[ing] a discursive window on the past through which audiences are given 
to understand historical chronology and potentially steer its trajectory toward the ends of 
symbolic, if not procedural, justice.”266  Bearing witness through technology – a simulation of 
witnessing – reproduces acts of witnessing instead of witnesses and testimonies.  The process is a 
simulation and reproduction of a particular view of the event – by emphasizing an ‘experience’ 
for visitors, the sheer existence of some witnesses/testimonies (and their diversity) are 
necessarily foreclosed.  Michel Foucault notes this phenomenon as well, with discourse acting 
not as an allegory or document, or a sign of something else, but as a monument – “discourse in 
its own volume.”267  The emphasis on witnessing and first-hand accounts at the museum is not 
the apolitical, intrinsically truthful – or authentic, or authoritative – distribution of history, but a 
way of producing and distributing particular formations of historical truth necessary to the 
operations of “social, political, and moral power.”268  
The datalogical shift marked by the museum’s utilization of technological curation and its 
reliance on a sheer quantity of exhibition material – data – parallels the memorial foundation’s 
celebration of numerical statistics at the memorial in promotional materials.  It also marks the 
temporal specificities of a 21st-century museum, in which such technologies “do not simply 
refract or record an event, but become the event by materially transcribing a political code onto 
the built environment, cultural memory and the politicized body, and by immersing spectator-
participants in fear provoking simulations of space-time actuality.”269  This datalogical shift maps 
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a larger question around capital and memory more generally: does the accumulation of data help 
justify the costs invested into a project?  And does it offer a “better” way to remember, or help 
prove the accuracy of one way in particular?  The museum, through its curatorial decisions, gives 
a linear chronology to what was, and continues to be, an unstructured, fragmented group of 
events.  Such a narrativization is in no small part achieved by the careful arrangement of a large 
quantity of material, following a calendrical timeline, with temporal fragments of the 9/11 attack 
assembled as a narrative, offering an origin point – a rational beginning – for the “Global War on 
Terrorism.”  
   
    
Museal remains 
 
 There are two other main exhibitions, the “Memorial Exhibition,” containing portraits of 
nearly every person who died, and the “Foundation Hall,” which showcases the slurry wall that 
remained through the destruction of the attacks, as well as the “Last Column,” a sixty-ton, forty-
foot-tall steel beam that bears personal memorials and missing posters placed there by rescue 
personnel and other site workers and that was the last piece of steel to leave the site during 
cleanup.  Another important piece of the museum, yet off-limits to the general public, is its 
collection of about 14,000 human remains whose DNA is too badly damaged for current 
identification tests.  Enclosed in a repository controlled by the city medical examiner, the 
remains will be sealed off from everyone except family members, awaiting advances in 
technology that will enable their identification. Of the 2,753 people reported missing at the 
WTC, 1,115 people (41 percent of the total), have not been identified, and the city medical 
examiner’s office holds 7,930 unidentified remains, which is 36 percent of all recovered remains.   
Some families want to keep the remains at bedrock.  However, many others have spoken 
out against the placing of the remains below ground, offended by sharing the resting place of 
loved ones with strangers visiting the museum, as well as the prospect of descending seventy feet 
below ground to reach the remains.  Seventeen family members have filed a suit against the city 
to reopen the decision, arguing that it is degrading to inter the remains in an underground 
museum.  In the 2011 lawsuit, plaintiffs claimed that neither the city nor September 11 Memorial 
and Museum consulted families over the decision to place the remains of the dead under the 
museum.  One plaintiff says, “it is dishonorable, disrespectful and inappropriate to place the 
remains in a private museum with an entrance fee,” and request the moving of the remains to an 
above-ground memorial separate from the museum.270  The families lost the lawsuit, whose 
primary objective was to obtain a list of addresses for the families of the 2,749 deceased, in order 
to poll them about the museum’s decision to house the remains underground; while spokespeople 
for the museum say that families have been repeatedly consulted, several of the families filing 
suit said they have not.  An appeal is currently underway.  City officials have said that a private 
“reflection room” will be available to families at the repository, and that the repository will be 
entirely closed to the public. 
On May 10, 2014, the unidentified remains were moved in a “ceremonial transfer” to the 
museum repository, where the city medical examiner’s office continues to maintain exclusive 
jurisdiction over the remains.  The remains were held in three metal, coffin-sized military 
transfer cases draped in American flags, one case each carried by a New York Police Department 
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vehicle, a Fire Department truck, and a Port Authority Police Emergency Service Unit.  A few 
dozen families attended the transfer, with some relatives wearing black gags over their mouths in 
protest over the lack of consultation in the decision to move the remains to what is likely to 
become a major tourist attraction.  One gag-wearer, a retired deputy fire chief who lost his 
firefighter son, says the museum repository will be a “dog and pony show,” for the reason that 
tour guides are likely to announce that “’Behind that wall are the victims of 9/11.’”271  And, 
because the remains are not actually entombed but in the care and storage of the chief medical 
examiner’s office, they are subject to removal for testing, which is an ever-present threat to the 
notion of a tomb or final resting place. 
Others have protested the decision as it relates to a curatorial feature of the museum: the 
inscription of a Virgil quote – “No day shall erase you from the memory of time” – on the outer 
wall of the repository.  From Book 9 of the Aeneid, the “you” of the quotation refers to two 
Trojan warriors who are lovers, Nisus and Euryalus.  The quote is culled from a scene following 
a night ambush of an enemy camp, where the two lovers slaughter their sleeping enemies until 
the ground is covered in “warm black gore.”  As they flee the murder site, the two are ambushed 
by a returning enemy troop and brutally killed (their heads impaled on spears), with Nisus first 
escaping mortal peril only to realize he has been separated from Euryalus and thus dying 
alongside his lover in an attempt to save him.  The Aeneid as a whole is a nationalist epic about 
state-building, following the journey of Trojan hero Aeneas as he winds up in Italy to realize his 
destiny of laying the foundation of what will become Rome.  The slaughter of the sleeping 
enemy enacted by Nisus and Euryalus is valorized as a part of this narrative.   
The central sentiment of the quotation inscribed at the museum refers to the fortune the 
two warriors had in dying together, a sentiment commonly found suitable for military deaths.  
Yet the quotation’s original context renders it inappropriate for remembering thousands of 
civilians indiscriminately killed, argue many scholars and commentators.272273  The museum has 
known for years that many classicists disagreed with the use of the quote in the museum, and it 
has since decided to remove the word “Aeneid” from the inscription to distance the quote from 
its original context, presumably, and suggesting that the quotation was meant as a “high-
sounding,” stand-alone phrase that would not invite visitors to further reflection or emotion 
drawn from context.274  Greenwald says that the quotation speaks to the indelibility of our 
memories and its choice for the wall was based not on the “classic story”’s narrative but the 
“reference to a single day not being able to erase the memory of those we love.”275   
Thus, the museum ends up engaging in an open disregard for cultural history.  Despite its 
private, not-for-profit status, it serves the public and considers itself on track to join the ranks of 
the vital cultural institutions of the city and nation.  However, it simultaneously asserts the 
acceptability of functionalizing and literalizing artistic work.  In turn, it distances the museum 
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from the intended work of similar institutions, both in its failure to “facilitat[e] learning” and 
offer an accurate historical record.276  Instead, it aims to affirm “universal lessons in human 
rights, justice, and morality,” irrespective of the diversity of the personal experiences, 
temporalities, politics, and possible interpolations at the site.277  In its quest to not only 
memorialize 9/11, but also call attention to “the absolute illegitimacy of indiscriminate murder” 
– a quote from Greenwald in her ‘Message from the Museum Director,’ which we shall revisit 
later in this chapter – the museum methods take on an imprecision.278 
 The Virgil quote is engraved on $40 key chains being sold in the museum gift shop, 
which some family members call a marketing of the headstone of their loved ones.  The gift shop 
has publicly come under fire from many people, being called “crass commercialism on a literally 
sacred site.”279  Such crass commercialism was also attributed to George W. Bush who asked for 
“continued participation and confidence in the American economy,” immediately after 9/11, 
ensuring that the best way for American people to combat terror was to start shopping again.  
However, several other memorial sites have gift shops, including the USS Arizona Memorial, 
Arlington National Cemetery, and the Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, and 
American museums almost always have an attendant gift shop.  These sites are also known 
tourist attractions, yet most criticisms of the 9/11 museum gift shop rest on the shop’s making of 
the museum into a tourist attraction.   
 The museum’s gift shop raises questions beyond whether it should exist.  Where does the 
desire to own something from the site come from – is it capitalist conditioning or a mnemonic 
impulse?  And how does its presence affect memory of the event?  There is a capitalization of 
memory in the gift shop, as well as of the quote.  Mourning and remembering is prescribed 
through not only the museum but the gift shop as well, and doing so in the correct way implies 
the necessity of buying a key chain, or ornamental rock, or coffee mug, or hooded sweatshirt, to 
remember the experience of the museum, if not 9/11.  9/11 is funneled through the museum, and 
the museum is funneled through the gift shop, culminating in a Port Authority Police Department 
magnet stuck to a visitor’s refrigerator at home. 
    
 
Ruins, aura, and spectacular materiality 
 
 Until 2011, roughly 1,200 artifacts from the WTC site were housed in Hangar 17 at JFK 
Airport.  The various remains include pieces of steel composing the towers, small items like 
clothing and golf balls from the shops from the underground mall, and entire aid vehicles, 
warped by the fire.  Chosen in the frenetic days after the collapse of the towers, the items in the 
hangar only represented about one percent of the 1.8 million tons of debris removed from the site 
and were selected as tokens of 9/11 that could be distributed to memorials around the country.  
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Much of the towers, and the people inside them, was pulverized into dust by the pressure of 
tremendous heat and weight, and the hangar contained two large blocks of material that are 
cross-sections of four floors, compressed by similar extremes of force.  The blocks are now 
housed in the museum, as are several other large relics from the site, including the “Last 
Column.”  The museum commissioned Spanish photographer Francesc Torres to photograph the 
hangar every day of April 2009, and his photos of individual objects and broad views of the 
hangar were collected in a book as well as exhibited in New York, London, Barcelona, and 
Madrid.280   
 The “Last Column” was featured in Torres’ photographs, and the column is shown lying 
flat and supported on steel beams brought in for the purpose, lending it an iconic or even artistic 
value.  It was also the first object moved from the hangar into the museum, which had to be built 
to accommodate its height.  This artifact of capital – a skyscraper’s support beam – determined 
the form taken by the museum meant to remember the deaths that occurred in the WTC.  Draped 
in an American flag when moved from the cleanup site to the hangar, nearly all accounts 
describe it as being “ceremonially removed.”  Soon after its arrival at the hangar, the rusted and 
burned skin of the beam began to flake and conservators urgently re-attached the loosened chips, 
an aestheticization of a ruin that raises questions about the museum’s politics of time.  As Hal 
Foster notes, an ambiguity between artifact and sacralized relic pervades the hangar and its 
objects; the preservation of the column’s chips, in particular, suggests it veers into the latter 
category.   
While the museum at first glance seems to be involved in a process of remembering that 
embraces the ruins of the site, the display of the ruins is a fixing and classifying – and 
aestheticizing – of those ruins.  The hazy status of objects at the hangar crosses into the museum 
as well, with objects in the formal museum setting expressing an ambiguity between historical, 
museal artifact and monumental sculpture.  The tridents of the façade of the Twin Towers are the 
first such object to greet visitors upon entering the museum, towering and rusted, demanding an 
audience.  The understanding of 9/11 that emerges from the museum is of damage to property, 
and capital more generally, that must be mourned.  The museum’s exhibitions feature mangled 
steel and cement and, occasionally, suggestions of bodies.  The question the museum begs is why 
this is mournable and why such destruction of materiality demands preservation – its 
consideration brings the place of finance capital in this story into relief.  
In his review of the museum, critic Holland Cotter calls the prevailing story presented by 
the museum as framed in moral terms, angels versus devils, as well as closely resembling the 
devotional quality of a religious pilgrimage, with the personal artifacts of those killed on 9/11 
becoming iconic, sanctified, miraculous.281  Such artifacts include eyeglasses, a stray shoe, and 
the red bandana worn as a mask by a civilian who perished after helping several others escape 
one of the towers.282  Infrastructural elements like the tridents, slurry wall, and “Survivor’s 
Staircase” also retain the same miraculous framing aura within the museum, made awesome by 
virtue of their preservation through the otherwise-complete destruction of the towers.  Yet there 
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is something to these ruins that overflows their museal lodging, an aura that is conjured up and 
which, if it does not quite “act as an antidote to the fixed, classified, and commodified” 
memories of formal commemorative spaces, at least stimulates a “form of remembering which is 
inarticulate, sensual, and conjectural.”283  They also inspire the design of the museum itself, with 
the ramp leading from the entry pavilion to the underground gallery space of the museum being 
inspired by an access road used during recovery that “eventually took on a sacral aura.”284 The 
resonance of such ruins is found in the evocation of a prior whole, and their size is able to 
overwhelm the parameters of the museum’s framing.  Yet what they are intended to call up for 
visitors – officially, it is to “honor victims” and “bear solemn witness to” and examine “the 
implications of” the attacks – does not readily lend itself to the artifacts themselves.  The “Last 
Column,” in particular, is housed in the museum to “encourage reflection on the foundations of 
resilience, hope, and community with which we might build our collective future.”285  The 
discursive and phenomenological connections are not visceral, yielding an unclear interpretive 
lens.  Thus, while the artifacts are remarkable in themselves, the way they are offered up by the 
museum is disjointed from an experiential understanding of them, mirroring the disjointed, 
exceptionalist narratives of 9/11 that have dictated the memory of 9/11 both in New York and 
nationally.286 
 
 
“Understanding 9/11” 
 
Unlike other American museums commemorating tragedy, the September 11 museum is 
opening relatively soon after the event in question.  The Holocaust Museum in Washington, 
D.C., for example, opened in 1993, many decades after the events and thereby offering historical 
distance and perspective.  The goal of the September 11 museum, according to Amy Weisser, the 
vice president for exhibitions, is to remind visitors of what happened, rather than tell them, since 
the museum’s creators are aware that visitors experienced the event.  Instead of having people 
relive the day, says Weisser, the museum intends to “put their experiences in a larger context” 
and that it is “a major part of setting the ongoing narrative … in many ways writing the initial 
history of 9/11.”287  Architectural historian Charles Jencks notes that “a building becomes iconic 
…when it is part of an unfolding media event that takes time. … A necessary ritual … in a 
secular society, only the newspapers, magazines, and TV can engender the proper aura, establish 
legitimacy, create taboos, and define what can be said and felt and what is unacceptable.”288  I 
extend this attribution of iconicity to the museum itself, which, through the intense publicity 
surrounding its planning and construction, has been elevated to iconic status rapidly, along with 
1 WTC.  An icon, from the Greek eikon, is literally a likeness or image, as the Twin Towers 
were an icon of Western capitalism to its destroyers.  The more commonly-used meaning of icon 
today, in computing, is also relevant to building, Charles Jencks tells us, as it signals the 
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compressibility of the iconic building.  Like a recycle bin icon has a similarity to its function of 
storing waste, an iconic building can be shrunk down to postage stamp-sized brand image.  In the 
case of the 9/11 memorial plaza, the icon representing it is two graphic black squares placed 
diagonally, mirroring the memorial pools.  The Twin Towers were commonly represented as two 
graphic black rectangles side by side.  Lastly, perhaps most importantly, iconic buildings often 
“carry out a function regarded as important.”289  This attribution of importance happens in a 
variety of ways, but a major one is its part in a media event that unfolds over many months, 
required to engender the necessary aura, legitimacy, and definitions of the building.  The 
museum’s status as an icon and cultural object has become a major part of the “ongoing 
narrative” Weisser seeks to develop within its walls, now an inextricable part of the “initial 
history of 9/11.” 
Though some family members want the museum to focus on remembrance of the 
deceased, many others desire an “unbiased” portrayal of the history of the attacks.  Refrains of 
telling the full story290, including the failures alongside the successes, echo through the words of 
family members interviewed by Graham Rayman in 2008.  However, optimism for an “honest 
discussion of 9/11” is low, with some people commenting that “‘political correctness’” will 
hinder a historically accurate depiction of the events on the ground, which includes “‘the 
disastrous breakdown in communication, the lack of planning, the fact that the city was not 
prepared, the flaws in the towers' design.’”291  One firefighter who lost his brother-in-law 
remarks that the museum should focus on the “’terror and horror, what happened and who did it, 
and the bravery and magnificence,’” as well as the failures and “’lack of preparedness,’” for they 
were all a “’’part of that day, part of that story.’”292   Scholars and experts from various technical 
fields also advocate for “the full story.”  As Glenn Corbett, a professor of protection 
management, says, the museum must address whether we are “’going to pretend there were no 
flaws, or are we going to tell the true story?’”293  Such flaws, according to Corbett, include radio 
failures and design flaws in the Twin Towers that were exposed in the attacks.   
The thread that emerges from such voices is the importance of offering as many elements 
of 9/11 as possible, so that museum visitors can not only remember the event but also think 
critically and draw their own conclusions upon leaving the museum.  Yet the possible avenues of 
examination are far-reaching and often involve large city institutions and players, such as the 
Fire Department of NY, Giuliani, Bloomberg, Pataki, and the Port Authority itself, which all 
have an interest in particular portrayals of 9/11. In March 2002, Rudy Giuliani noted that we 
would have to “remember September 11 in its reality” because “censor[ing] it too much … 
find[ing] too many euphemisms for what happened” would render people incapable of reliving it 
and “therefore motivat[ing] them to prevent it from happening in the future.”294  Lee Ielpi, a 
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founder of the Tribute Center295 and memorial board member, lost his son on 9/11.  He similarly 
advocates a view hinging on the “obligation to inform [visitors]…about the effects of hatred and 
intolerance.”296 
However, the museum has been criticized for encouraging those very effects.  One piece 
has been the primary target, a video about the rise of Al-Qaeda.   A six-minute film projected 
onto a wall in the museum, “The Rise of al-Qaeda” was made by commission for the museum.  
The film’s use of “Islamist,” “jihadist,” and “Islamic terrorism” without clear explanation of 
their distinction from peaceful Islam is the primary target of critique, as well as an overall 
inflammatory tone that skews the Islamic faith in an antagonistic light.  Criticism of it came both 
from its internal interfaith advisory group, as well as from a group of 400 academics that 
petitioned the museum to review the film and its terminology.  Both group’s requests were 
rejected by the museum, leading to the resignation of the advisory group’s sole Muslim member.  
It signals a particular ideology of censorship: tolerance means censoring too much is not 
acceptable, but a little bit of censorship is fine.  The marshaling of the “reality” of 9/11 into 
representation is revealed as a task that necessitates such rules, paralleling the depoliticization of 
Virgil quote at the repository. 
As museums do and have done, the 9/11 Memorial Museum is manufacturing an 
experience of the real and an experience of the entity that is 9/11, and this is further complicated 
by its slippage into the terrain of memorial and the profit-driven original purpose of the WTC 
site.  The understanding of 9/11 that emerges from the museum is of damage to property, and 
capital more generally, that must be mourned.  The museum’s exhibitions feature mangled steel 
and cement and, occasionally, suggestions of bodies.  The question the museum begs is why this 
is mournable and why such destruction of materiality demands preservation.  What is displayed 
in the museum is wreckage – a 47,000-pound piece of antenna tower, a heat-warped ambulance, 
an elevator motor.  The wreckage is comprised of mundane objects, things one rarely notices on 
the day-to-day, yet these remnants become relics of the Twin Towers.  In their destruction and 
separation from their original context, and their subsequent archivization, the remnants become 
evocative, and the museum uses them to specific effect.  They become symbolic of 9/11 and, 
unexpectedly, the “promise of a world in which it should be impossible for people to … get 
caught in the vortex of terrorism.”297  The remnants-cum-relics offer a display of wounding and 
triumph, an invitation to view the damage of the attacks as well as the strength that enabled that 
damage’s preservation, curation, and display.   
 The attempt to “understand 9/11” leads to an archivization of everything, including the 
incredible destruction of the day’s events.  Missing persons are archived through their 
photographs and family remembrances made public in the museum.  Even the dead, and the 
fragments and dust of their bodies in the museum’s repository, if only available to the Medical 
Examiner’s team and family, are awaiting identification with future technologies that can 
facilitate their subsequent archivization.  A neoliberal scopic regime manifesting in the museum 
extends those of the Enlightenment, with obsessive archivization serving to colonize 9/11 in its 
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attempt to tell a version of the “full story” and also mark an ending to the aggression illuminated 
by 9/11.  We will not be caught in the vortex of terrorism once again because of the reassurance 
of the archive effect: the risk is over, because it already took place and has been archived.  
Echoing the 9/11 maxim to “Never Forget,” the museum assures us we will never forget and 
thereby never have to experience such trauma again.  In this way, we also “thus deny the 
irresistible foreboding that the worst has not taken place, not yet.”298  Instead, tissue boxes are 
discreetly placed near particularly sensitive displays, such as photographs of people jumping 
from the towers, and the museum’s visitors are expected to mourn and be viscerally affected by 
the documentation of the event past. 
There is a slipperiness in the distinctions between the memorial and the museum.  The 
memorial complex as a whole is called the National September 11 Memorial and Museum, while 
the museum in particular is the September 11 Memorial Museum.  From the late twentieth 
century on, the “memorial museum” has become an increasingly common designation, with the 
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Alice Greenwald’s former place of employment, and 
Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Museum as other widely-visited examples.299  A memorial museum 
distinguishes itself from typical museums by performing narratives – be they of an ‘educational’ 
quality, providing historical information, or more personal, offering up artifacts of individuals 
and sketching stories of people that occupied the site of the tragedy in question – on a site of 
memory.  It allows visitors to construct the living-out of the possible lives of the dead, versus the 
dwelling in loss that spaces like cemeteries more readily lend themselves to.   
In Greenwald’s pre-opening “Director’s Message,” included on the museum’s website 
prior to late-May 2014, there is a slippage and overlap of the words memorial and museum.  She 
writes that “memorials are the way people make promises to the future about the past,” and 
assigns this task to the museum in the next sentence.300  Is this because the museum picks up 
some of the work the memorial does not attempt or successfully undertake?  A museum creates a 
narrative, while a memorial is a fixed point that the public can return to.  In the case of the 9/11 
Memorial Museum, there is a sense that it is “memorializing” the past, yet a tension with the 
future and a sense of progress remains.  According to Dipesh Chakrabarty, museums of late 
democracies are “opening out to questions of the embodied and the lived,” which echoes the 
experiential qualities the memorial’s designers sought to evoke.301  Their predecessors, on the 
other hand, aimed for historical analysis and objectivity.  Yet the 9/11 Memorial Museum is 
attempting to offer just that, with its timelines, photographs of each person dead, and the 
extensive display of 9/11 media coverage.  In fact, it’s all about knowing, or recording, 9/11.  
When purchasing tickets online, there is an option to also purchase a guided tour called 
“Understanding 9/11,” which doubles the cost of admission.  Greenwald’s message and nearly 
every other statement from those involved in the museum’s conception and realization cite the 
importance of offering such an understanding to the museum’s visitors and its centrality to the 
mission of the museum.  Yet the museum does not feature that kind of work, with the headlines 
of “Timescape” and occasional mentions of conspiracy theorists and tensions between security 
and civil liberties being its only examples.302  There is no mention of the events precipitated by 
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9/11, including detentions, torture, drone raids, and 9/11 politicking by U.S. politicians, 
including Giuliani and Bush.   
The desire to write the “initial story” of the event was one motivation to build the 
museum with such unusual pace.  Yet, as elided in the museum itself, the intertwining of 9/11, 
the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the speed with which the museum and memorial were 
built is crucial.  Securing immediate support for the invasions required a mythologization of the 
event itself, and aligns with the correlation argued by Paul Virilio – that the question of war is 
summed up in the question of speed of everything that surrounds it.303  The question of speed 
also implicates mourning, particularly in the context of 9/11.  Derrida writes that engaging the 
memory of a deceased person right after her death is in fact the antipathy of mourning.  
Committing something to memory with haste serves to center the remembering-person as the 
point of reference, a speedy appropriation of the other and the other’s epitaph into an 
autobiographical discourse.304  A ‘speaking of’ the deceased in mourning does not preserve the 
memory of the deceased as much as write the narrative or autobiography of the mourner, which 
is the National September 11 Memorial Foundation, LMDC, and Port Authority in the case of 
the museum.    
 
 
The crisis temporality of 9/11 
 
 The potential for destruction and defacement is the monument’s most important quality.  
Yet the museum’s monumental artifacts are indoors, guarded, not open.  In its incarnation as the 
Twin Towers, the WTC was a publicly-accessible monument to America and global capital, and 
in its destruction, it is rendered archival, demanding preservation.  What is the promise to the 
future from the past that these preserved remnants offer? 
On one of the walls of the museum is a quotation from remarks made by the twins’ 
architect, Minoru Yamasaki, on their dedication and opening in 1973, declaring the WTC a 
“monument to world peace” and destined to become a representation of “man’s ability to find 
greatness.”  When someone visits the site a century from now, the memory generated will not be 
an experiential one, based in a live experience of 9/11, but in the synergy of the museum’s 
offerings and popular and individual understandings.  The state is often the actor that generates 
memory for the future, and its contribution of money to the museum is one way it satisfies this 
role.  The museum’s political vision, according to Greenwald, is its “promise to the future about 
the past.”  In her Director’s Message on the museum website, Greenwald says that in 
remembering victims and honoring rescue workers, the museum explores the “very real impact 
of terrorism” in peoples’ lives and underscores the “absolute illegitimacy of indiscriminate 
murder.”  “As custodian of memory,” she writes, “the Museum is taking on the mantle of moral 
authority that will define its continuing and evolving role [in perpetuity].”305  This mantle, 
according to Greenwald, means that the museum “embodies the promise of a world in which it 
should be impossible for people to go to work in the morning only to get caught in the vortex of 
terrorism ... the kind of world we want to bequeath.”  It also encompasses the definition of “what 
it means to be a human being.”306  Here is an instance of explicit ethical authority and imperative. 
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Such moral authority serves to underscore the “absolute illegitimacy of indiscriminate murder,” a 
gesture toward peace that carries within it the museum’s justification for and support of targeted, 
discriminate murder.  Importantly, however, the nationalist narrative of the museum keeps the 
enemy in question veiled, though the war waged against it has been public and enduring. 
 In this way, a crisis temporality emerges as central to the museum’s understanding of 
itself.  At the memorial and museum, there is an enfolding of time, a funneling of the past (the 
event), into the present and projected future.  Simultaneously, a sense of infinitude exists 
alongside a truncation of the meanings of 9/11 that the museum exhibits.  A temporal promise is 
inherent to the museum and memorial, and the politics of form and representation condition it.  
The memorial plaza is a representation of triumph, healing, and mourning into the future, with 
the desire to communicate into perpetuity emphasized by the Memorial Foundation’s official 
statements.  These are well-encapsulated by Memorial Foundation president Joe Daniels when he 
says that its creators “want this museum to make the world a better place.”307  Yet, are the 
foundation, the LMDC, the Port Authority, and the state itself equipped to take on this 
endeavor?308   
 We return to the question of speed and that with which 1 WTC and the memorial plaza, 
in particular, were constructed.  Societal temporality is brought into flux with the speedy 
construction, a shift in patterns of collective memory that have governed American public history 
and space for a long time previous.  The rapid call for rebuilding, and its attendant design and 
contract competitions, funding politics, and public rhetoric, had the effect of “saturating 
immediacy” with the installation of official representations of 9/11.309  With such saturation 
comes destruction and elision – of alternative discourses, memorials, and commemorations.  
With an estimated 2.5 million visitors at the museum alone this year, there is a sense of coming 
and out, packing a maximum saturation of experiencing, and ‘understanding,’ 9/11 into a short 
visit.  The parallels to airports – the other marquee projects of the Port Authority – are striking, 
particularly because many New Yorkers say they do not want to visit the museum, though they 
understand why it exists – it is meant for others, for the state, for history. 
The converting of the wounds of the Twin Towers to a single skyscraper, the tallest in the 
nation, is a use of speed to shore up the masculinity of New York City and the nation, a 
compensation for the wound opened.310  The importance of 9/11 as an attack on American soil 
has been widely acknowledged, with connections commonly made to the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941.  However, the Twin Towers were commercial office towers and Pearl 
Harbor was a military base.  Their conflation – or at least, comparison – unveils certain popular 
characterizations of both the WTC and the attacks of 9/11; the WTC, similar to the Pentagon and 
Pearl Harbor, becomes a body of the state, even when its ownership and generation by the Port 
Authority and LMDC is disregarded. 
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Conclusion: rallying memory and finance 
 
The first piece of public architecture at Ground Zero was the viewing platform installed 
at the edge of the site on December 27, 2011.  Designed by a team of high-profile architects, 
including Diller + Scofidio, the viewing platform was inspired by the private viewing platform 
constructed earlier for victims’ families, a simple and plain plywood structure that took the 
flowers, letters, and tags of mourning into its crevices and onto its surfaces.  The public platform, 
on the corner of Fulton Street and Broadway, was similarly bare to promote messages and 
mementos. 
 The platform was built to regulate the chaos that fell on the site after the towers, with 
large masses of people attempting to gain views of the site, climbing fences for a glimpse.  It was 
a viewing platform to view the wound, a carefully designed and built platform to survey the 
construction in progress.  A moment outside of the Twin Towers but not yet the memorial or 
office towers, it is the wound, an opening of horror and patriotism, extinguished and also 
teeming with activity.  Said Giuliani, denying people access to it would have been like “denying 
people access to other sites of historic significance, like Gettysburg or Normandy.”311  
 Echoing similar sentiments, the May 15, 2014 museum dedication ceremony ended with 
a performance of Aaron Copeland’s “Fanfare for the Common Man,” perhaps most popularly 
known as the theme music from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey.  Bloomberg called the dramatic 
selection fitting and enduring.  At the press conference the day before, he argued that the 
museum’s opening would be “an important day in our city and our country, and … the civilized 
world, where we value each other’s beliefs and rights to express ourselves.”  The museum, 
according to him, is a “testament to how we can overcome anything if we stand together as one.  
It tells the story of how after the attacks our city and nation and people across the world came 
together and emerged stronger than ever.”312  The emphasis on unity and strength on the local, 
national, and global scales is nothing new, but it overlays another, more revealing one: that of the 
importance of the state’s narrative freedom.   
In comments given by Giuliani on the viewing platform’s opening day, his final mayoral 
address, he similarly stresses that “… we shouldn’t think about the site out there, right beyond 
us, as a site for economic development,” he said. “You’ve got to think about it from the point of 
view of a soaring, beautiful memorial. If we do that part right, then the economic development 
will just happen. Millions of people will come here, and you’ll have all the economic 
development you want.”313  Rather than continue the straightforward story of business-as-usual at 
the WTC site, Giuliani urges a monument, one that soars and – according to his vision – 
communicates something wholly different, while remaining economically viable.  Bloomberg 
and Giuliani both stress the quality of the story to be told by the site and by the state and public’s 
engagement with it; it is to be an uplifting story, a positive engagement, a relationship to the site 
– especially the memorial and museum – that is reparative politically and economically. 
It is useful to consider the reparative functions of the state alongside the complex 
relationship between states and corporations.  State-corporate hybrids and collaborations have 
long been common, characterizing many colonial enterprises, but modernist discourse 
emphasized the symbolic differentiation between the state and the corporation.  Marxist state 
theory argues that liberal states fundamentally serve capitalist economic relations, as discussed in 
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Chapter 1, and much of what has been witnessed at the WTC site reconstruction has provided 
backing for this assertion.  Yet, the question of the distinction between economy and polity, and 
the history of modern liberal states promising to be a protection against ferocious capitalist 
excesses, remain.  While Bloomberg and Giuliani do not say anything that counters Marxist state 
theory, their emphasis on moral rhetoric and something beyond the economic, especially in 
Giuliani’s case, offers a point of pause.  Wendy Brown writes that the state “provides webbing 
for the social body dismembered by liberal individualism,” while simultaneously administering 
those same subjects.314  The concurrent repair of capitalism and individualism’s damages takes 
economic, administrative, and legislative forms and, I argue, requires the backing of the state’s 
ethical claims.  Though moral neutrality is ideologically central to neoliberal political rationality 
and market control of the state, I argue that the WTC memorial plaza shows us that the ethical 
gap between economy and polity that liberalism was able to harbor still remains in neoliberal 
New York City.  On one hand, the state attempts to close the ethical gap, in line with neoliberal 
imperatives.  Yet on the other, it strives to maintain it by financing and facilitating the building 
of memorial plaza, ostensible site of public space and public memory, as a method of governance 
that operates through the reterritorialization of memory.  There is a resulting tension between the 
two strategies of the state.  
At the WTC site, the Port Authority and LMDC, as well as the federal government, have 
fed huge amounts of funding to the private interests running the WTC that are legally responsible 
for the towers’ reconstruction.  However, in exchange for this financial gift, they are also able to 
claim an ethical stance in rebuilding the site, in addition to creating a public memorial plaza.  As 
I have argued in this chapter, this claim for an ethical stance reproduces the legitimacy and 
power of the state, which the Twin Towers’ destruction exposed as permeable.  The memorial 
plaza as it exists now is a state-sanctioned mourning place for this destruction, yet the sensations 
and experiences it induces in visitors – of overwhelm and vigilance, for example – serve to 
expose the unresolved, chaotic relationship to 9/11 that is still in effect in New York City and 
nationally.  The inability of the memorial plaza to offer a mourning place or contemplative space 
to all who visit is a failure to do the very thing it is tasked with.  Such failure serves to 
foreground the state’s shame at its permeable legitimacy and its subsequent shoring up of 
legitimacy, and a visit to the memorial or museum induces this feeling, if one experiences the 
memorial or museum correctly and as one should.  It is to experience 9/11 in hyperreality and 
recognize that the experience could not be otherwise in light of the still-disjointed, still-roiling 
condition of 9/11 in public discourse and public life.  The memorial plaza performs its own 
failure, staging environments aboveground, on the ground, and underground where we are led to 
think a wound has been addressed, when it remains ever-open.  Public debate has centered on 
whether the memorial and museum work or do not, but that question in fact enables both to be 
true, because the memorial and museum work through their own failure to stage the state and its 
reproduction. 
 
* * * * * * *  
 
Scholars of monuments write that the obliteration of a site of trauma by a built monument 
“stems from the wish to hide violence and forget tragedy.”315  However, at the 9/11 memorial and 
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museum, the physical signs of the attacks – all of the artifacts of Ground Zero, the architectural 
remains and footprints of the Twin Towers – are preserved.  These remnants of the destroyed 
buildings and killed people expose vulnerability yet encase it in a memorial and museum whose 
costs have no precedent.  This exposure of vulnerability, of failure to protect its citizens, is 
crystallized through these particular memory practices, “as if only by rapidly assuming 
responsibility for their ‘failure’ to protect their citizens could the sovereignty of states be 
reinstated.”316  
Yet the enshrining of the Twin Towers’ ruins is also an embracing of that failure and 
powerlessness, thereby choosing to construct New York City and the U.S. as exceptional – U.S. 
exceptionalism has been commonly proffered to explain the attacks.  The memorial plaza 
becomes a way of highlighting the U.S.’s status as a chosen nation, exceptional in its quality of 
life and values, and the emphasis on future temporalities, on a future-rhetoric, in memorial 
foundation documents becomes more intriguing when considered in this light.317  If the U.S.’s 
exceptionalism is cited as a reason for 9/11, then the attacks emerge as deserved, generating 
shame in those citing exceptionalism, particularly the state.  As this chapter argues, this 
movement is a creative destruction of the state, with a morality springing from and compensating 
powerlessness in a way not dissimilar to Nietzschean ressentiment.  The ethical imperative to 
remember and rebuild emerges in a moment of state crisis as a compensatory measure, to 
counteract an incapacity for action (such as the failed wars launched post-9/11) and critique a 
certain kind of power, in order to secure the ground of truth and regain something of what was 
lost.  A public, shared deference for 9/11 as a wound and event deserving remembrance, 
cultivated through the construction of the memorial plaza, serves as a method of moral 
governing, to make successive wars guarding U.S. exceptionalism more palatable.  In other 
words, the mobilization of memory provides an occasion to construct a sense of reality via the 
symbolic coordinates of the memorial plaza. 
 What does it really mean to have the experience of the waterfalls, steel and granite of the 
memorial, the evening lights, the cavernous, yet crowded, underground space of the museum?  
The meaning of these structures and how they relate to the actors of the state and the memorial 
foundation is bound to change as long as they remain, but the visceral experiences of the 
structures persist.  The waterfalls are anti-reflection, with the mirrored skyscrapers surrounding 
the plaza more reflective than the Reflecting Pools themselves.  The waterfalls, and the huge 
tower reflecting them, are willfully large and raucous.  The overstuffed exhibitions of the 
museum, anxiously forcing a narrative, are even less coherent, instead expressing a liminality 
between market and mourning, document and monument, and memory and consumption.  
Ultimately, it resonates strongest with the latter grouping, as a museum that prescribes 
consuming 9/11 as a way to understand it, which in turn is the prescribed form of mourning. 
 At the beginning of the memorialization process, Libeskind acknowledged that 
“Whatever is built will have to acknowledge the permanent loss.  This emptiness will remain and 
cannot be obliterated by any building.”318  What has manifested at the memorial plaza twelve 
years later is far from his original plan.  We have seen numbers exert an ethical weight at the 
plaza, whether through building statistics, including the volume of materials, and the widespread 
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use of algorithms, in the face of an inability to mourn.  The reterritorialization of memory 
through such means has had a variety of effects, an intended one of which is to create an 
environment of security in which similar attacks won’t happen again.  Through the investment 
expressed through large quantities, sums, and figures, the memorial and museum and the state 
attempt to shore up an image of strength and protection, ensuring a continuation of the social 
contract, despite the inability to offer guarantees of an unimpeachable national boundary.  The 
base of 1 WTC is essentially a bunker, the museum has airport-level security for entrance, and 
the memorial is heavily policed, to the point where children are prohibited from standing on the 
low granite plinths that serve as benches and running is out of the question.  There are no 
garbage cans if people bring food (vendors are not allowed to sell any there), and singing and 
demonstrations are not permitted.   
Such securitization suggests that mourning loss is not the primary aim at the site.  
Instead, the memorial plaza is a codification of injury, casting the masterminds of the new WTC 
site as “neutral arbiters of injury rather than as themselves invested with the power to injure.”319  
Spontaneous memorials at the site have become criminalized, for the most part, as have certain 
configurations of “expressive activity,” demanding the question: why does the state criminalize 
expressions of grief?320  This chapter argues that such criminalization is in service of preserving 
the state form, as is the overall outcome of the memorial plaza.  At its expense, there is the loss 
of the ability to experience loss, which the memorial plaza not only engenders but performs. 
 On top of this loss of the ability to mourn freely, the memorial plaza also codifies the loss 
of public space.  Unlike other major American memorials, the 9/11 memorial and museum also 
serve “as the forecourt for an office development and as public space for Lower Manhattan.”321  
Prior to its 9/11, the WTC site was a vast, wind-swept plaza that was not on a human scale.  
Today, even with the memorial’s field of trees, the site retains that unsettlingly-larger-than-life 
feel.  It was only in the interim between the two iterations of the site that people were pulled to 
those sixteen acres.  The ruins of the destroyed towers generated a public space unlike the built 
plazas they were sandwiched between.  The ruins served as a source of inclusion, retroactively 
showing that the original WTC actually did belong to everyone, even though only certain people 
were allowed through the towers’ doors.  Upon the shuttling of the ruins to Fresh Kills, to 
Hangar 17 at JFK, and to the museum, and upon the paving of the remains of those ruins, the 
WTC site loses the feeling of commons it temporarily had while its vulnerabilities were vividly 
exposed and distinctions between what was public versus private were blurred.  In its rebuilding, 
the WTC site becomes yet another skyscraper’s concession to public amenities, mirroring all 
those privately-owned public spaces of New York City – except that it is publicly-owned land.  
The memorial plaza’s existence reminds us of what was lost, while showing us that its loss is 
permanent.  The closest to public space we get is a public memorial to private people that 
organizes the names of those people according to the company they worked for.  The state 
changes what the city and memory look like, with the inscriptions of the names of the dead a 
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reminder of the market’s rule and ultimate role in the entrenchment of privatization and 
fragmented public life in the city. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  Fresh Kills 
 
 
Every space of daily life, every site at which women and men bodily engage in everyday practice, every 
meaning-filled location of the quotidian, is riddled with the unspeakable. Every local and wider 
geography of human activity has its counterpart geographies of the unspeakable. Every conjunction of 
situated practice, circulating discourses, and power relations is one with the (re)production of the 
unspeakable. The unspeakable is, in short, a constant presence. A constant presence that in one way or 
another bespeaks an absence, a silence, an invisibility.322   
 
 
Anything that might be something is placed in a black bucket. Jewelry and other items are photographed, 
cataloged, and stored away by the property clerk's office of the Police Department. Human remains are 
kept in a refrigerated trailer, then driven to the medical examiner's office.323 
 
 
The memorialized remains of the Twin Towers housed at the National September 11 
Memorial and Museum remind us of what was lost on September 11, 2001, without creating a 
successful site of mourning – or public space understood more broadly – in the process.  Yet 
there is a potential counternarrative to this story, found in a former landfill a stone’s throw from 
Ground Zero.  A huge park and wetlands conservation area, three times the size of Central Park, 
is rising in Staten Island: a conversion of Fresh Kills landfill into Freshkills Park.  Contrasting 
the fights for space characterizing Lower Manhattan, Freshkills Park will be expansive, open, 
and, by all accounts, a public space par excellence.  The ‘openness’ of the natural appears to 
offer an immediate distinction from the restrictions at the memorial plaza, an open expanse for 
public leisure unencumbered by the demands of securitization in the city.  Fresh Kills Landfill 
was owned and operated by the New York City Department of Sanitation (DSNY) and now the 
city-owned site is managed by the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation 
(henceforth referred to as the Parks Department).    
More recently Fresh Kills has come to be known as where the detritus of Ground Zero 
was sorted, no longer the bearer of an exclusively trash-laden history.  Two million tons of 
wreckage from the WTC site was shipped by barge from Lower Manhattan to the expansive 
Staten Island location.  It included construction rubble, personal artifacts, and human remains, 
the traces of which now linger in and over the landfill-become-park.  Some ruins from the site 
deemed worth preserving were taken to Hangar 17 at JFK Airport, approximately one percent of 
the wreckage, of which an even smaller fraction was installed in the 9/11 Memorial Museum as 
exhibits.  A 9/11 memorial is projected to rise at Freshkills Park in 2020, in an earthwork style.   
This chapter explores the after-remains of the WTC destruction, as they are brought into 
relief by the city’s reimagining of Fresh Kills.  By examining the existing archive of the park still 
mostly yet-to-be-built, it gathers the displaced remains of the story formally closed at the 
September 11 memorial plaza.  Legal, political, and cultural issues concerning the memory of 
9/11 all gather at Fresh Kills, intersecting with contemporary state imperatives toward a green 
modernity, both as a political-economic strategy and a related cultural projection of American 
public good. Paralleling the relationships of ethics and the state in previous chapters – the public 
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authority serving as the bearer of ethical commitment, bridging the state and private interests in 
Chapter 2; the possible ethical gap between economy and polity interrogated in Chapter 3 – this 
chapter explores the public park as an ethical formation that can be formally detached from the 
materiality of the WTC, while remaining inextricably tied to it.  
A puzzle stems from a gap between the various sites in this dissertation: the state 
produces itself differently, and has a different role, at each site, while ruins and remains continue 
to be central at all of the them.  In the case of Fresh Kills, memorialization and the state’s 
conceptualization of the site, as a whole, is necessary to make the ethical state.  The park is now 
conceived in tandem with the making of the ethical state, which is officially correcting its past 
failures through its conceptualization of Freshkills Park.  This chapter argues that the landfill 
reveals what the memorialization work at the National September 11 Memorial and Museum 
does not allow us to see: that memorialization in fact supplements the material mixing of remains 
and debris at the sites.  The materiality of the mixing of remains and debris is the constitutive 
other of the ethical work attempted by the state in processes of memorialization.  The 
constitutive other of the WTC site is, in turn, the landfill – the place that reminds us of the brutal 
materiality of disaster and its place in the work of memorializing, precisely because of its 
associations with waste and the collection of refuse.  A memorial at Freshkills Park had to be 
envisioned to overcome that brutal materiality – ethical work had to supplement it.  I argue that 
the intervention of the state’s conceptualization of a memorial makes possible that which is 
impossible – the separating of remains from debris, ashes from dirt – at least as far as the law and 
the state are concerned.  I also argue that the undiscovered remains represent yet another site for 
the failure of mourning, as the September 11 memorial plaza does, because those remains do not 
allow closure for the families attempting to mourn their dead.  
At Fresh Kills, we are confronted with the pure materiality of garbage and memory 
buried within it – taking the form of landfilled human remains and WTC site artifacts.  On the 
other hand, at the 9/11 memorial plaza the ruins and public memory are memorialized.  The 
juxtaposition of memorialized and landfilled memories of destruction is a point from which I 
build a theory of the state.  At Fresh Kills, we encounter the destruction of garbage in addition to 
the manipulation of remains, as well as a different conception of building than what we have 
seen at the other sites discussed in this dissertation.  The remains in the ground of Fresh Kills do 
not do ethical work in the way of the memorialized remains at the memorial plaza, but do 
material work to make the state’s infrastructure through their enforced persistence at the site.  I 
argue that the materiality of ruins, in this case, is crucial to making the state at the moment when 
the state’s ethical work reaches its limits: that is, when memorialization fails to circumscribe 
those ruins.  In this way, the Fresh Kills site delves ever-further into considering the materiality 
of loss generated by 9/11. 
The chapter traces the conceptualization of the Fresh Kills site as a park and as art by the 
state, in particular exploring the mixing of ruins and dirt at the site and the state’s efforts to 
conceptually purify those ruins, while they remain forever mixed despite these efforts.  To 
uncover these processes, the chapter traces the history of the site from its beginnings as a landfill 
to the landfill’s politically-motivated closure.  It then explores the sorting of WTC remains at the 
site and ends with an examination of current operations converting the landfill into parkland and 
a WTC memorial.  The chapter asks how such operations contribute to the ethical and material 
production of the state, interrogating the literal overcoming of garbage at Fresh Kills that 
produces memorials, orders nature, and legitimates the state.  
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Fifty years of trash 
 
Fresh Kills landfill was active from 1948 through March 2001, when its operations 
ceased due to years of protest and a trash volume that was “getting out of hand.”324  The landfill 
handled all of New York’s trash, which helped make it the tallest point on the Eastern Seaboard 
during its active operations.  It occupies about four square miles, over 2,200 acres, and, as is oft-
cited, is three times the size of Central Park.  Four trash mounds occupy about half of the site, 
together comprising the largest man-made structure in the world and holding more waste than 
anywhere else on land – 150 million tons.325   
 Until its conversion into a landfill, Fresh Kills was a tidal marsh known as Todt Hill.  In 
1917, it became home to the Metropolitan By-Products Company, a waste handling, resource 
recovery plant, but it was shuttered in just one year after being declared a nuisance by the New 
York City Board of Health.  With the rise of mass consumption in the 1920s, both the volume of 
trash and new packing materials dramatically magnified the need for local waste management, as 
the practice of ocean dumping (sending garbage out to sea on barges) was defiling local shores.  
Attempts to expand Rikers Island’s use as a dumping ground were rebuffed by Robert Moses, 
who didn’t want the waste site within the line of vision of visitors to the World’s Fair in Queens; 
he tasked Sanitation Commissioner William Carey with solving New York’s trash problem.  
Carey pioneered the landfill method of waste disposal in New York in 1939, which had the dual 
advantages of modulating odor, by burying garbage under soil, and creating new real estate out 
of the salt marshes.  By 1940, a filling project was underway on Staten Island, with Moses 
attempting to build a park at Great Kills.  Poor maintenance of the landfill, resulting in exposed 
garbage and a rat problem on Staten Island, meant that Moses’ 1945 proposal for another landfill 
at Fresh Kills was unsurprisingly met with public protest.  It was only by calling the land 
“presently valueless” that Moses and Staten Island Borough President Cornelius Hall were able 
to convince voters that Fresh Kills’ development would be beneficial and only temporary, until 
the city’s trash incinerators were overhauled.326  As New York historian Ted Steinberg writes, 
“Fresh Kills had made the leap from a wild and untamed marsh into a place of no earthly use 
whatsoever, a move that consigned the vast wetland to the dust heap of history before the first 
garbage scow had even arrived,” a decision that had “a veneer of inevitability” imparted by the 
logic of industrialization in post-war New York.327   
The dredging of Fresh Kills’ marshes began in 1947, with the first barges of trash 
arriving shortly after in 1948.  When, by 1951, the city hadn’t made progress on its incineration 
system, Hall and Moses resolved to make Fresh Kills a more permanent operation, hoping to add 
highways, parks, and industrial and commercial development in the process.  By the 1960s, most 
of the tidal marshes in had been filled, beginning a process of mounding existing landfills.  This 
process would eventually contribute to creating the world’s largest landfill, alongside the 
increase in trash material spurred by the decline of municipal garbage incineration at the end of 
the decade. Upon first visiting it in 1970, former sanitation commissioner Samuel Kearing noted 
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that the site “had a certain nightmare quality.”328  The city’s continued growth paralleled that of 
the landfill, with the tidal marsh of Fresh Kills buried by New York’s trash within twenty-five 
years.  As environmental regulations became more prevalent, the expenses of maintaining 
landfills increased.  As New York City dealt with fiscal crises (see Chapter 1), it consolidated its 
garbage into fewer landfills, including Fresh Kills; the giant trash mounds of Fresh Kills reflect 
these crises. 
 Through the 1980s, the four mounds of trash grew, with the tallest reaching over 200 feet 
by the 1990s.  As the mounds grew taller, odors dispersed further.  In the summers, water trucks 
sprayed deodorizer throughout communities near the landfill “but the stench still kept adults and 
children inside.”329  Gulls (and their screaming) and plastic bags blown into trees became regular 
features of the landscape of Fresh Kills and its surrounding areas.  The landfill increasingly 
provoked dismay and anger in Staten Island residents, as well as became the defining feature of 
the borough for non-Staten Islanders.  In the 1993 New York City mayoral race, Rudy Giuliani 
won the election, despite losing Manhattan’s vote.  He did, however, carry Staten Island, making 
him the first Republican to become mayor in nearly thirty years.  As a nod to the constituency 
that helped elect him, in 1996 he announced that Fresh Kills landfill would be closed by the end 
of his second mayoral term – December 31, 2001.  After his re-election in 1997, he proclaimed 
that “In 2001, images of waste from all five boroughs being dumped on Staten Island will no 
longer be a daily headache. They will be memories.”330  He also promised that no borough of the 
city would ever again become the dumping ground for another, a gesture toward some kind of 
equality. 
His announcement followed a federal lawsuit filed by Staten Island political leaders that 
included Borough President Guy Molinari – city officials suing their own city – demanding the 
closure of the landfill because of odors and health hazards to Staten Island residents.331  Where 
New York’s trash would go became the most important issue after Fresh Kills’ closure, with 
critics claiming the decision wasn’t well thought out, since the dump contained space for 20-30 
more years of garbage produced at the city’s daily rate of 13,000 tons, and no neighboring states 
welcomed that volume of trash into their borders.332  Giuliani responded to the political outcry 
over his plan to ship the city’s garbage to a Linden, New Jersey transfer station by asserting the 
difference between “the politics of garbage” and “the business of garbage,” and promising that 
regional economic development would be spurred by the exportation of New York’s massive 
amount of garbage, in spite of the plan’s political unsavoriness.333  Ultimately, Giuliani’s New 
Jersey plan fell through due to community protest over the building of transfer stations in each 
borough. 
 Less than a year after the closure, the city’s attempt to manage its garbage without Fresh 
Kills was deemed a failure.  The city’s Sanitation Commissioner described the plan, a series of 
truck-to-rail and truck-to-barge operations, as simply falling apart, in no small part due to Fresh 
Kills being closed without adequate, attendant planning for the future of New York’s trash.  
Much of the trash was shipped to private dumps in Virginia and Ohio, until controversy arose 
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when Virginia passed laws restricting large shipments of imported trash.  A court case between 
several garbage handling companies and the state of Virginia went to the Supreme Court, where 
garbage was deemed interstate commerce whose regulations were to be administered by 
Congress, not states themselves.  Over five years, the cost of shutting Fresh Kills and managing 
New York’s trash was $622 million, over $100 million more than what was predicted before its 
closing.  $180 million of the original $522 million was allocated to exporting trash, which was 
done incrementally, and the overall cost increases were due in no small part to the difficulties in 
finding a dumping alternative to Fresh Kills.334      
 Today, all of New York’s trash continues to go out of state, much still to Ohio, as well as 
to South Carolina, costing $300 million per year to ship it out, almost twice the cost of disposing 
at Fresh Kills (costs for collection, spread between public and private systems, are much 
higher).335  The interim plan of relying on private waste companies with out-of-state landfills 
remains in place today, with New York City sanitation trucks dropping trash at thirteen 
privately-owned waste transfer stations in neighborhoods comprised mostly of people of color 
(Red Hook and Greenpoint in Brooklyn, Hunts Point in the Bronx, Jamaica in Queens) from 
where trash then goes out-of-state via long-haul trucks.  For city neighborhoods, the 
environmental impact of transporting the trash is significant, due to truck emissions and noise 
pollution in particular.  In 2006, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s Solid Waste Management 
Plan (SWMP) was passed as a permanent option that would reduce truck usage and waste itself, 
by improving city recycling programs.  Like Giuliani’s, Bloomberg’s proposal promised to “treat 
each borough fairly,” aiming to distribute trash facilities without the socioeconomic and racial 
bias argued about existing distributions.336 Current Mayor Bill de Blasio’s administration 
supports the plan, whose most recent stage – the re-opening of a waste transfer station in the 
wealthy Upper East Side, part of the effort to make sure every borough manages its own trash – 
has experienced community backlash.  Similar to what fueled the years-long battle to close Fresh 
Kills, dismay and outrage continues to crop up in neighborhoods close to sites of waste 
management, but with advocates of environmental justice and city equity mostly still found 
living in neighborhoods that have historically housed trash operations. 
New York City’s waste disposal emerges, perhaps unsurprisingly, as an emotional issue, 
bringing into relief issues of race, class, and their geographies.  Yet the emotions associated with 
Fresh Kills gained a new intensity when the landfill was thrust into an unexpected role mere 
months after its official closure, becoming the sorting site of WTC wreckage.  The history of the 
site, with its controversies over its accumulated growth and demands to close it, which were met 
only to have the landfill immediately reopened, parallel the activity at the site upon receiving 
ruins from Ground Zero which, as we see in the next section, is characterized by recurring calls 
to reopen search and sorting operations.  There is also a parallel between the materiality of both 
garbage and ruins, with both maintaining an unresolved quality, not least of which concerns the 
inability to confine either garbage or ruins to one geographic place.  Both are remains of history 
that continue to afflict the state, sources of embarrassment that memorialization processes 
attempt to subdue. 
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Reopening Fresh Kills 
 
On September 12, 2001, Fresh Kills was temporarily reopened to receive wreckage from 
Ground Zero.  Roughly one-third of the rubble from the WTC site was sorted at Fresh Kills by 
the City’s Department of Design and Construction (DDC) and Taylor Recycling, a private 
contractor, and the moving of debris from the WTC site to Fresh Kills was contracted by the 
DDC to four companies.  Before the arrival of Taylor Recycling’s sifting equipment at the site in 
October, workers manually sifted the wreckage, supervised by the FBI and local police.  Over 
ten months, almost two million tons were screened and sifted in the first round of recovery 
operations and nearly two hundred missing persons were identified from discovered remains.  
The sorting was done under budget, by nearly $700 million.  Approximately 200,000 tons of 
steel were recycled, with the remaining debris – excepting the artifacts taken to Hangar 17 and 
nearly 20,000 discovered human remains – getting landfilled at a roughly fifty-acre site on the 
western side of Fresh Kills.337,338 
After the operation was finished, Bloomberg said no new searches at Ground Zero would 
be done, continuing to refuse them when families requested another search by citing high costs.  
However, upon the continued unearthing of new material around the WTC site, beginning with 
the accidental discovery of human remains by ConEdison workers in 2006, a second sifting 
operation began on April 2, 2010, lasting eleven weeks and costing $1.4 million.  A third 
operation occurred in April 2013, with roughly 60 truckloads of debris uncovered during the 
WTC site reconstruction and subsequently taken to Fresh Kills to be searched.  The discovery of 
remains has been controversy-plagued, with families arguing that construction and service roads 
– and, implicitly, the new WTC and tourism – have been prioritized over a thorough excavation 
of the WTC site and surrounding areas in search of human remains.  About 2,750 people died 
when the Twin Towers were destroyed, but about 1,100 people have left no bodily traces, 
meaning roughly 40% of families have not recovered remains. 
Paralleling the construction of the memorial and museum, the search and sorting 
operation has been fraught with family grievances, with the group WTC Families for a Proper 
Burial, Inc., representing seventeen families, filing suit against the city on several occasions.  In 
2008, the group sued to have residue from the landfill moved to a vacant lot across the street, 
where a cemetery could be built for unidentified people whose personal effects had been found 
in the landfill, with the assumption that their bodies had been incinerated to ash.  At least 
400,000 tons of the residue, it was argued, was also shoddily sifted by the city and its 
contractors.  According to the sworn affidavit of Eric Beck, the senior supervisor for Taylor 
Recycling, debris powders – known as fines – were taken from the landfill to pave roads and fill 
potholes, and that remains may have been missed due to the speed of sorting demanded by those 
in charge.  Another affidavit from Theodore Feaser, the retired director of mechanical operations 
for the DSNY who also supervised the Fresh Kills recovery effort for the DSNY, testified that he 
was “absolutely convinced that if the City of New York unearthed, resifted and washed the 
debris at Fresh Kills ... it would find hundreds of human body parts and human remains.”339 The 
families claimed that the remains did not need to be bulldozed with the rest of the landfill and its 
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soil, and that the city instead could have left them separate so that they could be moved off the 
landfill for further excavation later or to be ceremonially buried. 
 The case was rejected by the judge, Alvin Hellerstein, who decreed that the city acted 
responsibly and not with deliberate indifference, a necessary condition for a civil action against 
the city to go through.  He added that the court was simply unable to right the wrongs in the 
particular situation of the remains and instead offered himself to both sides if they wanted to 
settle the issue together outside the court.  In 2010, WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. filed 
an appeal, arguing that 223,000 tons of material were never sifted for remains and claiming, as in 
2008, that the residue at the landfill contained human remains.340  The group rejected assurances 
from city officials that all material had been finely sifted and claimed violations of their property 
and religious rights by the city’s refusal to take additional steps to identify remains.  The appeal 
was denied in the Supreme Court, upholding the earlier dismissal of the case and ending the legal 
path of the residue toward a burial deemed proper by the families.   
 The common refrain among family members is that they hate – and are unsettled by – the 
thought of their loved ones’ remains mingling with the contents of the dump, be it soil or trash.  
The idea of a WTC memorial on the site itself is similarly difficult; the mingling of the landfill 
and remains is unbearable to the families suing.  Part of the reason is the open question of 
whether there are physical remainders of loved ones now buried in the landfill (whose process is 
detailed in the next section).  The memorial doesn’t solve that question for those involved in the 
lawsuits, and in some ways it makes it more difficult by offering a seeming close or resolution to 
the open question.  Both the remains and the landfill emit auras at the Fresh Kills site, each 
distinctly powerful; it is their interaction that now colors the site.  On the one hand, the site is a 
place of personal anguish, loss, and frustration; on the other, it is the burden of the landfill, 
generating fear, anger, and revulsion.  Families surmise that the ashes of their loved ones are at 
the landfill from the discovery of personal effects among the wreckage sorted at the dump, such 
as credit and identification cards.  Yet those discoveries are coupled with the knowledge that 
their loved ones won’t be identified, either due to the premature termination of the search or 
because those bodies have turned to ash, or “incorporeality,” as Hellerstein said his 2008 ruling.  
The desire that the court cases crystallize is the possibility of mourning that incorporeality at a 
location that is not Fresh Kills.   
  In the 2010 appeal, Peter Wies, deputy chief of the New York City Law Department’s 
World Trade Center unit, said “The city approached the task with dignity, care and respect, 
and as a result, thousands of human remains and personal items were located.”  In his written 
decision for the 2008 lawsuit, Hellerstein noted that the city was planning Freshkills Park to 
include a memorial and offered the following: “What better reverence could there be than a 
memorial that both recalls those who died, even without leaving a trace, and points to the 
tenacity and beauty of life that must go on? The terrorists sought to destroy our lives and our 
freedom. They failed, and a memorial in such a beautiful setting can symbolize the vital 
continuation of our vibrant democracy.”341  Yet this does not address the families’ concerns – 
that remains are mixed with the earth of the landfill.  Can ashes be meaningfully distinguished 
from dirt?  Judge Hellerstein’s ruling and the City’s lawyer claim they cannot be, saying that the 
“ashes are undifferentiated dirt.”342  The parameters of the memorial were also unclear at that 
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point – would it be a monument or a memorial park?  A Staten Island congressman proposed 
legislation to create a permanent national memorial in 2002, after plans for Freshkills Park were 
announced.  He suggested a permanent national memorial at the 175 acres of “The Hill” – where 
the 1.6 million tons of wreckage were examined -- to bring the site to “its proper place in 
history,” one of “national significance.”343  The proposed legislation didn’t make it and, even if it 
had, it would not have solved the dilemma of intermingled dirt, ash, and decades-old 
decomposing garbage.  As this dilemma lingers, the current site plan for Freshkills Park, includes 
an earthwork memorial on the mound where sorting happened, proceeds forward. 
 As Mierle Laderman Ukeles, Artist in Residence of the DSNY since 1977, thus having a 
long-standing relationship with the city and Fresh Kills, upon finding out about the plans for the 
landfill sorting and burial, said “the City would never do that. They would never mingle human 
remains in a place where they put garbage; that would collapse a taboo in our culture.  That 
crosses a line.”344  She originally thought she’d be “healing the effects of garbage,” with her 
design plans prior to September 2001, but since then the meaning of the place has been thrown 
into flux.  The relationship of art to the site will be discussed later in this chapter, as is Ukeles’ 
plan to memorialize the landfill. 
 The FBI, NYPD, and Office of Emergency Management determined when the retrieval of 
“discernible remains and effects” had been complete, sending them to the NYC Medical 
Examiner’s office for identification and storage, and then put the sifted remains of the WTC site 
in a 48-acre area adjacent to the recovery site on the West Mound.  To bury the site debris, clean 
soil at least one foot deep was layered below the screened materials, which were then covered 
with clean soil.  The area was clearly marked to prevent disturbance upon its burying in 2001, 
but there is no information on its current status.  The material recovered from Ground Zero was 
considered criminal evidence during the sorting, sifting, and burying processes, and 55,000 
pieces of evidence were salvaged.  However, there is testimony from Staten Island residents that 
says otherwise about the handling of remains: “’after 9/11, a convoy of trucks came through 
town with all this stuff blowin’ off the back. That couldn’t have been good.  I’m surprised it 
didn’t glow.’”345 
The fact that Fresh Kills was already intended for conversion to a park before 9/11 and 
the subsequent sorting operations adds another knot to this puzzle – the memorial quality of 
nature was already anticipated, as well as the processes necessary to begin the landfill-to-park 
transformation.  How has that knowledge and expected work affected the sorting operation and 
subsequent demands for further searches?  Bloomberg advocated the continued searching for 
remains around the WTC site but shut down the possibility of doing further searches at Fresh 
Kills early on, despite many acknowledgments – including from Charles Hirsch, the city’s chief 
medical examiner – that remains were likely missed in the sifting process and could be lingering 
in the landfill.  Other than its opening for 9/11 sorting, it has served as a temporary debris 
transfer station after Superstorm Sandy hit New York City in late October 2012.  Similar to after 
9/11, debris was brought to the site to be sorted and what couldn’t be salvaged was shipped to 
landfills around the country.   
Its use for Sandy is well-documented in official Freshkills Park materials, published by 
the New York State Department of Parks and New York City Parks and Recreation Department, 
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but there is no mention of 9/11 sorting in virtually any of them.  However, at the same time, the 
materials – brochures, newsletters, maps, webpages – do not shy away from the landfill status.  
In fact, the act of conversion from landfill-to-park is embraced and championed as a 
representation of the city’s eco-consciousness, progressiveness, and commitment to public good, 
as the next section explores.  Yet alongside this valorization, the garbage at the site persists. It is 
an undifferentiated mass of things, buried to be forgotten.  Just as garbage does not end at the 
site, remaining and perhaps partially decomposing for years to come, underground and out of 
sight, the human remains from Ground Zero are not delimited.  Never fully discovered, they, too, 
persist at the site. 
 
 
Landfill to landscape: from Fresh Kills to Freshkills 
 
There is nothing particularly special about the ground on which I’m walking.  It’s what lurks 
beneath that counts.  In fact, it’s quiet here, almost peaceful.  The wind rustles the weeds.  Birds 
glide.  When they flap their wings you can hear it.  Otherwise it’s still.346 
 
 
The conversion of Fresh Kills from landfill-to-park has acquired shades of meaning from 
its sudden relationship with 9/11.  Central Park is no longer the only relevant New York City 
comparison for the site, as it was before September 2001 – now, the National September 11 
Memorial and Museum also join the conversation of public memory and public space that Fresh 
Kills invites.  Public mourning at Fresh Kills is also inseparable from a consideration of the 9/11 
memorial plaza, particularly the controversial repository in the museum.  These two New York 
City sites harbor human remains from the WTC, and both are fraught with conflict between 
families, state officials, and program planners.  Yet they bear these remains alongside starkly 
different histories, with the unequivocal stigma of the Fresh Kills landfill – despite official 
attempts to embrace it by the city and state Parks Departments – contrasting with retrospective 
eulogies for the Twin Towers.  
 Today, Fresh Kills looks every bit a grassy marshland, excepting the common sight of 
methane pumps.  It summons a peaceful pastorality, yet less than two decades ago it was visibly 
heaped with trash, stinking and noisy with gulls.  It began a transformation into the pastoral upon 
announcement of its closing, though its 150 million tons of trash is still decomposing and will 
continue to indefinitely, buried under a plastic cap.  Its conversion to a park is about crafting that 
peace into something serviceable for the city, something that scrubs away the stigma of the 
place.  That scrubbing has found its way to the place’s name itself: from Fresh Kills landfill to 
Freshkills Park, the two words have been “fused in the interest of softening the morbid name,” or 
to simply start afresh – to erase the history of the landfill entirely, or at least rebrand it.347  
 As such, it is healing that emerges as the dominant trope at Freshkills Park.  There is the 
healing of 9/11 injuries, particularly for families who grieve the outcome of the sorting process at 
the designated portion of the West Mound of the landfill.   There is also the healing of the effects 
of garbage, as Ukeles puts it – four mounds worth.  She says “something was ‘taken’ from Staten 
Island and should be returned,” over the course of the landfill’s fifty-year operation.348  Yet what 
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was it?  The lack of differentiation attributed to the mixture of human ashes and dirt in the 2008 
lawsuit ruling also applies to garbage itself: garbage is an undifferentiated mass of things, de-
natured and put away to be forgotten.  This “un-naming” that garbage undergoes as it 
accumulates in its designated place is simultaneously a seizure from Staten Island, the city itself 
taking something from the borough that Freshkills Park can potentially restore. 
 
A new plan for Staten Island 
The International Design Competition for the park was announced by the City of New 
York on September 5, 2001, less than a week before the WTC was destroyed.  The winner – 
James Corner Field Operations – was announced December 18, as sorting of WTC debris 
continued.  A “Final Closure Plan” for all four sections of the landfill was completed in June 
2003, and master planning and public outreach for the park began in September 2003.  There was 
a series of community design workshops organized by the City and the design team, in spring 
2004, with one in May intended specifically to gather ideas on the WTC memorial site.349  The 
public planning process ended in August 2005, with a master plan (Draft Master Plan) released 
in April 2006.  The Draft Master Plan promises to “create extraordinary settings for a range of 
activities and programs that are unique to the city,” as well as “honor the events of September 
11, and the recovery effort that took place at Fresh Kills, in a dignified and unique way.”350  The 
Parks Department was tasked with implementing the plan by then-Mayor Bloomberg, though 
several other agencies are involved; from the city side, there is the Parks Department, DSNY, 
Environmental Protection, City Planning, Department of Transportation, and Design and 
Construction, and from the state side, the Department of Environmental Conservation, New York 
State Parks, Department of State, and State Transportation all control some aspect of the 
generation of Freshkills Park.  The Freshkills Park Alliance, a nonprofit, steers the overall 
project, as well as raises money, guides programming, and determines what scientific research 
will be done at the site. 
 The park’s 2,200 acres will make it the largest park developed in New York City in over 
100 years.  It is expected to be completed in 2035.  Official park guides, developed by the state, 
note that “along with this massive scale comes a massive opportunity to shape the City’s 
evolving identity.”351  Goals for the park, as sketched in the materials available to the public, are 
future-oriented, emphasizing the transformation of the physical legacy of the place.  The other 
elements of this legacy – most recently rooted in the stigma and fear incited by the landfill – are 
not explicitly addressed, instead implicitly signaled by calling up notions of public refuge and 
peace that can be “left by today’s City to the City of the future.”352  In nearly all its public 
materials, the city proclaims that the park is “one of the most ambitious public works projects in 
the world, combining state-of-the-art ecological restoration techniques with extraordinary 
settings for recreation, public art, and facilities for many sports and programs that are unusual in 
the city.”353  A transformation of its legacy involves both an ecological repair as well as the 
supplementing of New York’s urbanity with public activities.  The relatively vast expanse of 
                                                
349 “New York’s New Parkland Fresh Kills Factsheet,” City of New York, no date. 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/fkl/factsheet1.pdf 
350 James Corner Field Operations, “Fresh Kills Park: Draft Master Plan,” March 2006. 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/fkl/dmp.pdf 
351 “Freshkills Park Site Tour Guide,” New York State Department of State (obtained at site in July 2013) 
352 Ibid. 
353 “Freshkills Park,” New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, no date, 
http://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/freshkills-park/. 
 93 
Freshkills Park is a counterpoint to the density of buildings elsewhere in the city, though it 
retains its constructed quality – fifty years-worth of an industrial city’s trash teems under the 
park’s greening.354  
 Public art has become a major player in transforming this Fresh Kills legacy, and the idea 
to do so came from the Municipal Art Society of New York (MAS), a landmark preservation and 
urban planning nonprofit organization.  Lee Weintraub, a landscape architect, helped spearhead 
the project, saying he “had always considered Fresh Kills an asset as well as a nuisance, a 2,200-
acre ‘bulwark against complete development,’” making it fitting for a public park.355  Upon 
announcement of the landfill’s impending closure, Weintraub and staff members at MAS 
contacted city agencies involved with Fresh Kills, including Planning, Parks, Sanitation, and 
Cultural Affairs, in the spirit of an educational endeavor that would show the agencies precisely 
how Fresh Kills could be more than a landfill.  With support of the city, MAS began raising 
money – an early $50,000 Public Works grant from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), 
a federal agency, a concrete testament offered to the city to indicate “’that serious people took 
this crazy notion seriously.’”356  MAS raised $200,000 to educate the public about the project and 
facilitate its response, using it for public programs and open meetings on Staten Island, as well as 
traveling and digital exhibitions of design finalists.  The Original Design Competition launched 
by the city had fifty entries, with six teams chosen and their trips to the site also funded by MAS 
fundraising. 
 The relationship of public art to the landfill runs even deeper, however, in the figure of 
Mierle Laderman Ukeles, New York City Department of Sanitation’s Artist in Residence for 
nearly forty years.  Through the 1970s, she received two NEA grants to do work pertaining to the 
DSNY.  Presently serving in a nonsalaried position, since 2013, Ukeles signed her first contract 
as “Artist of Fresh Kills Landfill” in 1992, to contribute to its closure and end-use design.  
According to Ukeles, while closure was always on the horizon, as were plans for public art, the 
timeline to close the landfill was established suddenly, announced in 1996 to be shut within only 
five years.  As a way of memorializing the landfill, she is currently making a piece for the south 
part of Freshkills Park that consists of a cantilever between two earthen mounds.  The piece has 
approval from the New York City Design Commission.  Many other landfills were declared 
inactive hazardous waste sites, making them off-limits for art, but Fresh Kills housed mostly 
household and municipal waste, allowing it to continue as a site for art and civic interaction.  Its 
huge size, relative to other landfills, also motivated the city to invest hundreds of millions of 
dollars to upgrade the landfill to environmental protections demanded of new landfills, ensuring 
its potential to be engaged by the public.  
 
The memorial 
As various public artworks are proposed and planned for the site, there is one 
monumental structure that has occupied the most consideration: the WTC memorial.  A 
placeholder design for the memorial has been established, part of the park’s master plan, but no 
public comment has yet been made about it.  When I toured the site on June 29, 2013, the West 
Mound – the area of the park where WTC debris was sorted and where the proposed memorial 
will go – was off-limits.  According to the James Corner Field Operations master plan, “an 
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enormous earthwork monument is envisioned atop the [West] mound, the same size and scale of 
the original twin towers, in remembrance of the September 11 recovery effort that occurred in 
this location. Set upon a vast hilltop wildflower meadow, the earthwork would be open to the sky 
and offer spectacular 360-degree views of the region, including an axis to lower Manhattan.”357  
Thus, the memorial, two earthen forms that resemble the Twin Towers on their sides, will be 
positioned at a height that provides visitors a view of where the Twin Towers stood.  Until the 
memorial’s construction begins, the WTC material – including the ashes contested by families – 
is being kept in an undisclosed, undisturbed area until it can be incorporated into the 
earthwork.358  
 What is clear is that the earthwork memorial at Freshkills Park will mingle ash and dirt.  
The incorporation of written names into the design, so crucial to both the National September 11 
memorial and museum, seems unlikely, or at the least very difficult to accomplish with the 
earthwork style, which relies on an integration and incorporation of native materials of the 
landscape.  However, Ukeles advocates a naming of each person to restore “the shattered taboo 
that enabled this unholy shotgun marriage [between ash and dirt] .... a chasm-change of attitude 
is required, one of very deliberate differentiating, of naming, of attentive reverence for each mote 
of dust from each individual.  Thus remembered.  This must become a place that returns identity 
to, not strips identity from, each perished person.”359  Here, naming becomes possible and easy; 
the name of a person encompasses him and his identity.  Yet  “some of the victim’s [sic] families 
are clearly not comfortable with an area that, they claim, still contains unidentified remains being 
seamlessly incorporated into a leisure-oriented lifescape.  These families are also worried that, 
once the debris mound is covered, their grievance with the city as to where these remains should 
be located will also be effectively sealed.”360  The very mingling of ash with dirt emerges as 
unnaming and no kind of memorial can rectify that fact, for any memorial implicitly closes the 
case and renders null the families’ appeal that ash and dirt should be un-mingled, ceremonially if 
not in full materiality.  Paradoxically, it is this fact that spurs the need for memorialization, as it 
does at the September 11 memorial plaza.  Both memorial sites are repetitive, neither offering 
complete mourning.  Like garbage, the persisting ashen remains can never be found and, 
therefore, mourned and lost once again.  The proposed memorial – taking an archetypal form of 
public art, the earthwork – here works as a conceptualizing, idealizing force that purifies the 
persisting ashes from garbage and gives the ashes an idealized status as human remains, yet all 
the while mingling ash and landfill dirt. 
 
 
Cesspool turned park 
 
 The question of landscape’s physical constitution and reconstitution is the recurring one 
at Fresh Kills.  A degraded landscape in multiple senses – by the landfill lurking below the re-
seeded marsh, by the troubled relationship to the WTC debris that remains – Fresh Kills has 
taken the conversion to park quite literally; from a degraded landscape, it will fully arrive at a 
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“Lifescape,” the name of the park’s design, by 2035.  Reclaiming the landfill is a technically 
involved process, requiring careful monitoring beyond that required for more typical tracts of 
land.  Because of the mass of the trash mounds, Fresh Kills alone was the origin of more than 
five percent of all methane gas emissions in the U.S., and about two percent of the world’s.  Air 
pollution other than methane was show to travel to Brooklyn, Manhattan, New Jersey, and even 
further, merely from the decomposition of trash.361  Fresh Kills was allowed to exist so close to a 
city in the first instance because of its status as landfill, versus a dump.  While a dump is simply 
an unregulated hole to receive trash, a landfill must meet certain environmental standards, 
specifically having liners and gas-capture systems, both of which help prevent pollution from 
leaking into groundwater and air.  While it was allowed to open in 1948, and its environmental 
protection mechanisms upgraded several decades later, a contemporary landfill would most 
likely not be allowed in such proximity to a major city.    
 Even after the landfill’s closure in 2001, maintaining the landfill and the garbage it still 
houses has been labor-intensive.  A primary source of concern is leachate – the toxic liquid 
created when water percolates through the soil and decomposing trash, picking up contaminants, 
sometimes called garbage juice.  The leachate is collected by perforated pipes that run through 
the landfill and drain into a collection pond, at a rate of 312 gallons per minute.  It is then 
transported to an on-site processing plant where it is chemically treated like sewage or 
wastewater.  It will continue to flow through the soils, settling ever further down due to gravity, 
until 2030 or later.  Methane gas capture is also done through embedded pipes in the landfill and 
processed at an on-site plant.  The gas is collected and then sent directly to National Grid, the 
British multinational electricity and gas utility that services much of the northeastern U.S., who 
pays the city about $10 million for the methane per year.  The gas heats about 20,000 Staten 
Island homes and the yearly profits are placed in the city’s General Fund.362  Modulating 
methane emissions is a delicate process, for if the methane is not properly monitored, 
underground fires can ignite and rage in the buried trash.  The methane emissions at Fresh Kills 
will continue at this rate for about a dozen more years, after which the methane will still need 
monitoring but will be less hazardous.   
The other crucial part of the protections against toxicity is the trash covering system, 
comprised of layers of soils, geotextiles, and thick, impermeable plastic.  While the trash in the 
four mounds of the landfill continue to decompose, the size of the mounds will barely change, 
since they are capped with several feet of plastic barriers and soil.  However, when Fresh Kills 
was first operating, none of these techniques were in place, including liners installed before the 
trash arrived.  Without them, and being located in a tide marsh, the garbage buried at Fresh Kills 
absorbs huge levels of moisture, open to the soil surrounding it; it is not a closed system, despite 
the fact that the clay soil below the trash has some sealing effect.363  More modern sanitary 
features were installed later, but neighbors and city officials believed residents had already been 
exposed to toxicity.  In 1995, an extensive emissions study confirmed that the landfill released 
more than a hundred organic chemicals into the air, while general landfill operations (driving, 
sorting) were also found to stir up dusts that contained metals and other toxins.  The landfill will 
continue to release organic chemicals, pollutants, and metals for years, until the decaying 
processes for all things buried is over. 
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 The first reclamation of Fresh Kills, in the words of Robert Moses, was of the wetlands 
themselves, by garbage.  Landfill was going to take the marshes and make them usable for post-
World War II urban development.  While Moses may not have envisioned as vast a heap of trash 
as Fresh Kills became, the goal was to fill the streams and watery passages of the marsh to create 
solid, buildable land, just as was done in Lower Manhattan and eastern Queens.  The Twin 
Towers were built on a landfill as well, after all.  During its fifty years of operation, what was 
deemed essential to the city was a place to send its trash, cheaply.  What is essential to the city 
and its residents has shifted, since New Yorkers can now count on the city to ship its trash away.  
Thus, the Freshkills Park project is not only physically ambitious but politically fraught, with its 
presumption that the city’s garbage will be rerouted elsewhere, somehow and at whatever cost.  
The burden of that political decision has thus far been placed squarely on Giuliani and 
Bloomberg, the mayors helming the decisions to both close the landfill and determine trash 
alternatives.  Yet the park itself is also burdened with those realities, a complicity in neoliberal 
post-industrialization and rhetorics of nature as a public good with externalized costs.  
 The stigma of the landfill-as-cesspool perpetually hangs over Fresh Kills as it transitions 
to park, with ambiguous healing framing the process.  The Freshkills Park newsletter writes that, 
“What was once an eyesore and source of smell and stigma is now becoming a diverse and 
spectacular landscape deserving of citywide and even global attention. … The massive 
undertaking is a global icon in terms of landfill reclamation.”364  In statements such as this, 
prevalent in official documents, the transformation from stigma to icon is emphasized, before the 
park has been open to the public or experienced on any meaningful level by the people in a 
position to determine whether the stigma of their zip codes – Staten Islanders – has softened.  
Similarly, cultural commentaries often raise issue of healing, but the questions of healing from 
what, as well as how such healing will actually occur with the material existence of a park, are 
left open.  There are gestures that point to the landfill as a symbol of the injustice of an 
industrial, consumerist-driven economy, but they offer the park as a corrective for 
industrialization, when the relationship between industrialization and the park conversion is more 
complex.365  Yet, they often culminate in ambiguous statements claiming that as the park is 
completed, its reclamation “will continue to mark an era of healing and inspiration for Staten 
Islanders and New Yorkers, standing as a beautiful monument to restoration and ecological 
adaptation, a symbol of our collective ability to learn from our past and move beyond a status 
quo and towards a more sustainable ideal.”366  Similarly, Staten Island Borough President James 
Molinaro, in the master plan design, says that “Staten Islanders can finally exhale and vacate 
from within all those remaining pent-up fears – large and small, real and imagined, from the 
personal to the community-based – that for two generations both defined and stigmatized Staten 
Island to the nation and the world as someplace you did not want to be in or even near.”367  The 
confidence in the conversion and its ability to release residents from the suffering the landfill 
generated is unequivocal, and the conviction of its champions in fact suggest that Staten 
Islanders have perhaps already been released from the fearful thrall of the trash mounds. 
 The indistinct quality of the healing and repair to be done is further enhanced when one 
also considers the healing sought by the mourners of those who died on 9/11, as well as the lack 
                                                
364 Fresh Perspectives: Freshkills Park Newsletter, City of New York Parks and Recreation: Summer/Fall 2011, 1-2. 
365 Elizabeth Monoian and Robert Ferry, “Introduction: Regenerative Infrastructures,” ed. Caroline Klein, 
Regenerative Infrastructures: Freshkills Park, NYC, Land Art Generator Initiative (Prestel: Munich, 2013).  
366 Ibid., 24. 
367 James Corner Field Operations, “Draft Master Plan.”  
 97 
of satisfaction that promises of a park, or even a memorial, yield.  The many valences of repair 
that are present at the Fresh Kills site are grouped into a burden of its history and notoriety, both 
as a dumping ground and sorting ground.  In a front page article marking the tenth anniversary of 
the landfill’s closure, the Freshkills Park newsletter, published by the city Parks Department, 
does not once mention 9/11 sorting operations over a three-page span.  A timeline accompanying 
the article marks the year 2001 with “Last barge of trash delivered; international design 
competition for park design held.”368  The absence of 9/11 is noteworthy as the landfill is 
converted, an enormous task mobilizing many cities and federal resources that is elided in this 
official celebration.   
 Jani Scandura theorizes depressive American modernity through the figure of the dump, 
arguing that an affective component of late-modern Americanism – a depressive affect – reveals 
itself when capitalism, individualism, democracy, and secularism – “the axioms of American 
culture and progressive modernity itself” – are questioned.369  The Fresh Kills landfill offers a 
catalyst for such revelation of depressive affect, both in its crystallization-through-putrefication 
of modernity’s excesses, as well as the unfortunate coincidence that it was the sole site in New 
York City that was large and unfettered enough to sort WTC debris.  The stigma of the landfill 
extends to the city, not just Staten Island, in consideration of these facts and their depressive 
quality.  In light of this, the celebration of Freshkills Park is new promise of the future of 
American modernity itself, resting in attracting the next generation of New Yorkers.370   
Post-millennial planning in cities around the world has rested in such regenerative design 
principals as those promoted at Freshkills Park.  Bloomberg’s pet project, PlaNYC 2030, a 
“sustainability and resiliency blueprint” for the city, was set up in 2007 to address long-term 
infrastructure, economic, and climate challenges for the city.  The initiative is advertised 
prominently in the city, in subways and bus stops, and Fresh Kills well-represents its notions of 
large-scale regenerative design.  An emphasis on lifestyle and “greening” promises a purification 
of contemporary ways of living, both in PlaNYC 2030 and at the park itself. 
 
Financing the conversion 
 Creating this “new nature lifestyle island” faces many technical challenges, not least of 
which is financing.371  The Freshkills Park Alliance has been tasked with fundraising, mostly 
from private donors.  City funds have also been put into the park project.  $420 million in DSNY 
funds were required for closure and post-closure costs, and about $100 million in city funds are 
needed to complete Phase I of the park build-out, after fundraising.  The final price tag on the 
park will exceed $1 billion.  It will also require financial and political commitment, in light of its 
extended timeline to completion. Once completed, operating costs are expected to be at least $33 
million per year, at a site that cannot support residential development and only very little 
commercial development to subsidize such costs.372  Methane harvesting currently brings a few 
million dollars to the city, but those profits will cease in another dozen or so years.   
 With such a broad expanse, public art has gained a notable role at the site.  The Land Art 
Generator Initiative (LAGI) is proposing permanent works of art at the park that can generate 
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economic stimulus benefits.  It notes that “the capacity of public artwork (especially large-scale 
and high-profile works) to increase economic activity is also well documented,” citing Olafur 
Eliasson’s “NYC Waterfalls.”373  Eliasson’s piece cost $15.5 million to install, financed by 
private donors, and brought in about $53 million in spending from visitors who came to see it 
during its four-month installation.  It averaged to an extra $483,000 per day to Manhattan 
businesses for those four months.  Such public art that is privately funded is an engine of 
neoliberal economic growth, and its anticipated role in Freshkills Park aligns with the recent 
activities taking place in New York City public spaces (see Chapter 3).  How such initiatives will 
stimulate potential finance for the park, let alone for local businesses, as it is relatively isolated 
from any commercial districts, is yet unclear.    
 At the same time, in comparison with the National September 11 memorial and museum, 
as well as 1 WTC, the conversion of the landfill is significantly less costly, even with the costs of 
closing the landfill (about $1 billion for plastic encapsulation, cleaning venting gases, and 
collecting leachate).  Yet it remains a sizeable capital infusion in the service of public space. 
 
The design: Lifescape 
The official Freshkills Park tour guide brochure does not shy away from the site’s former 
landfill status, noting that it “ was once the world’s biggest landfill – an emblem of wastefulness, 
excess and environmental neglect. Its transformation into a productive and beautiful cultural 
destination will make the park a symbol of renewal and an expression of how our society can 
restore balance to its landscape.”374  Such embracing of the landfill emphasizes the 
transformation that produces the magnificence of the state; in literally overcoming garbage and 
producing a memorial and ordered nature for public benefit, the ethical state is produced.  The 
brochure notes that the park plan is, accordingly, mission driven, with programming that 
emphasizes “a renewed public concern for our human impact on the earth.”375  However, a 
common critique of the six final designs for the park, as well as the one chosen – “Lifescape” by 
James Corner Field Operations – is that the designs exhibit a silence around waste.376  The 
alienation they exhibit from the geographies they modify encapsulates the modern relationship to 
trash and where it goes. 
Of their winning Conceptual Design and Planning proposal, James Corner Field 
Operations writes,  
 
This lifescape is rendered ‘cultural’ to the degree that it is wholly effectuated through human 
agency – through design.  Lifescape is a design strategy that recognizes humanity as a 
symbiotically evolving, globally interconnected, and technologically enhanced system.  
Ecological reflection, passive recreation, active sports and exercise, creativity, performance and 
cultural events, community development, economic enhancement and neighborhood revitalization 
all take their place alongside the micro-macroscopic processes of lifescape.  It is fully integrative.  
Lifescape is not a loose metaphor or representation – it is a functioning reality, an autopoietic 
agent.377 
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Due to the sheer size of the park, as well as its technical demands, Corner says that “Rather than 
choose between French and English landscaping – rather than designing a grand composition – 
we designed a method.”378  His model of landscape urbanism means reclaiming and recycling the 
landfill, and among the finalists, his team’s design emphasized the role of the four trash mounds.  
In the case of “Lifescape,” the trash mounds are the crucial sites of views and vistas that would 
entice people to travel the three or four hours it would take to get to the park from the furthest 
places in the city.  The autopoiesis of the site is less clear, or in the least completely projected, as 
the site is utterly impossible to maintain without an extensive network of city and nonprofit 
agencies, as we have seen.  What else does this autopoietic quality refer to?  When the lifescape 
strategy emphasizes the global interconnection, technological enhancement, and constant 
evolution of humanity, it can be seen as qualifying the neoliberal, “global” city and its 
reproduction of ideologies of ecologically-reflective living: autopoietically linking state, capital, 
and nature in a cycle of creative destruction of the landscape of Fresh Kills. 
Similarly to the High Line, the other big New York City park designed by James Corner 
Field Operations, Freshkills Park does not have typical park infrastructure.379  Schmul Park was 
its first complete project at Freshkills, which opened to the public on October 4, 2012 with a 
ribbon-cutting ceremony.  Park representatives say that it “sends a strong message about the 
principles underlying Freshkills Park as a whole.  It is first and foremost about the local 
community – a community no longer forced to contend with the world’s largest landfill in their 
backyards, and a community that can play an active role in the stewardship of Freshkills Park.  
But it’s also an opportunity to showcase creative, sustainable design solutions.”380  While 
acknowledging the Staten Islanders that have lived side-by-side with the landfill for decades as 
“first and foremost,” the other opportunity it presents – to showcase sustainable solutions to a 
ambiguous design projects – neutralizes the trauma that it simultaneously calls up. 
 
 
Layers of modernity 
 
On March 22, 2011, DSNY and the Parks Department came together to celebrate the 
tenth anniversary of the last barge of waste’s deposit at the landfill.  The event was 
commemorated by a delivery of young oak trees via barge, which took the same water route as 
the last trash barge.  This shift from trash to trees is illustrative of the greening coloring highly 
visible city projects today, not least of which include 1 WTC and the 9/11 memorial, whose 
constructions are frequently framed as sustainable and LEED-certified.  The Freshkills Park 
Alliance’s slogan – “Recycling the land, revealing the future” – encapsulates the green 
modernity its champions foresee for the site but could fit the projects at the WTC just as well.  
Recycling the land happens both in a traditionally ecological sense, at Fresh Kills, but the 
creative destruction of the built environment engages a similar practice. 
At Freshkills Park, such green modernity is the backbone of the rhetoric of transforming 
and “turning into.”  The park is an example of neoliberal waste reprocessing, engineering and 
developing waste into leisure and recreation.   As the material mechanisms of these processes 
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continue their work, the rhetoric defining them also runs apace.  The function of spatial 
transformation and the rhetorical power of it, I argue, are harnessed for neutralizing trauma at the 
site, by asserting that the legacies of industrial activity are blighted in a way that its future is not.   
 There are two layers of green modernity expressed at the site – the harvesting of methane 
waste and cultivation of modern leisure rooted in ideas of nature and parks.  The latter resides in 
a centuries-old idea of sublime American nature, linked to Western expansionism and even 
earlier transplantations of pastoral English gardens.  The notion of “monumental forms fading 
into an immense space” conjures frontiers and sublimity.381  Yet the history of Fresh Kills bears a 
different relationship to the land, one of putrescence and death that has been capped with a green 
– in both senses of the word – veneer of plastic and soil.  The re-visioning of the site is as a park, 
but why is this the case?  If the land was to gain a different public purpose, and the land can be 
restored to habitability, why choose a park?  The park, in the case of Freshkills, is a symbol of 
redemption, purification, and healing, but is it the best use of space in New York City?   
 The site contains all of New York City in its trash, an urban social identity made even 
more powerful by the incorporation of 9/11 debris.  It is also a testament to the activities of 
sustaining, building, and re-building capital.  The legacies of industrial activity throughout the 
country are contamination and dereliction, brownfields where redevelopment is complicated by 
perceived contamination or actual pollution.  However, the municipal landfill has a different 
relationship to space and real estate than other brownfield sites – it is separated and neglected, 
despite being a part of New York City.  This is partly due to its water features, its marshes, and 
the roadways separating it from neighboring areas, but it is especially due to its massive amount 
of garbage.  In 1936, Flushing Meadows Corona Park was created from the Corona Ash Dumps, 
another urban landfill, but its contents were different, as are its sizes – Fresh Kills not only 
houses trash, but it is gigantic.  Accordingly, similar to the WTC reconstruction, nothing has 
been easy or quick about the Fresh Kills project.   
 Another process of creative destruction is happening in the conversion of Fresh Kills.  
Scars of industry and capital at the site are greened over and made consumable, yet they haven’t 
been obviated.  The process of mining for intimate traces amid the WTC debris and its unsettled 
aftermath leaves those involved with the knowledge that those traces remain still, as recounted 
earlier in this chapter.  As the city’s medical examiner Charles Hirsch says, it is “virtually certain 
that at least some human tissue is mixed with the dirt at the Staten Island landfill.”382  In the 
weeks after 9/11, Giuliani announced that every family would receive something from the site, 
saying that he hoped remains would be recovered but, regardless, “we [would] give every family 
something from the World Trade Center, from the soil, from the ground, so that they can take it 
with them.”383  Such a promise swelled the value of the WTC soil; it would do if bodily remains 
or personal affects couldn’t be found.  The soil itself was sacralized.  Yet at Fresh Kills, such 
soil, transplanted, loses its value as an object of mourning for the state.  The lost remains, whose 
traces are present but unavailable to the families, are objects that induce mourning; the hope is 
that their symbolic recovery and transplantation can close the work of mourning.384 
In fact, the production of any of these traces – from credit cards to key chains – has been 
a source of comfort for families, a generation of structure and solidity in the path toward 
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mourning.  The struggle for a formal acknowledgment of these traces in a dedicated site of 
mourning like a cemetery brings the park and what it is shaping into – something resembling 
what Marc Augé calls a non-place of supermodernity – reflects the issues of memory and state 
reconstructions in the city more broadly.  Once a way-station for the other objects that construct 
modernity for us, Fresh Kills is now a place formed in relations to the ends of consumption and 
leisure.  No longer a landscape mentally externalized from the physical interior of “New York 
City,” Fresh Kills (and the borough of Staten Island) are vying for recognition through its 
“greening.”  Its mixture of absence and possibility, and vacancy and freedom, however, has 
always existed.  It is engineered into a new form, but still toward a modern end of organized 
space. 
Modernist planning separated functions into discrete spaces in an attempt to avoid 
conflicts of use, as well as conflicts of meaning.  Combating that sterility requires the layering 
and intertwining of features and functions. In the case of the park, there is no fictionally 
untouched nature.385  James Corner himself notes that the invocation of a cultural image of 
“nature” – mostly represented by softly undulating pastoral scenes, is “generally considered 
virtuous, benevolent, and soothing, a moral as well as practical antidote to the corrosive 
environmental and social qualities of the modern city.  This landscape is the city’s ‘other,’ its 
essential complement drawn from a nature outside of and excluding building, technology, and 
infrastructure.”386  It seems that he is attempting to work past the idea of a purely natural 
ecology, integrating a more fluid notion of ecology with landscape urbanism: what the proposal 
calls a “precise openness.”  The ecologies of money, infrastructure, and people are systems he 
claims are integrated into the design of “Lifescape.”387  Such a stance is perhaps necessary, or 
inevitable, when dealing with a site that houses an actively decaying landfill – a landfill that 
requires the intervention of DSNY for at least three more decades.  Unlike the array of corporate 
possibilities available at other sites of New York City rebuilding, Freshkills Park is only just 
losing its quality as a no-man’s land – meaning, a land unsuitable for corporate redevelopment.  
The design of the park is an opportunity to consider how the landfill was a dangerous, failed 
project, echoing the fiscal crises of New York City past.  Calling up the landfill’s failure in the 
design of the park is a way to force visitors’ consideration of dumping practices, re-evaluating 
waste management’s stigma on nearly every front, from creation to collecting.  Yet the design 
elements of “Lifescape” stylize the dump, from the huge bulldozer located near the park 
entrance, a sign directing visitors hanging jauntily from the its jaws, to the streamlined mound-
shaped forms of not only the actual trash mounds-come-scenic viewpoints themselves, but other 
park features, like the playground at Schmul Park. 
 Parks Department Commissioner Adrian Benepe expressed his vision for the park as 
“having unparalleled vistas and recreational experiences, with lessons to teach about waste and 
reuse, the capacity to demonstrate new strategies for reclaiming land and renewable energy, and 
a new model for 21st century parks.”388 These vistas from the tops of mountains of trash offer the 
unique experience of looking at Manhattan from a collection of its past waste, serving as a 
warning about the toxicity of our past.  The toxicity of our present is elided by the design and 
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city agencies’ emphasis on crafting the site’s identity as a locus of sustainable land management 
practices, renewable energy, and public art and engagement.389  The positioning of innovation as 
a hallmark of Freshkills Park forgets the destructive, negligent use of the landfill when it wasn’t 
fiscally viable for the city to find more innovative solutions.  I argue that the highlighting of 
methane waste reuse is a concrete, common example of the rhetoric of environmentalism at the 
park, but it is also part of the erasing of the political – specifically, memorial – issues of bodily 
remains at the site. 
 The successful futurity put forward by Freshkills Park remains haunted by the garbage 
and ash beneath its green, a landscape that is a palimpsest of traumas.  As Marshall Berman 
reminded us in 1982, everything capitalist society builds is built to be torn down; Fresh Kills 
landfill was built and, in its case, tamped down under a plastic capsule and dirt.  The debris of 
neoliberal New York City has been effectively erased at Freshkills Park, yet the destruction of 
space there – both the ecological damage and the historical erasure of memory – remains 
palpable if one looks long enough.  The destruction has an ongoing presence, hidden beneath the 
surface both materially, in the case of trash, and politically, with the decisions of the state 
dictating the possibilities of memory and mourning for its citizens. 
Once, the landfill at Fresh Kills was a direct counterpoint to the Twin Towers standing 
across the water.  The latter were monuments to progressive modernity and neoliberal economy, 
while the former, though equally towering, was its fallout – an estranged, alienated twin.  The 
landfill was emblematic of neoliberal neglect, mass consumption, and social inequality and the 
park is attempting to rework this story.  Yet now, with the site’s ongoing transformation into 
Freshkills Park, the site aspires to overcome the weighty materiality of garbage, as well as 
overcome the brutal materiality of persisting WTC remains.  Memorialization of those remains, 
mingled with the landfill, is necessary to make the ethical state.  However, both human remains 
and human garbage – ashes and dirt – have the status of “remains.”  It unites them and it is why 
the memorialization of 9/11 at the park ultimately remains incomplete.  As a park, the site retains 
an uncanny sense of the landfill it was and the issues it currently faces, including the question of 
9/11 families seeking the ashes of their deceased relatives, continue to estrange it from the 
qualities of transparency, openness, and green modernity it espouses.390  It remains haunted by 
this uncanny estrangement as the simultaneous process of recuperating and reinvigorating 
modernity at Fresh Kills continues.   
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    CONCLUSION  Burial Grounds 
 
    Ruins: places haunted by the living who inhabit them.391 
 
 
In a world thoroughly saturated with the material expressions of capital flows, do 
examples exist which successfully honor memory?  Freighted with economic and political 
interests and conflicts, as we have seen with 1 WTC, the National September 11 Memorial and 
Museum, and Freshkills Park, these material expressions serve multiple purposes for the 
capitalist U.S. state.  This dissertation has focused on the state’s use of these projects to assert its 
ethical position.  The use of public funds to build office towers and memorials, all under the 
auspices of public good, is a strategy for reinforcing the state’s legitimacy, with construction and 
memorialization emerging as techniques of publicly displaying the state’s relative autonomy 
from corporate capital interests.  In these cases, the cultivation of public memory by the state 
corresponds to the needs of the productive forces of capitalist development: what Gramsci calls 
the ethical state.  
 The question of remembering the past is a pressing one in the U.S. and globally as 
neoliberal capital flows grow ever-faster, American consumption of fossil fuels require ever-
more ravaging of landscapes, and rapid technological change speeds the turnover of existing 
capital investment.  The destruction wrought by urban growth and decay – itself generated by 
forces like war, ecological disaster, and incredible income equality – inevitably brings loss with 
it.  Such loss demands memorialization, often by affected communities and, sometimes, the state.  
The cases of memorialization in this dissertation have focused on the state’s inclination to 
memorialize, but the possibilities of cultivating memorialization are also capable of generating a 
public memory that is outside the reach of the state, materially and symbolically.  In her reading 
of Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades Project, Susan Buck-Morss writes that “The ruin … is the 
form in which the wish images of the past century appear, as rubble, in the present.  But it refers 
also to the loosened building blocks (both semantic and material) out of which a new order can 
be constructed.”392  The wish-image of the past is a generative ruin that can provide a 
revolutionary moment, the seizure of which represents a moment of dialectical seeing.  Only by 
grasping the past, or ruin, that is itself inhabiting the present can future change occur.  
Benjamin’s fundamental insight, as framed by Buck-Morss, is simultaneously simple and far-
reaching: one can only understand the present and imagine the future by excavating and 
interpreting the ruinous layers of the past.  Progress is a phantasmagoric concept one must 
eschew, as it is not a moving forward but rather an eternal repetition of the same ‘new,’ a 
catastrophic norm.   
At the new WTC site and Fresh Kills, progress has been the dominant refrain throughout 
the planning and construction of the new projects.  Such a refrain, along with the built fabric 
itself, has served to stabilize the gaze of those at the sites, mediating their visions and 
remembrances.  But, as Buck-Morss and Benjamin offer, it is the instability of remembrance that 
offers a path toward generating something truly new and revolutionary – that is, a public memory 
outside state hegemony. Speaking about Ground Zero in 2004, New York urbanist Jane Jacobs 
noted that, “‘The significance of that site now is that we don’t know what its significance is … 
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We’ll know in fifteen or twenty years.’”393  Recognition of the ambiguity and instability of place 
allows for an active engagement with the site and its history, while the rush to build memorials 
can lead to the “supplanting [of] a community’s memory-work with [the memorial’s] own 
material form.”394  Memorials have a tendency to serve as a ‘final solution’ to the issue of 
memory, a divestment from the obligation to remember for oneself and in multiple ways. 
The instability and difficulty of the present state of affairs of memory in New York City 
persist, as do efforts to stabilize and organize memory.  Yet sometimes memorialization itself 
becomes a political demand.  While this dissertation has shown that memorialization is a practice 
the state exercises to generate an ethical stance that reproduces the state’s legitimacy, other sites 
in New York City suggest that state memorialization can also be a political demand in service of 
community-based memory.  While such political demands by family members for a burial 
ground outside the Fresh Kills site were denied, a site in a Harlem has yielded state recognition 
through similar political demands by its local community. 
In 2008, after work began to replace the Willis Avenue Bridge connecting Harlem to the 
Bronx, the history of an adjacent African burial ground re-emerged.  The Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (MTA) was planning to rebuild and expand its East Harlem bus terminal – on top of 
the burial ground – once work to replace the neighboring bridge was complete.  Projected to start 
in 2015, the bus depot expansion has since been cancelled, with community efforts to block it 
serving as the primary motivating factor.       
The present bus depot is paved over a quarter-acre burial ground dating back to 1665.  
When the land was sold for development in the 1870s, white bodies were disinterred and 
reburied elsewhere.  Black bodies, of freed and enslaved Africans, remained and have been 
repeatedly built over – raising concern that the burial ground could be lost or forgotten forever.  
A community gathering at the present location of the Elmendorf Reformed Church – the 
contemporary incarnation of Harlem’s oldest church organization, which was the original 
steward of the burial ground – persuaded the MTA to set up an archaeological study, which said 
that it is unlikely that there are bodies where the proposed depot expansion would be. No human 
remains have yet been found by New York City Department of Transportation (DOT) workers 
rebuilding the Willis Avenue Bridge, east of the burial ground.  In 2009, the Harlem African 
Burial Ground Task Force (HABGTF) was formed by community members to seek historic 
designation for the burial ground as well as some kind of museum or cultural center on or near 
the site that would exhibit documents and artifacts from colonial-era Harlem.395   
  The burial ground is significant to local and national history and memory, and for the 
effects its ruins, visible or not, have had – and continue to have – on the surrounding 
environment.  As a nation with a relatively recent history of slavery, the U.S. continues to 
struggle with its legacy, with much higher rates of incarceration and poverty among slavery’s 
descendants.  The burial ground’s location in Harlem is uniquely significant as a present-day hub 
of black-owned businesses and political activity.  Harlem has been a predominantly African-
American community since the early 1900s, becoming a locus of political, artistic, and economic 
movement after its first wave of African-American migration in 1904.  Despite periods of 
gentrification and an influx of African immigrants, including those most recently that have 
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brought rapid and noticeable changes to the material and cultural texture of the area, it has 
retained a majority African-American population.  The preservation of an African burial ground 
in Harlem would further enrich the African-American cultural resources there amid city-wide 
gentrification and the particularly strong encroachment of rezoning and residential change in 
Harlem.396 
The Harlem site is not the first known African burial ground in New York City on which 
construction has been attempted.  A thirteen-year battle began in 1991 to halt the construction of 
a federal office building upon a then-newly-rediscovered burial ground in Lower Manhattan, at 
which an estimated 15,000 enslaved and free Africans were interred – the largest in the nation.  
The struggle over the site forced a construction shut-down there in 1993, but it was over a decade 
later that the site was commemorated by the state (as a National Monument, under the 
stewardship of the National Park Service), a length of time attributed by preservation activists to 
the lack of seriousness with which the cultural and historical importance of the burial ground was 
addressed by actors in charge of the building project.  This precursor to the struggle over the 
ground in Harlem is significant, for it both offers a successful precedent but also may have 
slowed the halting of the bus depot project since there is “already” an officially marked and 
claimed African burial ground downtown. 
The Harlem burial ground is one exhibit in this investigation of power, state, and 
economy.  The site itself drew me in, both as a location in my neighborhood and a place where 
historical memory, city governance, civic opinion, and infrastructural change were juxtaposed.  It 
is at present a paved lot with a large MTA garage-type construction on the northeastern edge of 
Manhattan, immediately surrounded by inter-borough bridges and a lone gas station.  That this 
was the site of an African burial ground is surprising, as isolated as it feels.  The physical 
qualities of the site, though not enticing in the typical fetishistic way of a place like New York’s 
Times Square, all flashing lights and corporate retail outlets, are uniform, unassuming, and 
apparently functional, serving the MTA, after all.   
I offer this site as an example of non-productive capital investment in a public work.  The 
bus depot does not promise any kind of future productivity, only a stimulus from the capital 
invested in it.  Simultaneously, the site it sits on harbors beneath it a cultural marker of 
importance to its community.  The burial ground is a tangible tie to one of history’s biggest 
crimes, a direct reflection of it, and its neglect can in turn be seen as a reflection of the 
irrelevancy to which slavery is reduced by public discourse.  Or perhaps the past – slavery in the 
U.S. – has nothing to do with these current processes at the bus depot and burial ground site.  
This dissertation has investigated the relation between historical ruins and public works and how 
it effects notions of inclusion and exclusion by the state, as it is doing in the case of Harlem.  In 
other words, what is so ethical about public works?  The overlapping sites of the MTA bus depot 
and the Harlem African burial ground bring into relief the problem in the relation between public 
works and ruins.  Each chapter of this dissertation has explored how state capital acts on New 
York City through the specific form of publicly-financed projects.  I conclude with this framing, 
but the Harlem African burial ground demands a further frame of attention, attuned to the elision 
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of historical legacies by contemporary transformations of New York City by neoliberal 
governance and finance. 
It has emerged that the WTC is also the site of buried African remains, complicating that 
site even more.  Both sites, Harlem and the WTC, share this aspect now, as well as being transit 
hubs (part of the WTC project is a new station for regional and local rail transit), publicly 
financed, and sites of commerce with long histories.  The WTC is much larger than the Harlem 
site, however, both in size, scale of projects, and public engagement with its construction 
processes.  Tourists are constantly visiting it and local residents are keeping close tabs on the 
activity at the site.  The Harlem site, on the other hand, is at the northeastern corner of 
Manhattan, edged by housing projects and bridges, uninviting to tourists.  Yet, the possibility of 
African remains at the WTC site remains nearly silent, while in Harlem the possibility has 
yielded much more historical preservation. 
Overlapping and intersecting with the capital projects of this dissertation are the elements 
of memory and violence – do works of construction combine with, overtake, or destroy the 
place-oriented memory that was there before, and is there violence in such workings of memory?  
The dissertation has explored what ideas of memory the capitalist state has generated, as well as 
how loss is engendered through the layering of fresh capital upon memory landscapes.  In this 
consideration of the Harlem African burial ground, race and histories of oppression explicitly 
figure in this story of capital in New York City.  The following pages explore what kind of 
narrative is being constructed by the planning process for the bus depot, and what kind of 
narrative is desirable – and what is irrelevant – for the state as it tries to improve public 
transportation, which at first glance appears to be an indisputable public good.  As Nadia Abu El-
Haj writes about Israeli archaeologists who choose what specific evidence will construct their 
historical narrative, usually in the service of decidedly contemporary goals, I investigate how the 
state is choosing to approach the burial ground.   
 Though the Harlem African burial ground is now going to be officially recognized and 
the bus depot will be retired, the state narrative that emerged prior to this decision was of the 
irrelevancy of the Harlem burial ground.  It was made irrelevant once by its first paving-over in 
1947 by the Third Avenue Railway (not affiliated with present-day MTA) to house trolley cars.  
Its memory has languished until the most recent announcement of plans to build on it, yet a move 
to reduce it irrelevancy once again was actively pursued by the MTA and the DOT.  While 
memory of the graveyard, and memory of its first loss, has continued among some of the 
inhabitants of Harlem, it was risked once again in this most recent project.  There is the loss and 
memory of the graveyard, memory of the loss, and finally a loss of the memory of the loss, an 
entire chain of degrees of memory that was threatened.   
Upon completion of this dissertation, the Harlem African burial ground site may undergo 
significant transformation into an unearthed site of memory.  The MTA will be forced to look for 
a new place to keep its busses.  A commemorative plaque may be embedded in the burial ground 
site for the first time.  A park or community center may grow from the depot itself.  No matter 
which outcome it faces, the struggles between the imperative to recognize the traumas and 
history represented by the burial ground and the dogged plan to invest in an updated bus depot 
offers insight into the state’s political logic and domestic economic goals, and it allows us to 
further consider the value of material remains in the process of memory and state sanction of it. 
 
The remains of enslaved labor in the Empire City 
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The Harlem African burial ground lies at the site of the first building of Harlem’s oldest 
church organization, now known as the Elmendorf Reformed Church.  Where the Willis Avenue 
Bridge meets First Avenue, the site is the end point of Dutch Governor Peter Stuyvesant’s “road 
to New Harlem,” a 10-mile length running from Lower Manhattan.  Constructed in 1658 by 
enslaved African workers, those slaves are still buried under the bus depot currently occupying 
the site, according to historians and archaeologists.   
The colonial village of New Amsterdam was established in 1625 in Lower Manhattan.  It 
was built to be a multinational trading post, with merchants primarily from Holland but also from 
England, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany and Scandinavia, and African slaves owned by the 
Dutch West India Company labored to expand the colony northward.  In 1636, Harlem was 
founded, initially established as Nieuw Haarlem, a name honoring the Dutch town of Haarlem 
that was nearly destroyed in the late 16th century by Spain and meant to reflect the danger of 
settling in Upper Manhattan, an outpost vulnerable to Native American and English attacks.  One 
in four Harlem residents was black at its founding and slaves had cleared much of the land for 
homes and farms, as well as widened a Lenape Indian trail to create what is now Broadway.397  
During the era of Dutch and Indian war, some slaves were freed or granted farmland.  Others 
continued enslaved, laboring to build the city and its infrastructure, including a wall spanning the 
width of Lower Manhattan in 1653, which would later become Wall Street.   
In 1660, two years after a permanent settlement was established in Harlem, the First 
Dutch Church was founded on the banks of the Harlem River, in a small wooden building.  A 
few years later, a stone church was built nearby and the First Dutch Church’s original site 
became the community’s “negro burying ground,” for African slaves and free blacks.398  The 
church’s main cemetery was for whites only, and it was also known as “God’s Acre.”  The negro 
burying ground remained open until as late as 1845.  Over three centuries, the First Dutch 
Church became the Dutch Reformed Church and finally the Elmendorf Reformed Church, 
occupying seven buildings at three sites in Harlem.  The first is at the current location of the bus 
depot, 126th Street and First Avenue. 
Slavery ended in New York City in 1827, and free black squatters were tolerated in the 
rocky, nearly unlivable rocky outcroppings of Upper Manhattan.  Harlem’s population grew 
rapidly after 1850, with an influx of European immigrants.  This influx led the First Dutch 
Church to leave its East Harlem location and move west.  It left a small chapel at 121st Street, 
which became used by African-Americans.  The First Dutch Church also sold “the property 
known as the Negro Burying Ground” to the highest bidder in 1853, with landfill soon after 
covering the cemetery.399  “God’s Acre,” where whites were buried, was also sold in the 1870s, 
but its bodies were disinterred and moved to a plot in the Bronx’s Woodlawn Cemetery in 
1869.400  Black remains were left in the same place, and they were to be repeatedly built over.  
The MTA bus depot was built on the site in 1947 and the remains were all but forgotten.  The 
repetition of forgetting and further defiling of the site spurred community leaders to mobilize a 
preservation movement.   
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The work of the Harlem African Burial Ground Task Force 
In 2009, the Elmendorf Reformed Church and its pastor, Reverend Patricia Singletary, 
began the work of bringing the Harlem African burial ground back into public consciousness, 
both to commemorate Harlem history and preserve the burial ground as “the birthplace of 
Harlem”401 and, according to Singletary, the “beginning of Harlem’s existence.”402  Organized 
around the threat to the burial ground by the work on the Willis Avenue Bridge and the MTA’s 
plans to rebuild the depot in 2015, Singletary and community members – including church 
elders, scholars, historical preservationists, filmmakers, students, and many others – formed the 
Harlem African Burial Ground Task Force (HABGTF).  Upon pressure from the HABGTF 
insisting on the presence of the burial ground, the DOT hired an archaeology firm to evaluate 
and help them “understand” the area around the Willis Avenue Bridge construction site.  In its 
report that firm argued that it is unlikely there are human remains or cultural artifacts left at the 
site of burial ground, due to the repeated building over the area.  Whether this holds true for the 
bus depot remains to be seen, as excavation at that site hasn’t yet begun.   
During a public hearing held on March 19, 2010, the Deputy Commissioner for Historic 
Preservation at the New York State Parks Department conceded that although the possibility that 
grave-sites had been disturbed over the years ordinarily precludes designation on the National 
Register of Historic Places, the extraordinary significance of the Harlem ground meant that it 
was possible to argue that notable history overrode issues of material integrity.  One senator 
replied that “even if due to earlier construction, there are no remains there at all, they were there, 
so the burial ground should be landmarked anyway.”403  Despite the blocks of gray concrete on 
and surrounding the burial ground, its ruins remain a locus of memory and historical and 
emotional resonance for local residents and have the potential to reach more people if it is 
uncovered, even if not physically, at least rhetorically – marked as such.  As journalist and 
Harlem historian Michael Henry Adams writes, “the most poignant historic resources are not 
necessarily those with the greatest visibility or renown” and the “invisible landmark” of the 
burial ground remains a landmark nonetheless.404 
In May 2013 the DOT confirmed plans to add a Nieuw Haarlem Interpretive Plaque to 
the reconstructed Willis Avenue Bridge.  The last in a set of four, the plaque is comprised of text 
written by the DOT’s historical consultants and the other agencies with jurisdiction over the 
bridge, including the MTA.  “Community-recommended language” was also added.405  The 
plaque features six paragraphs, three on Nieuw Haarlem’s history and three on the African burial 
ground through the 1700s to mid-1800s.  The DOT plaque gives name to the burial ground, 
noting its historical presence, if not its contemporary physical one.  Yet as church elder Deborah 
Gibson says, “I need to be able to go to Harlem's African Burial Ground, to see it and to touch it, 
with my grand children, so that I can teach them about the lives and deaths of their ancestors. I 
need to do this for them and to remember our people, and a mere plaque, will not do!”406   
The MTA has similarly confirmed the burial ground’s existence, with the resources of the 
HABGTF and church records.  In January 2014, it was announced that the MTA would shut 
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down its East Harlem bus depot.  The facility is home to the city’s busiest bus route, the M15 
that travels Second Avenue in Manhattan, and the building on the site occupies 104,000 square 
feet.  An official with the Transport Workers Union Local 100 calls the closing of the depot 
“impractical” and says that it will “disrupt service,” advocating for a monument to be put up 
instead.407  The closure of the depot is set for January 5, 2015 and a slave memorial will be 
developed at the site, as well as possible residential development.  After the depot’s closure, the 
site will go from MTA control to the city.  City Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito, whose 
district includes East Harlem, says, “This is an incredible opportunity …. We’ve already started 
to work on [the memorial] … Residential is a thought, but it has to be done in a respectful 
way.”408  The head of the City Council’s Land Use Committee, David Greenfield, on the other 
hand, says it’s still early to figure out what will be done at the site.  The land’s value is difficult 
to determine, but similar parcels have doubled in price over the past two years, according to East 
Harlem realtors, who also note that “Any vacant land in Harlem is a hot commodity now.”409  
The day after the announcement was published in the New York Post, it was picked up by The 
Real Deal, a website for New York City real estate news, which simply noted the potential 
residential conversion.   
 Before any construction on the memorial or housing, an excavation of the bus depot 
needs to take place.  While Mark-Viverito says that the MTA will help with the excavation, the 
agency itself has declined to make any announcements on its plans for the depot, other than its 
closure.  Yet what has drawn the HABGTF and city residents to this graveyard remains 
intangible – the fact that an African slave’s bones once inhabited this ground, whether those 
bones remain or not. 
 Reasons to commemorate the burial ground and create a cultural center of some kind, 
even without the presence of remains, have been offered by the HABGTF in response to various 
queries, primarily from city public authorities like the MTA and DOT, that implicitly ask the 
HABGTF to justify their demands.  Most basically, the fact that remains have not yet emerged 
from the site adjacent to the Willis Avenue Bridge does not mean they will not turn up at a later 
date, as they did in the case of the Lower Manhattan African burial ground.  Historical records of 
excavations and their depths are not always accurately descriptive.  This is particularly true 
because of the prevalence of landfill throughout Manhattan; areas get filled and then excavation 
does not always extend beyond the fill.  In Manhattan’s Washington Square, once a potter’s 
field, all bodies were thought to be disinterred in the 1840s but several were found during the 
construction of the square’s arch in 1895.  As the HABGTF asserts, one cannot be sure what 
remains and what doesn’t, so it is important to take steps to preserve history before it is erased 
completely.  
  
African remains in Lower Manhattan  
One of very few remaining African-American historical sites from the colonial period, 
the Harlem African burial ground has likely gained in interest for the city in light of the 
discovery and preservation of the African burial ground in Lower Manhattan, now a National 
Monument maintained by the National Parks Service.  The earliest large African cemetery 
uncovered in North America, the burial ground was used by New York’s African population 
during the British colonial era.  Rediscovered in 1991 when construction began on a new federal 
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office tower, federal officials decided that archaeology of the site would take precedence over 
the construction.410  This decision led to considerable political conflict when the government 
learned the excavation would take four months and cost $6 million in construction delays, and in 
turn decided to speed the excavation by using less painstaking methods and tools – such as dental 
pick and spoon – in favor of wide shovels.  Further methodological issues, including the use of 
out-of-date site drawings and maps, exacerbated conflict between the state and community 
activists.  By 1993, the site was declared a National Historic Landmark and in 2006, a National 
Monument.  The Lower Manhattan African burial ground helped focus attention on the many 
other cemeteries in New York City, resulting in an array of attempts to preserve them, with 
mixed results.411  Yet it also helped standardize archaeological testing procedures that allotted for 
the possibility of deeper-than-expected deposits, due to shifting land gradations caused by 
palimpsestic urban redevelopment.412   
After 9/11, during the excavation of Ground Zero, artifacts from the Lower Manhattan 
African burial ground were discovered.  Some 100 boxes of remains and personal effects were 
gathered, originally housed in a laboratory in 6 WTC, destroyed along with the Twin Towers.  
Activists and community groups expressed outrage at the General Services Administration, the 
agency in charge of reburying the remains of the burial ground, because the agency delayed the 
reburial, resulting in the damage and loss of remains on 9/11.413  The years-long struggle to gain 
recognition of the burial ground, followed by its 10-year excavation, identification, and sorting 
culminated in a loss once again.  The remaining remains were reburied at the site in 2003. 
The memorial competition for the Lower Manhattan burial ground announced a winning 
design in 2005.  It is a large reflective structure, with a circular libation court, a wall of 
remembrance, ancestral pillars, and an ancestral chamber, now fully constructed and open to the 
public.  One design supporter, Howard Dodson, Director of the Schomburg Center for Research 
in Black Culture, noted that “If there’s something there that’s physical and permanent, it would 
take a willful act of those who were opposed to it being recognized as a burial ground to take it 
away physically.”414  Yet even with the Lower Manhattan burial ground, community members 
and activists also felt that any structure on the site would be disturbing sacred ground, as we have 
also seen with other sites in this dissertation.   In the case of the Lower Manhattan burial ground, 
federal support was needed for the investigation of remains and access to land – these are not 
projects that could be undertaken privately.  Similarly, the smaller site in Harlem needs the city’s 
assistance, at a minimum.  Yet despite the state’s role as custodian of memory at all these sites, 
people with personal relationships to the sites have insisted on claiming a role in – or even the 
control of – the fate of bodily remains and their memorialization. Paralleling the ashes and their 
corporeal qualities at Fresh Kills in their invisible, absent presence, the African bodies act as 
loved ones, whose custodianship community, family, and ancestors are trying to claim back from 
the state.  When the state cedes that custodianship, it is an act of creative destruction – a ceding 
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of power that allows the state to take up another mantle of power, rooted in the political 
significance of the memory industry for it maintain any semblance of legitimacy. 
 Both burial grounds offer a different context of African and African-American histories 
in the city.  Black history has largely been excluded from the history of New York and New 
York City as it is taught in public schools, with slavery represented as a primarily Southern 
institution. Yet these remains have brought that representation into question.  African labor built 
the infrastructure of New York, with the number of enslaved people there exceeding that of 
every English colonial settlement except Charleston, SC.415  The sites illuminate contemporary 
injustice by bringing into stark relief the specific question of who controls black history.  
Preliminarily, at the Harlem site we are confronted with the state’s continuing power over that 
narrative, particularly its ability to decide whether that narrative takes precedence over other 
projects, particularly narratives of capital development and public good, which the bus depot and 
Willis Avenue Bridge represent in the state’s portrayals of itself.    
And now that people’s demands have yielded a halting of the MTA reconstruction, will a 
physical sign of commemoration offer resolution?  Will the problem of memory be solved by 
commemorative state construction?  Or might an effect of that kind of commemoration be to 
produce a particular space that transforms attempts to reclaim it?  And does such 
commemoration influence the production of knowledge in ways comparable to the state’s more 
typical construction projects?  Similar questions can be asked of the WTC site.  Have all the 
African remains at the site been discovered or rediscovered (most likely not), or will the fact of 
their former presence and current absence be acknowledged, perhaps eventually by a plaque 
added to the September 11th memorial plaza?   
 
Race, Nation, and the Legacy of Public Works 
Through this exploration of ruins, economy, and landscape, we may also learn something 
about the sacred.  Saidiya Hartman writes that she does not believe a slave fort is “sacred ground 
because terrible things transpired [there].  Brutality doesn’t make a place worthy of veneration.  
But I did believe that the gravity of what had happened required a degree of solemnity.”416  
When nothing ‘happened’ during her visit to the slave fort, she ends up noting that “Only later 
did I realize that there was nothing to see.  I hadn’t missed a thing.”417  Yet, the need for gravity 
remains.  What, then, makes a landscape sacred?  And why must such sites be preserved or 
commemorated even if there is ‘nothing to see’?  I suggest that it offers something between life 
and death, which is never present as such but must be engaged; Derrida calls this engagement a 
learning to live.  We may not know what do with these sites, but if they are abandoned, will we 
cease to be ourselves?  May the site of mourning, the sacred landscape, be a concrete point in the 
gap between truth and meaning, a point which offers stability in the ambiguities of meaning in 
mourning?  The invisibility of the African remains, the impossibility of ashes as bodies at Fresh 
Kills, and the elision of alternate ways of remembering at the September 11 memorial plaza, time 
and again, call up these ambiguities yet also retain the importance of materiality and place in the 
act of remembering and mourning loss. 
The state’s resistance to acknowledge for years, through physical commemoration, the 
African burial ground in Harlem, suggest to me that, for the state, the commemoration of an 
burial ground in Lower Manhattan is enough to reflect its responsibility to the legacy of slavery 
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and, more subtly, present-day racial inequality.  The monument there already serves as one space 
which interrupts our daily lives, and fulfills the neoliberal state’s obligation to bear witness to its 
past.  As states attempt to reconfigure scarred landscapes for politico-economic reasons, 
affinities between state reconstruction practices and the violence they purport to remedy emerge, 
with memorials and new constructions serving to erase or stabilize conflicting, or simply 
different, ideas of a place.  
Modernity is indicted by such discoveries as these burial grounds and the conflicts they 
raise over how to honor, and even recognize, remains and memory.  The construction of 
“progress” and public good that interferes with both the materiality and immateriality of memory 
recurs.  With privatization increasingly entering state projects of construction and 
commemoration, the meeting point of state and capital interests shifts in our time, with the 
state’s ethical and public commitment emerging as an uneasy point where state and capital 
interests meet.  What is happening in Harlem now, in the wake of the closure of the bus depot, 
the beginning of the memorialization process, and the potential opening of public land to (likely 
private) development is echoing what is taking place in the rest of the city.  The rise of condos 
and towers, rezoning that is spurring commercial development, and the displacement of long-
term residents haunt the city as sites of memory commemorating those displaced and dead 
continue to surface.  As Michel de Certeau tells us, the juxtaposition of historic relics and 
everyday rituals is what defines a haunted landscape, as it does in New York City’s many 
corners.  The state, as it tries to maintain a hold on these corners, sometimes partially succeeds 
but also reveals its own unstable legitimacy in its struggle to control ideas of public space and 
public memory. 
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